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ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT
The aim of the current programme of research was to determine if the IRAP, a recently 
developed methodology for the assessment of implicit cognition, is a useful measure of 
implicit racial bias in the Irish context. Over the course of a series of experiments, the 
research refined the IRAP and examined its relationship with various alternative attitudinal 
indices, including self-report measures and measures of behavioural intentions. In 
addition, the fifth experiment explored the predictive validity of the IRAP using known-
groups, while Experiment 6 investigated the relationship between neural activity, 
measured with electroencephalograms, and IRAP responses. In the final experiment, the 
malleability of IRAP performances, as a result of acceptance and education-based 
interventions, was investigated. Overall, the research reported in the current thesis 
provides support for the reliability and validity of the IRAP and suggests that it is a 
relatively robust measure that could be used in subsequent research in the study of implicit 
racial bias.
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter serves as a road map for the current thesis. It begins by outlining the 
pertinent literature and highlighting the relevance of the current research programme. 
Following this, each of the chapters of the thesis is mapped out. The principal goal of the 
thesis is to determine if the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP: Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Hayden, Milne, Power, & Stewart, 2006), a recently developed 
methodology for the assessment of implicit cognition, is a useful measure of implicit racial 
bias in the Irish context.
The Socio-cognitive Approach to Understanding Attitudes
From a socio-cognitive psychological perspective attitudes are hypothetical 
constructs which cannot be directly observed but rather, are inferred from observable 
responses (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960). Attitudes as 
hypothetical constructs, by their very nature, are difficult to define. However, Fazio and 
Petty (2008) suggest that an “attitude is a person’s evaluation of an object -- favorability or 
unfavorability toward the object” (p.3). It is this evaluative component that many assume 
to be the most important aspect of an attitude (see Baron, Byrne, & Watson, 2004). The 
socio-cognitive approach contends that such evaluations are stored in memory (Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), exist across time and are automatically activated 
from memory upon mere observation of the attitude object (Fazio & Petty, 2008; Fazio, 
2001). In fact, cognitive neuroscientific evidence indicates that evaluative judgments 
produce different patterns of neuronal activity when compared with non-evaluative 
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judgments (Ajzen, 2001).
The study of attitudes has long preoccupied social scientists and continues to do so, 
not least of all because of their assumed relationship with behaviour. From this stance, 
positive attitudes are deemed to be associated with approach behaviours and negative 
attitudes with avoidance behaviours (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This belief accounts for at 
least some of the preoccupation with attitude research. The following section will review 
socio-cognitive research investigations of the structure of attitudes, their relationship with 
behaviour and how this perspective has addressed the measurement of attitudes.
The structure of attitudes. Within mainstream attitude research there remains a 
theoretical debate concerning the structure and dimensionality of attitudes (Chaiken & 
Stangor, 1987). The one-component view suggests that attitudes are primarily affective 
evaluations (Thurstone, 1928). More recently, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) suggest a two-
component perspective in which cognitions also have a large role to play in evaluation. 
The three-component or tripartite model is the most popular and widely accepted model of 
attitudes (Krech & Crutchfield, 1948; Katz & Stotland, 1959; Rosenberg & Hovland, 
1960; Triandis, 1971). This model sees attitudes as being comprised of cognitive, affective 
and behavioural components. However, although these three components are conceptually 
and empirically distinct (Breckler, 1984), research has demonstrated that they are not 
easily distinguishable from each other in simple assessments (see Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). 
Despite these inconsistent findings, the model remains the most popular mainstream 
approach to the structure of attitudes and has served to provide an important conceptual 
framework (Fazio & Petty, 2008).
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 The attitude-behaviour relationship. The relationship between attitudes and 
behaviour has been widely researched. As discussed previously, the three-component view 
tends to assume that attitudes have some predictive utility and it is at least in some part 
because of this belief that the study of attitudes is considered theoretically important. 
However, early research indicated that the relationship between attitudes and behaviour is 
tenuous (LaPiere 1934; Wicker 1969). Later, research began to focus on the context in 
which attitudes and behaviour were related and on variables that moderated this 
relationship. Findings indicated that the magnitude of the attitude-behaviour relation varies 
as a consequence of how the relation is measured (i.e. the assessment tool), where or in 
what context the relation is measured and on various salient aspects of the individual being 
assessed (Fazio, 2001; Krosnick, 1988). The moderating power of some of these variables 
has been widely reported in the research literature.
Studies have shown, for example, that participants who are highly motivated to 
control prejudice can report attitudes that they consider more socially desirable, and 
consequently these reported attitudes might not correlate with actual behaviours towards 
the attitudinal object (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Campbell, 1950). In addition, low 
correlations may be the product of assessing only one component of the tripartite model, 
which would not fully represent the complexity of the attitude construct thus resulting in a 
weaker attitude behaviour relationship (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). Finally, according to 
Greenwald (1989) low correlations may also result from a failure to measure attitudes and 
behaviours at comparable levels of specificity.
More recent attitude research has been concerned with revealing the direction of 
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attitude-behaviour relations. Social psychology research findings indicate that this 
relationship is bi-directional with attitudes influencing behaviour at times and vice versa 
(e.g., Holland, Verplanken, & Van Kippenberg, 2002). Within the cognitive literature 
numerous processes have been proposed as explanations for how behaviour can influence 
attitudes. Bem (1972), for example, suggested that when we are unsure of our evaluations 
of a particular object, we may infer our attitudes from our behaviours towards that object. 
Such inferences may be made when the attitude is weak, ambiguous or un-interpretable. 
Other cognitive theorists suggest that behaviour can influence attitudes when we attempt 
to reduce the experience of cognitive dissonance. That is, after performing a behaviour 
that is inconsistent with an attitude we feel discomfort, but we cannot change the 
behaviour we have performed and thus we tend to change our attitude so it becomes 
consistent with our behaviour (Festinger, 1957).
Several socio-cognitive theories including the theory of reasoned action (TRA; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), and its successor the theory of planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen, 
1991), have attempted to model the relationship between attitudes and behaviours. These 
models each emphasise the moderating role of behavioural intention in determining 
whether or not a particular behaviour is carried out in response to a specific attitude. 
Socio-cognitive research by Ajzen (1991) and Beale and Manstead (1991) indicate that the 
attitude-behaviour relationship is stronger than was previously indicated in the early 
literature. Typically, the stronger a person’s intention to engage in a particular behaviour 
the more likely they are to perform the behaviour.
The measurement of implicit attitudes. Explicit self-report measures have long 
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been the principal means of assessing attitudes from Likert’s (1932) summated rating 
technique to Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum’s (1957) semantic differential scale. However, 
more recent research has highlighted a number of confounds intrinsic to such self-report 
measures (e.g., de Jong, 2002; Gemar, Segal, Sagratti, & Kennedy, 2001; Raja & Stokes, 
1998; Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 2001). According to Dawes (1972) the limitations of 
self-report methods result from the fact that when completing such measures participants 
are given time and opportunity to control their responses and these are thus subject to 
various cognitive, motivational and situational factors. The limitations of self report 
measures can be conceptualised as falling into two main categories; (i) those caused by the 
frailties of introspection and (ii), those that result from various demand characteristics 
(Orne, 1962). For example, individuals may be unaware that they hold a particular attitude 
and, accordingly, may fail to report it (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Dambrun & Guimond, 
2004). Conversely, individuals may hold attitudes that they believe to be socially 
undesirable and may therefore attempt to conceal these from researchers (Paulhus, 1984; 
Rust & Golombok, 1999). These limitations are exacerbated by the fact that the way 
questions are framed may influence an individual’s response (Rasinski, 1989).
Recently, in an effort to circumvent these problems, researchers have devoted 
increasing attention to studying the nature of implicit attitudes. Greenwald and Banaji 
(1995) define implicit attitudes as “introspectively unidentified or inaccurately identified 
traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action 
toward social objects” (p. 8). Despite ongoing debate surrounding the adequacy of this 
definition (see De Houwer, 2006), the core argument holds that because implicit attitudes 
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are often unconscious, their influence on subsequent behaviours may go unnoticed. Insofar 
as implicit attitudes may be unconscious, traditional self-report explicit measures will 
quite probably fail to capture them. Consequently, researchers have endeavoured to 
develop reaction-time based methodologies in which implicit attitudes are inferred on the 
basis of response speed and accuracy (see De Houwer, 2006).
In the socio-cognitive literature implicit attitude measures are referred to as 
indirect attitude measures. The term ‘indirect’ comes from the fact that these measures do 
not directly ask the individual to report their attitude (Petty, Fazio, & Brinol, 2008). To 
date, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) is the 
most widely used indirect, reaction-time based measure in the assessment of implicit 
attitudes in socio-cognitive and clinical research. The IAT is based upon the assumption 
that it should be easier and therefore will take less time to respond, when two closely 
associated concepts in memory are assigned to the same response key, than when these 
two concepts are assigned to different keys.
Evidence in support of the psychometric properties of the IAT have been 
comprehensively investigated for more than a decade and are generally accepted (e.g., 
Fazio & Olsen, 2003; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). However, across a recent meta-
analysis, Greenwald, Poehlmann, Uhlmann, and Banaji, (2009), found that the relative 
predictive validities of the IAT and self-report measures varied depending on the content 
domains, but overall, that each measure provided a gain in predictive validity compared 
with using the other alone. For the IAT, this gain was found to be greater when socially 
sensitive topics were being investigated. Greenwald et al. (2009) thus recommend that 
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both the IAT and self-report measures be employed together, as predictors of behaviour.
The IAT has been applied to fields and content domains both within and beyond 
social psychology, from clinical, developmental and health psychology research (e.g., 
Teachman & Brownell, 2001; Baron & Banaji, 2006; and Teachman, Gapinski, Brownell, 
Rawlins, & Jeyaram, 2003) to neuroscientific research (e.g., Cunningham, Johnson, Raye, 
Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 2004), and market research (e.g., Maison, Greenwald, & Bruin, 
2004). In particular, it has been used extensively to examine prejudice (e.g., Dasgupta & 
Greenwald, 2001; Rudman, Feinberg & Fairchild, 2002) and stereotypes (e.g., Rudman, 
Greenwald, & McGhee, 2001).
Numerous studies using the IAT, have indicated that white participants tend to 
show a relatively strong pro-white/anti-black bias (see Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald & 
Banaji, 2000; Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & Mellott, 2002; Monteith, 
Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001; Livingston, 2002; Ottoway, Hayden, & Oakes, 2001). In 
the study conducted by Dasgupta et al., for example, findings showed that participants 
responded faster on tasks that categorized pleasant words with ‘white’ (faces or names) 
and unpleasant words with ‘black’ (faces and names) than vice versa. Furthermore, this 
pro-white/ anti-black bias occurred for participants who explicitly stated that they held no 
racist attitudes,
The IAT often reveals levels of bias not registered at self-report (e.g., Chambliss, 
Finley, & Blair, 2004; O’Brien, Hunter, Halberstadt, & Anderson, 2007). As discussed 
above, implicit assessment methodologies, such as the IAT, were developed in part to 
overcome the problems associated with self-report measures. However, despite its utility, 
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several limitations of the IAT have been identified. (see Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001; 
Richeson & Ambady, 2003). The following limitations are of particular interest. Firstly, 
the IAT cannot be used to measure the valence of individual concepts as it was designed to 
be a measure of relative associative strength (De Houwer, 2002; Nosek, Greenwald and 
Banaji, 2005). That is, the IAT is relativistic in that it can indicate that x is preferred to y, 
but it cannot reveal to what extent x and y are liked or disliked, per se. In the context of a 
race IAT, for example, each trial involves presenting both of the relevant categories, (i.e., 
Black People and White People), and consequently the IAT effect is based on responses 
that occur in the context of both categories, rather than each independently. Thus, a pro-
white/anti-black IAT effect could indicate, for example, that a participant has a positive 
attitude to “White People” and a neutral attitude to “Black People”, or it could indicate a 
neutral attitude to “White People” and a negative attitude to “Black People”.
Secondly, the IAT offers a relatively indirect measure of implicit attitudes. De 
Houwer (2002), for example, has argued that the IAT measures associations rather than 
relations among stimuli or events, and as such can provide only an indirect measure of 
beliefs:
Greenwald et al. (1998) designed the IAT to assess the strength of 
associations between concepts in memory. One can argue that beliefs 
involve more than just associations between concepts. First, beliefs 
reflect qualified associations. For instance, the belief “I am a bad 
person” implies a special type of association [italics added] between the 
concept “self” and the concept “bad,” namely a directional association 
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[italics added] which specifies that “bad” is a property or characteristic 
of “self.” IAT effects do not reflect the nature or directionality of an 
association between concepts [italics added], they can reflect only 
strength of association. Second, many beliefs involve several 
associations and several concepts. For instance, conditional beliefs such 
as “if I do not perform well on a task, then I am an inferior person” 
involve rather complex structures of qualified associations between 
several concepts. The IAT cannot be used to directly capture such 
complex conditional beliefs (also see de Jong et al., 2001, p. 111). . . . In 
sum, the IAT does not provide a measure of beliefs, nor was it designed 
to do so. It can only provide an index of associations that are assumed to 
be involved in certain beliefs and thus indirect evidence for the presence 
of certain beliefs (pp. 117–118).
Thirdly, although there is considerable evidence that the IAT may reveal levels of 
bias not recorded using self-report measures, there is recent research that suggests that the 
IAT is not completely impervious to at least some of the confounds that affect explicit 
measures. For example, evidence that the IAT is sensitive to the context in which it is 
completed was provided by a study investigating homonegativity (Boysen, Vogel, & 
Madon, 2006) in which the measure was administered in both public and private 
assessment situations. In the public condition, participants believed that the experimenter 
would know their level of bias. In contrast, participants in the private condition did not 
hold this belief. The results showed that the public context significantly decreased the 
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level of bias toward homosexuality relative to the private context. Critically, this finding 
suggests that, similar to explicit measures, racial bias on the IAT may be reduced when 
participants are more motivated to conceal their prejudice (i.e., when they think their 
prejudice will be public; see Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007, for a review that 
questions the common assumption that implicit measures are immune or less sensitive to 
social desirability concerns). 
Although the IAT is by far the most widely used measure of implicit attitudes, 
substantial empirical attention has been directed towards developing alternative implicit 
measures that aim to address some of its limitations. So-called implicit measures such as 
the Go/No-go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001), Evaluative Priming 
(Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), the Emotional Stroop (Pratto & John, 
1991) and the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003b) have been 
offered, but they all share a common feature. Specifically, they were all designed to 
measure associations in memory. For example, evaluative priming involves presenting a 
positively or negatively valenced prime before presenting the relevant attitude object. If 
the prime and target share the same valence (e.g., they are both positive) then the prime 
and target will be associated in memory, and thus the former will activate the latter leading 
to a relatively short response time. If the prime and target do not share the same valence, 
associative strength will be low and response time will be longer. In effect, the vast 
majority of implicit measures are based on the assumption that they are revealing 
underling associative strengths represented in memory. However, as we shall see in the 
next section, an alternative approach has recently been offered. 
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An Alternative Behavioural Approach to Understanding Attitudes
The previous section detailed the mainstream socio-cognitive approach to the 
measurement of attitudes. The widely used IAT was discussed and several limitations of 
the IAT where highlighted. The current section will introduce a recent alternative implicit 
attitude measure -- the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP), which aims to 
address some of the IAT’s limitations. The IRAP emerged from behaviour analysis, a 
distinctly different psychological tradition to the socio-cognitive tradition which gave rise 
to the IAT. The following section will provide an account of the behaviour analytic 
approach to attitudes. The final part of the chapter will provide a detailed account of the 
IRAP and of research that has employed the IRAP for the measurement of implicit 
attitudes across a range of domains.
 Behaviour analysis. Behaviourism is a philosophy of science (Baum, 1994). The 
scientific study of the behaviour of organisms is known as behaviour analysis (Leslie & 
O’Reilly, 1999). Behaviour analysis, thus involves the study of behaviour and the 
variables that influence it (Grant & Evans, 1994) and behaviour analysts seek to predict 
and influence behaviour (defined as any and all activities that an organism can engage in, 
both overtly and covertly). Behaviour analysis aims to identify functional relationships 
between manipulable independent variables found in the environment and behaviour 
(dependent variable). When relevant manipulable variables are identified, the 
experimenter may then have the opportunity to influence and change the functionally 
related behaviour as they wish. The classification of functional relations produces a 
scientific account of behaviour, independent of unobservable mental events or 
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hypothetical constructs (Baum, 1994). It enables the application of experimental analyses 
to both overt and covert behaviours and shuns so-called “explanatory fictions” of the mind 
and mental states (Nye, 1975). Within the behaviour-analytic tradition, mentalisitc 
concepts like attitudes are not offered as explanations for behaviour. However, the 
functional relationships involved in behaviours (which are typically accepted as indicators 
of attitudes) do necessitate systematic empirical analysis. Derived stimulus relations are 
particularly relevant in this regard.
Relational Frame Theory. Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes 
& Roche, 2001) is a modern behavior analytic account of human language and cognition. 
RFT has its roots in investigations of derived relational responding (Hayes et al., 2001). 
Sidman (1971) was the first to demonstrate the emergence novel behavior that had not 
been directly trained or reinforced. When he trained participants in a series of related 
conditional matching tasks using arbitrary stimuli he found that several untaught 
performances emerged according to a pattern which he called “stimulus equivalence”. For 
example, if a participant was taught to choose A in the presence of B, and to choose B in 
the presence of C, then several untrained performances would typically emerge including 
choosing B with A and C with B, thus reversing the taught relations (referred to as 
symmetry) and choosing A with C (transitivity) and C with A (combined symmetry and 
transitivity). Sidman named the overall pattern stimulus equivalence because the 
participant appeared to be responding to the stimuli as equivalent.
The concept of stimulus equivalence received considerable attention because it 
offered a way to rapidly advance response repertoires. Furthermore, empirical research 
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revealed a strong link between stimulus equivalence and human language across a variety 
of contexts (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, Cullinan, & Leader, 2004; Cowley, 
Green, & Braunling-Mc Morrow, 1992; Devany, Hayes, & Nelson, 1986; Kendall, 1983; 
Wulfert & Hayes, 1989). Barnes (1994) outlined five research areas that appear to lend 
empirical support for this view: (i) derived equivalence is readily demonstrated by 
verbally-able humans, whereas, it has not been unequivocally demonstrated by non-
verbally-able humans or nonhumans (Barnes, McCullagh, Keenan, 1990; Devany et al., 
1986; Dugdale & Lowe, 2000; Hayes, 1989; Sidman & Tailby, 1982); (ii) learning to label 
stimuli may make equivalence responding possible in young children (Dugdale & Lowe, 
2000); (iii) human language impairments can be treated through the use of equivalence 
procedures (e.g., Cowley et al., 1992); (iv) a behaviour analytic understanding of both 
symbolic meaning and the generative nature of grammar has been generated through 
stimulus equivalence (Barnes & Holmes, 1991; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Cullinan, 2000; Hayes & Hayes, 1989; Wulfert & Hayes, 1988); (v) equivalence 
phenomena have been applied to human verbal behaviors such as logical reasoning and 
social categorization (e.g., Barnes & Hampson, 1993; Roche & Barnes, 1996; Watt, 
Keenan, Barnes, & Cairns, 1991) . In addition, neuropsychological research has recently 
uncovered similar brain activation patterns during the semantic processing underlying 
language and the formation of equivalence relations (e.g., Dickins, Singh, Roberts, Burns, 
Downes, Jimmieson & & Bentall, 2001). In general, these findings indicate that the 
control exerted over behaviour by stimuli participating in equivalence classes appears to 
be comparable with the control that verbal stimuli exert over human behaviour (Hayes & 
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Hayes, 1989).
From an RFT perspective, derived stimulus relations make up the core of what has 
been absent from a satisfactory behavioural account of human language. RFT appeals to 
the concept of arbitrarily applicable relational responding in its account for derived 
equivalence relations (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2004). This idea grew out of the basic finding 
that organisms, from insects to primates, can learn to respond to the non-arbitrary 
relations among stimuli (e.g., bigger than, smaller than; see Reese, 1968). This is now 
referred to as non-arbitrary relational responding. Furthermore, RFT holds that in the 
context of an appropriate history of multiple exemplar training, verbally-able humans can 
also respond to arbitrary relations among and between stimuli.
According to RFT, arbitrary relations are defined not by the formal properties of 
the stimuli involved but rather by additional features of the context outside of the stimuli 
being related. For example, imagine that a mother shows her verbally-able child a picture 
of a dog (stimulus A) and she says “This is a dog” (stimulus B). She might also tell the 
child that a dog (stimulus B) makes the sound “woof” (stimulus C). RFT proposes that 
contextual cues such as the spoken word “is” can bring a repertoire of arbitrarily 
applicable relational responding to bear on the stimuli such that the child will subsequently 
regard these stimuli as “going together” and will be able to derive novel relations between 
the stimuli that were not explicitly trained. For example, if the mother later gives the child 
pictures of different animals and asks “Which one says ‘woof’?” then the child may well 
readily point to dog, despite this being an untrained response.
RFT proposes that this type of performance is based on a history of being rewarded 
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for responding relationally to pictures and words and to other pairs of objects in the 
presence of contextual cues (such as “is”) that serve to manage or manipulate the response. 
In addition, following extensive training across multiple exemplars, relating becomes so 
abstracted that it can be arbitrarily applied to any stimuli. Arbitrarily applicable relational 
responding is also known as relational framing. This comes from the metaphor of an 
empty frame that could potentially be filled with any content.
For RFT, stimulus equivalence symbolizes an example of relational framing that is 
brought to bear by a certain feature of the context in which the task occurs. For example, 
in a matching to sample task in which a participant is trained to pick a stimulus 
consistently in the presence of another stimulus the context itself can function as a 
contextual cue signaling that the two stimuli are the same. As a result, further relational 
responses will be derived. This particular type of relational framing is referred to as 
framing in accordance with the relation of sameness or coordination. There are many 
diverse forms of relational framing including opposition, distinction, comparison, 
hierarchy, perspective, and so on, and the properties of the derived relational responses 
involved differ greatly (Barnes, 1994). A frame of opposition for example has the property 
that an opposite of an opposite is the same, an opposite of an opposite of an opposite is an 
opposite, and so forth (Hayes et al., 2001). In general therefore, RFT is far broader in 
scope than stimulus equivalence.
There are three central properties inherent in all forms of relational framing --  
mutual entailment, combinatorial entailment and transformation of stimulus function. 
Mutual entailment refers to the bi-directionality of relational responding (Hayes et al., 
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2001). That is, if X is related to Y in a given context, then a relationship between X and Y 
is entailed. The relationship between the stimuli can be symmetrical (i.e., as in the case of 
equivalence or coordination), but not necessarily so. For example, if X were smaller than 
Y, the relationship is not symmetrical but is mutually entailed. Therefore, two relations 
would exist, “X is smaller than Y” and “Y is bigger than X” (Hayes et al., 2001).
Combinatorial entailment refers to derived stimulus relations that involve two or 
more sets of relations. Combinatorial entailment makes it possible to define the relevant 
forms of relational frames (Hayes et al., 2001). For example, if X is related to Y in a 
particular context and Y is related to Z, then a relation is entailed between X and Z and 
equally between Z and X. This may include, but is not restricted to, the transitive relations 
found in stimulus equivalence. In mutually entailed relations, the specified relationship 
between X and Y always entails a relationship between Y and X at the same level of 
precision. Conversely, in combinatorial entailed relations, the derived relationship may be 
less precise than the original relationship. For example, if X is different to Y and Y is 
different to Z, then the relationship between X and Z and Z and X is clearly unknown. 
Moreover, the unknown nature of the latter relationships, in and of themselves, constitutes 
stimulus relations (i.e., identifying a relation as unspecified is a relational response).
The third defining property of a relational frame is termed the transformation of 
function. That is, any function associated with one of the stimuli involved in a relational 
frame may lead to the transformation of functions for any or all of the other stimuli 
participating in that frame (Barnes, 1994; Hayes et al., 2001; Hayes & Wilson, 1993). The 
functions are always transformed in terms of the specific relational frame involved. For 
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example, if two stimuli are involved in a frame of comparison, such that X is “more than” 
Y, and Y is known to have an aversive function, then X will acquire a stronger aversive 
function than Y.
RFT proposes that the three central properties of relational framing make up the 
basis of what an adequate behavioural account of stimulus equivalence and human 
language has been lacking (Hayes & Wilson, 1993). In particular, the belief that these 
processes are central to understanding language has provided a means of studying 
language and other complex behaviours in purely functional terms. From an RFT 
perspective, verbal behaviour constitutes the action of framing events relationally (Hayes 
et al., 2001, p.43). Moreover, this process involves two parties-- the speaker and the 
listener (Hayes & Hayes, 1989). When the speaker engages in this process they are 
speaking with meaning, and when a listener does so, they are listening with understanding 
(Hayes & Wilson, 1993). It is important to note that it is the framing of these events that 
indicates that the behaviour is verbal for both speaker and listener. Accordingly, verbal 
meaning is a highly specified behavioural process not a mental event (Hayes & Barnes- 
Holmes, 2004). Likewise, a verbal stimulus has its functions, in part, because it 
participates in relational frames.
In summary, the development of an appropriate behavioural account of language 
has made a behavioural approach to the study of the verbal phenomenon of attitudes 
possible. In other words, RFT “provides an alternative, behaviour-analytic approach to 
verbal events that is theoretically consistent, is built on existing principles, is in contact 
with some of the latest empirical evidence, and is fully subject to behaviour analysis 
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directed toward prediction and control” (Hayes & Wilson, 1993, p. 228).
Relational Frame Theory and attitudes. RFT proposes that attitudinal behaviour is 
verbal responding to an attitude-object that involves transformation of evaluative stimulus 
functions with respect to that object. Grey and Barnes (1996) conducted the first empirical 
behaviour analytic study designed to model attitudes as verbal phenomena. This study 
involved two experiments which sought to examine the contribution of stimulus 
equivalence to the formation of attitudes towards stimuli that had not previously been 
directly paired with an attitude-forming event and in the absence of direct reinforcement 
with those stimuli. In Experiment 1, participants were trained using a match-to-sample 
procedure to form three three-member equivalence relations (A1-B1-C1; A2-B2-C2; A3-
B3-C3) using nonsense syllables as stimuli. One member from two of these classes (B1 
and B2) was placed on a label attached to one of two video cassettes. The videos contained 
scenes of either a religious or romantic nature. After viewing the videos, participants were 
presented with four new videos. The new videos were labelled with the remaining 
nonsense syllables from the equivalence training (i.e., A1, C1, A2, C2). In order to 
examine the influence of their participation in equivalence classes, the next task asked 
participants to categorize the four unseen videos as “good” or “bad”. The task served as a 
model for the phenomenon in which an individual forms an attitude about an object for 
which they have no direct experience. Results revealed that participants had derived 
equivalence relations in that they categorized the unseen videos in accordance with their 
evaluations of the originally viewed videos.
In Experiment 2, Grey and Barnes (1996) demonstrated a stimulus equivalence
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model of attitude formation and change. Firstly, in order to determine if performance on 
the categorization tasks could be manipulated, contextual control was incorporated into the 
procedure through equivalence relations. To achieve this, match to sample training was 
provided which served to make the phrases “moral content” and “dramatic presentation” 
members of two separate equivalence relations along with a number of arbitrary stimuli. 
Participants were then tested in these derived stimulus relations. Following this task, 
participants were presented with a sexually violent video that was labelled with one of the 
nonsense syllables in the remaining relation (i.e., B3) from the equivalence training 
provided in Experiment 1. The final part of the study involved presenting participants with 
the same categorization tasks as those completed in Experiment 1. Results showed that the 
categorization of the videos came under the contextual control of two arbitrary stimuli 
because of their participation in equivalence relations with the two phrases (i.e., “moral 
content” and “dramatic presentation”). More specifically, when a participant was required 
to categorize a sexually violent video given a contextual cue that participated in an 
equivalence relation with “moral content”, the video was categorized as “Bad.” However, 
when the contextual cue participated in an equivalence relation with “dramatic 
presentation”, the video was categorized as “Good”.
Grey and Barnes (1996) also established that watching the sexually violent content 
altered the evaluative functions of some of the videos. For example, participants who 
categorized the videos with sexual content as morally bad in the first categorization task, 
failed to retain this classification after watching the sexually violent material. In other 
words, participants changed their attitudes towards other stimuli in this response class. 
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Overall therefore, Grey and Barnes (1996) offered a basic empirical model of the 
formation of attitudes as a transformation of evaluative stimulus functions through 
stimulus equivalence. Moreover, they suggested that contextually controlled transfer, in 
particular, may explain the common finding that people report different attitudes on the 
same issues in different contexts (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
The Relational Elaboration and Coherence model: A functional account of implicit 
and explicit attitudes. RFT has recently offered the Relational Elaboration and Coherence 
(REC) model in an effort to formally account for the empirical and theoretical divergence 
between implicit and explicit attitudes (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 
in press). This approach has at its core, the notion that relational responses, like all 
behaviours, develop over time. Thus, when a stimulus is encountered, a relational response 
will occur relatively quickly, and this may be followed by additional relational responses. 
These additional relational responses may occur as a response to the stimulus itself or be 
directed toward the initial response to the stimulus. Given enough time, these additional 
relational responses will likely form a coherent relational network. Take for example a 
white participant who is presented with the image of a black man holding a gun. The first 
relational response to occur may well involve a negative evaluation based on a verbal 
history in which black men are repeatedly depicted (in the media) as violent and 
dangerous. On the other hand, further relational responding may involve quite a different 
evaluation, for example, “judging someone on the basis of their skin colour is wrong” and/
or “He may be a police man”, and so on. Put simply, relational responding may be 
relatively quick and immediate or can involve broader relational networks.
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It is these brief and immediate relational responses that the REC model views as 
forming the basis for so-called implicit attitudes. Conversely, from the perspective of the 
REC model the extended relational responding that is needed to produce a response that 
coheres with one or more other relational response(s) in the person’s behavioural 
repertoire provides the basis for so-called explicit attitudes. The behavioural effects 
captured by both self-report and implicit procedures are believed to reflect arbitrarily 
applicable relational responding. However, responding can be either brief and immediate 
or extended and elaborated -- depending on the properties of the measurement situation 
(e.g. whether or not participants are given time or opportunity to elaborate).
The REC model also offers an account for the dissociation that commonly emerges 
between implicit and explicit procedures, in terms of relational coherence. A relational 
network is said to cohere when all of the individual elements relate to each other in a 
manner that is consistent with the reinforcement history typically provided by the verbal 
community for such relational responding. According to RFT, the verbal community 
constantly reinforces coherence (and punishes incoherence) within relational networks, to 
the extent that relational coherence itself becomes a conditioned reinforcer for most verbal 
humans. Take, for example, the statement, “John is taller than Paul and Paul is taller than 
Ringo, but Ringo is taller than John.” It is likely that you can recognise the incoherent 
nature of this simple relational network, and question its veracity1.
This quest for relational coherence also relates to our own verbal behaviour. For 
example, responding to a picture of a black man as “dangerous” (with no additional 
1 It is worth noting that there may be some degree of conceptual overlap between relational coherence and 
the concept cognitive consistency (e.g. Festinger, 1957; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). The latter refers 
to the process of assessing the logical consistency between two or more propositions based on the 
assignment of truth values and the application of syllogistic rules and logical principles.
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information) may not cohere readily with additional relational responses, which follow 
that initial response, such as “I am not a racist and I treat everyone equally”. In this 
example, the individual has produced an incoherent relational network, and as a result 
additional relational responding may follow in an attempt to resolve the incoherence. 
Consequently the initial response may be considered to be “wrong”, and therefore 
divergence between implicit and explicit attitudes would be observed. In other words, 
individuals may “reject” their immediate and brief relational responses (automatic 
evaluations) if they do not cohere with their more elaborate and extended relational 
responding. In certain contexts, however, relational elaboration may reduce or remove the 
incoherence within a network. For example, when the functions of the original stimulus 
are transformed the incoherence may be resolved. In the example above, the individual 
may conclude that the black man in the picture does actually look rather dangerous, which 
would thus cohere with the original brief and immediate relational response to the picture. 
In sum, brief and immediate evaluative responses may or may not cohere with subsequent 
relational responding -- when they do cohere, implicit and explicit measures will typically 
converge, but when they do not they will generally diverge.
The REC model, therefore, aims to account for the divergence in behavioural 
effects produced on implicit and explicit attitude procedures by appealing to the same 
process of arbitrarily applicable relational responding, but focusing on the extent to which 
such responding is brief and immediate or extended and coherent1. At this point, it is worth 
1 Strictly speaking the REC model is not a single process model given that it allows for the involvement of 
other behavioral processes other than relational framing (e.g. respondent conditioning and primary stimulus 
generalization). That said, the REC model broadly explains the difference between implicit and explicit 
attitude measurement procedures in terms of the elaboration and coherence involved in the single process of 
relational framing.
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noting that when implicit cognition is viewed as relational, rather than purely associative, 
an alternative, non-associative measure of implicit attitudes becomes feasible. In this 
respect, the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, Hayden, Milne, Power & Stewart, 2006) is a new methodology, which has 
recently been developed.
The IRAP: a non-associative measure of implicit attitudes. The IRAP is a 
computerised response latency procedure designed to target stimulus relations rather than 
mental associations in memory. Specifically, the task involves presenting relational terms 
(e.g., Similar, Opposite, More than, Less than) so that the properties of the relations among 
the relevant stimuli can be assessed. Similar to other response-latency methodologies, the 
IRAP involves asking participants to respond quickly and accurately in ways that are 
either consistent or inconsistent with their pre-experimentally established verbal relations. 
The rationale behind the IRAP is that responding should be faster on consistent (e.g. Love 
Similar to Pleasant) relative to inconsistent trials (e.g. Love Opposite Pleasant) because 
brief and immediate relational responding will coordinate more often with consistent overt  
responding. The response time differential between consistent and inconsistent trials 
(defined as the IRAP effect) is assumed to provide a non-relative index of the strength of 
the verbal or relational responses being assessed.
To illustrate this more clearly, consider an IRAP designed to index automatic racial 
attitudes towards Black and White people. On each IRAP trial one of two label stimuli 
“Black People are” or “White People are” is presented at the top of the computer screen 
with either a positive (e.g., “Good,” “Peaceful,” “Clever”) or negative (e.g., “Bad,” 
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“Violent,” “Stupid”) target stimulus presented in the centre of the screen and participants 
are required to choose between one of two response options (e.g. “True” and “False”)
presented at the bottom left and right of the screen. During a block of consistent trials, a 
response defined as consistent with prevailing white verbal contingencies (e.g., choosing 
True given White Person and Good) clears the screen for 400ms and presents the next 
trial. If an inconsistent response is emitted (e.g., choosing False given White Person and 
Good) a red X appears immediately under the target stimulus. To remove the red X and 
continue to the 400ms inter-trial interval, participants are required to emit the consistent 
response. In contrast, during inconsistent blocks participants are required to make an 
inconsistent response in order to progress from one trial to the next (a consistent response 
produces the red X).
The IRAP typically consists of a minimum of two practice blocks and a fixed set of 
six test blocks. Each block presents the same number of trials, comprised of what are 
defined as four different trial-types. The trial-types are created by presenting each label 
stimulus with each of two sets of target words (see Figure 1, for a schematic representation 
of the IRAP). Given the previous example, a block of consistent trials thus requires the 
following pattern of responses: White People are – Positive – True; White People are– 
Negative – False; Black People are – Positive – False; Black People are – Negative – 
True. A block of inconsistent trials requires the opposite response pattern. The feedback 
contingencies are reversed across successive blocks of the IRAP, and thus participants are 
exposed to an alternating sequence of consistent and inconsistent blocks. For each block of 
IRAP trials participants are typically required to reach a standard of 80% correct 
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      Pro White/White Positive                    Pro White/Black Negative 
      Pro Black/ Black Positive                    Pro Black/ White Negative
Figure 1. The four IRAP trial-types. The sample stimulus (e.g. ‘I think Black People are’ or ‘I think White 
People are’), target word (positive or negative words e.g. honest, deceitful), and response options (True and 
False) appeared simultaneously on each trial. Arrows with superimposed text boxes indicate which responses 
were deemed pro-White or pro-Black (boxes and arrows did not appear on screen).
responses, and a median response time of less than 3000ms. Failure to maintain these 
criteria across successive test blocks results in the removal of data (see Barnes-Holmes et 
al, in press, for a more detailed overview of the procedure).
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I think white people are
Honest
select ‘d’ for      select ‘k’ for
True             False
select ‘d’ for                 select ‘k’ for
  True                                      False
Pro-White Pro-Black
I think black people are
Honest
select ‘d’ for      select ‘k’ for
True             False
select ‘d’ for                 select ‘k’ for
  True                                      False
Pro-Black Pro-White
I think white people are
Deceitful
select ‘d’ for      select ‘k’ for
True             False
select ‘d’ for                 select ‘k’ for
  True                                      
Pro-Black Pro-White
I think black people are
Deceitful
select ‘d’ for      select ‘k’ for
True             False
select ‘d’ for                 select ‘k’ for
Pro-White Pro-Black
The IRAP differs from existing associative implicit measures, in that neither spatial 
nor temporal contiguity is manipulated across the task -- the presentation of the label and 
target stimuli remains unchanged throughout. However, the pattern of responding required 
by participants does change (responding True to White and Good in one block but 
responding False in another block), and thus the outcome of the measure is not readily 
attributable to the spatial and/or temporal association of stimuli within the procedure itself 
(the implications of this are discussed below).
The IRAP effect has now been replicated across a growing number of domains and 
studies have shown that the IRAP; (i) compares well with the IAT as a measure of 
individual differences (Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010; 
Barnes-Holmes, Waldron, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010); (ii) demonstrates 
comparative levels of predictive validity to well-established procedures such as the IAT 
(Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes & Stewart, 2010; Barnes-Holmes, Waldron, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009; Roddy et al., 2010), (iii) is not easily faked (McKenna, 
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2007); (iv) may be used as a measure of 
implicit self-esteem (Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009), implicit 
attitudes to work and leisure (Chan, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009), 
implicit ageism (Cullen, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes Stewart, 2009), and deviant 
implicit attitudes in child sex offenders (Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, Gresswell, Hart & 
Gore, 2009); and (v) produces effects that clearly diverge from those obtained on explicit 
measures when targeting socially sensitive attitudes (Power, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Stewart, 2009).
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Critically, each of the studies outlined above required participants to respond 
directly to stimulus relations (or propositions), rather than to simple stimulus pairings or 
associations. Nevertheless, the IRAP produced behavioural effects that are typically 
defined as implicit attitude effects on associative procedures. From an associative 
perspective these findings could be perceived as counter-intuitive, in that the IRAP targets 
propositions and yet it reveals effects that are typically attributed to associations. It may 
eventually be possible to develop an associative account of the IRAP effects, however, at 
present, thinking relationally rather than associatively about implicit cognition has led to 
the development of a new methodology and data that stress possible limitations to a purely 
associative approach.
The REC model provides a non-associative account for the above mentioned 
IRAP effects. Put simply, according to the REC model, each IRAP trial involves asking 
participants to respond to the relationship between two stimuli. Each IRAP trial will 
therefore cause the participant to emit a brief and immediate relational response prior to 
pressing the appropriate computer key. The probability of this response will be determined 
by a combination of the participant’s prior verbal and non-verbal learning history and 
current contextual variables. The most probable response will, by definition, be emitted 
first most often. Accordingly, on consistent IRAP trials the required key press will 
coordinate with the emitted response thus producing faster response latencies. Conversely, 
inconsistent IRAP trials require a key press that opposes the most immediate relational 
response emitted by the individual and, therefore, it occurs less quickly1. Thus across 
1 A potential behavioural explanation for the shorter latencies observed on consistent IRAP blocks is that 
relational coherence, as noted previously, is established by the verbal community as a conditional reinforcer. 
Thus brief and immediate relational responding coheres or coordinates more frequently than not with 
subsequent relevant responding in the day-to-day verbal behaviours of most individuals.
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multiple trials the average latency for inconsistent blocks will be longer than for consistent 
blocks. It should be noted that this interpretation of the IRAP effect precludes any appeal 
to mediating mental constructs and instead formulates an explanation in terms of 
behavioural events that may occur either overtly or covertly. 
The Current Research Programme
At the time of writing only one published study had used the IRAP to measure 
implicit racism (Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010). In this study, participants were presented 
with the words “Safe” and “Dangerous” as label stimuli and pictures of white and black 
men holding guns as target stimuli. The results revealed an anti-black bias on the IRAP, 
but only when responding to the label-target combination, Dangerous-Black. That is, 
participants responded “True” more quickly than “False” when indicating that a Black 
man holding a gun was dangerous. Furthermore, this effect was only observed when 
participants were required to respond within 2000ms on each trial. 
Although promising, this one study is somewhat preliminary and many issues 
remain to be addressed before one can conclude that the IRAP provides a valuable 
measure of implicit racial bias in Ireland. For example, one of the defining features of an 
implicit measure is its resilience to motivating factors in socially sensitive contexts. For 
example, implicit racial bias should be observed irrespective of whether or not participants 
are motivated to conceal their prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998; Boysen, et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, levels of implicit racial bias should differ across relevant social groups. For 
instance, white participants may produce an anti-black bias on an implicit measure, but 
black participants may not (see Dasgupta, et al., 2000; Greenwald et al., 2002; Monteith, 
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et al., 2001; Livingston, 2002; Ottaway, et al., 2001).
The purpose of the research presented in the current thesis was to determine if the 
IRAP may be used as a reasonably reliable and valid measure of implicit racial bias in 
Ireland. To this end, the IRAP will be used to explore implicit racial prejudice across seven 
empirical studies focusing on: (a) its ability to detect participants’ preferences for black 
and white people; (b) its malleability as a result of context manipulation effects; (c) the 
impact of response latency restrictions and personalisation; (d) known-group differences; 
(e) correlated neural activity; and (f) malleability as a result of intervention.
(b)Malleability as a result of context manipulation effects. In one of the first 
studies designed to assess the malleability of IRAP performance, Cullen, Barnes-Holmes 
and Barnes-Holmes (2009), employed the IRAP in an analogue of prior IAT-based work 
conducted by Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001), which examined the malleability of 
implicit anti-age bias. On each trial participants were presented with one of two sample 
stimuli (“Old People” or “Young People”), a target stimulus that was a positive (e.g., 
energetic, enthusiastic) or a negative adjective (e.g., tired, weary), and two response 
options (“Same” and “Opposite”). Thus, four trial-type response patterns were presented 
across this task; young-positive, young-negative, old-positive, and old-negative. Cullen et 
al. (2009) reported that exposure to images of positive old exemplars resulted in reduced 
levels of pro-young bias (smaller effects on the young-positive and young-negative trial-
types) and reversed the anti-old effect (inverse effects on the old trial-types), whereas pro-
young exemplars were found to have no effect on IRAP responses; in addition, they found 
that this effect persisted over 24 hours. Interestingly, exemplar exposure was not found to 
30
influence explicit attitudes. Importantly, the IRAP was able to provide more detailed 
insight than the IAT on the influence of exemplars on age-related bias by revealing how 
the intervention affected particular trial-types. Specifically and as outlined above, the 
IRAP revealed that pro-old exemplars weakened the pro-young and reversed the anti-old 
biases. These findings indicate that relational responding as revealed by the IRAP may be 
affected by presenting participants with relevant exemplars beforehand and that the 
observed effects can be durable in the short-term. The IAT employed in the Dasgupta and 
Greenwald (2001) study could only identify reduced levels of implicit pro-young/anti-old 
bias overall whereas the IRAP could show the effect of exemplars on responding to young 
and old independently.
In a second IRAP investigation into the malleability of implicit responding, 
Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes and Stewart (2010) examined the sensitivity of 
pro-white/anti- black responding as revealed by the IRAP to a public-private assessment 
manipulation. This study was an analogue of a previous IAT study conducted by Boysen, 
Vogel and Madon (2006) examining implicit homonegativity in public and private 
assessment contexts. In the public condition in Barnes-Holmes, Murphy et al. study: (1) 
the experimenter told the participant that she (the experimenter) would be able to see the 
levels of bias recorded on the IRAP; (2) the experimenter sat beside the participant while 
he or she completed the task; and (3) participants were required to tell the experimenter 
each of their answers on a series of self-report measures. Meanwhile, in the private 
condition: (1) participants performed the IRAP task alone; (2) they were informed that the 
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experimenter would collect but would not examine their IRAP scores; and (3) they filled 
out the self-report measures but were explicitly told not to record any personally 
identifiable information, because all responses were to remain confidential.
It was hypothesised that there would be less implicit stereotyping in the public than 
in the private condition; however, this was not quite the pattern observed. Instead, while 
participants in the private condition demonstrated significant pro-black attitudes, 
participants in the public context showed significant pro-white attitudes. To further 
investigate, therefore, additional empirical work was conducted examining IRAP 
performance in a public setting but using a 2000ms response latency criterion, which 
permitted comparison with the data from the initial investigation in the public setting. 
Results showed that participants responded with greater pro-white and anti-black bias than 
in the previous study, while self reported (explicit) attitudes indicated neutral or positive 
racial bias. These findings thus highlighted that relatively “fast” responding is needed on 
the IRAP when examining socially sensitive attitudes, as this increases the “implicitness” 
of the responses under investigation. 
In summary, recent research has examined the malleability of implicit prejudicial 
responses on the IAT and IRAP by investigating the effect of contextual factors on the 
subsequent extent of negative, and socially sensitive, attitudes on these measures. The 
current work will extend these previous investigations in the context of a broader race-
IRAP.
(c) The impact of response latency restrictions and personalisation. Previous IAT 
studies (see Payne, Govorun, & Arbuckle, 2008) have demonstrated the malleability of the 
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IRAP as a consequence of personalisation. For example, the use of phrases such as ‘I 
Think” has been found reduce prejudicial responses on the IAT. In addition, as outlined 
above, Barnes-Holmes, Murphy et al., (2010) found that response latency restrictions were 
crucial and the current work sought to extend these findings. 
(d) Known-group differences. Previous research using implicit measures has shown 
that white participants tend to show a relatively strong in-group pro-white bias (e.g., 
Noseck, et al., 2002; Pena, Sidanius, & Sawyer, 2004), the opposite pattern has not been 
observed for black participants. Rather, black participants tend to show a relatively weak 
out-group, pro-white bias (Nosek, et al., 2002; Pena, et al., 2004). Nevertheless, the 
difference in positive bias towards whites does differ significantly between the groups, 
with whites showing a stronger bias than blacks. Thus, insofar as the IRAP is functionally 
similar to other implicit measures, one might predict that both white and black participants 
will produce evidence of pro-white bias on the IRAP, although the white bias will be 
significantly stronger than the black bias.
 (e) Correlated neural activity. Psychophysiological assessment tools such as ERPs 
(time-locked EEGs) have been suggested as viable and useful assessment techniques 
which can circumvent the limitations associated with self-report measures (Ito & 
Cacioppo, 2007). Furthermore, such measures may provide convergent validity for other 
less direct measures of biased responding. The very first IRAP study involved collecting 
both IRAP and electroencephalogram (EEG) data (Barnes-Holmes, Hayden, Barnes-
Holmes, & Stewart, 2008), and the results showed different patterns of EEG activity 
across blocks of consistent versus inconsistent trials on the IRAP. 
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(f) Malleability as a result of intervention. A critical issue in the area of racial 
prejudice concerns the development of methods that may be used to modify or undermine 
such prejudice. There has been a growing increase in research in this area (Bargh, 1999; 
Blair, 2002; Cullen, et al., 2009). At the time of writing no published study had 
demonstrated the malleability of implicit racial bias as measured by the IRAP (cf. Barnes-
Holmes, Murphy, et al., 2010). Furthermore, no published IRAP study had attempted to 
investigate the impact of educational or other types of interventions designed to undermine 
racial prejudice. Thus the current research programme sought to explore this issue.
Chapter 2 presents the first study of the thesis. This initial study directly explored 
the context sensitivity of the IRAP. Chapter 3 presents the second study of the thesis, 
which investigated the impact of response latency restrictions on IRAP performances. 
Chapter 4 presents Experiment 3, a study that further explored the impact of response 
latency restrictions on the IRAP. Chapter 5 presents the fourth study of the thesis, which 
explored the impact of personalising the labels on IRAP performances. Chapter 6 presents 
the fifth experiment, which involved a known-groups study exploring the predictive 
validity of the IRAP. Chapter 7 presents the sixth experiment, which investigated the 
relationship between neural activity and IRAP responses. Chapter 8 presents the final 
experiment in the current research programme, which investigated the malleability of the 
IRAP as a result of an acceptance- versus an education-based intervention. Chapter 9 
concludes the thesis with a review and discussion of the main findings across the seven 
empirical studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPERIMENT 1
CHAPTER 2 
EXPERIMENT 1
As outlined previously, numerous studies using the well-known IAT have indicated 
that white participants tend to show a relatively strong pro-white/anti-black bias (see 
Dasgupta, et al., 2000; Greenwald et al., 2002; Monteith, et al., 2001; Livingston, 2002; 
Ottaway, et al., 2001) and that this pro-white/anti-black bias occurs for participants who 
explicitly state that they hold no racist attitudes. At the time of writing only one published 
study had used the IRAP to measure implicit racism (Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2010). This 
study employed only two words -- “Safe” and “Dangerous” as label stimuli and pictures of 
white and black men holding guns as target stimuli. Similar to the IAT literature, this 
preliminary study revealed an anti-black bias (although, only when responding to the 
label-target combination, Dangerous-Black and only under strict time constraints). 
One criticism of the Barnes-Holmes et al. (2010) could be that the IRAP targeted 
only one specific dimension of racial prejudice, specifically safe versus dangerous. 
Furthermore, given the common portrayal of black males in the North American and 
British media as violent gun-carrying gang members, it could be argued that the resulting 
IRAP effects were hardly surprising because participants were asked to respond to pictures 
of black (and white) men holding guns. At the beginning of the research programme, 
therefore, it seemed important to determine if anti-black IRAP effects would be obtained 
again if participants were asked to respond to a range of negative-versus-positive attributes 
and to respond to statements rather than pictures. If the basic effect was replicated this 
would indicate that the IRAP may provide a general measure of racial bias, rather than one 
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that is restricted to a particular dimension.
Specifically, Experiment 1 sought to further develop the IRAP as a measure 
implicit racial stereotyping in Ireland, using a broader array of label stimuli and written 
statements rather than picture target stimuli. Similar to Barnes-Holmes, et al. (2010), 
Experiment 1 manipulated the assessment context in which the IRAP was completed. The 
aim of the experiment was to determine if manipulating the private versus public context 
of the assessment situation would impact upon the IRAP effects in a similar manner to that 
observed with the IAT in the Boysen, et al. (2006) study (i.e., a reduction in implicit in-
group bias in the public relative to the private assessment context).
Method
Participants
Forty-two participants, 19 males and 23 females aged 18 to 37 years (M = 25), 
completed the experiment individually in the Department of Psychology at the National 
University of Ireland, Maynooth. All participants were white, Irish citizens and were 
randomly assigned to one of two assessment contexts — Public (21 participants) and 
Private (21 participants). No inducements were offered for participation in the study. All 
participants were experimentally naïve. Fifty-one individuals commenced the experiment, 
but the data from nine participants were excluded because they failed to achieve pre-
determined performance criteria on the IRAP (described below) -- this level of attrition is 
not unusual.
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Materials and Apparatus
Discrimination and Diversity Scales. All participants were given four explicit self-
report measures to complete. The Discrimination (DS) and Diversity (DV) scales, created 
by Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park (1997), required participants to indicate on five point 
scales their agreement or disagreement with a total of 14 statements, 1 = strongly agree 
and 5 = strongly disagree. The DS scale consisted of ten statements concerning beliefs 
about discrimination within Irish society (e.g., “These days, reverse discrimination against 
Whites is as much a problem as discrimination against Blacks itself”). The DV scale 
consisted of four statements and targeted beliefs about the value of ethnic diversity within 
society (e.g. “There is a real danger that too much emphasis on cultural diversity will tear 
Ireland apart”). The questionnaires were scored such that 1 or 2 indicated negative racial 
stereotyping, 4 or 5 indicated positive racial stereotyping, and 3 indicated no stereotyping.
Semantic differential scales. Participants were required to complete 12 seven-point 
semantic differential scales, six for black people and six for white people. Each scale 
ranged from -3 to +3. These seven-point scales were anchored at either end by the 
following polar-opposite adjective pairs (taken from the IRAP): friendly – hostile, honest 
– deceitful, hardworking – lazy, peaceful – violent, good – bad and clever – stupid. To use 
the semantic differential scales as an explicit measure of racial stereotyping, the average 
ratings given for the White targets were subtracted from the average ratings given to the 
Black targets for each participant. Thus a positive score indicated pro-black stereotyping 
and a negative score indicated pro-white stereotyping.
Feeling thermometers. Two feeling thermometers assessed the favourability of 
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participants’ explicit feelings about white and black people. Participants were asked to 
mark an appropriate position on a picture of a thermometer numerically labelled at 10º 
intervals from 0º (cold or unfavourable) to 99º (warm or favourable).
Motivation to conceal prejudice scales. The internal and external motivation to 
respond without prejudice scales (the IMS and EMS, respectively), created by Plant and 
Devine (1998), asked participants to indicate on nine-point scales their agreement or 
disagreement with a total of 10 statements, 1 = strongly disagree and 9 = strongly agree. 
The IMS scale consisted of five statements concerning beliefs about internal motivation to 
respond without prejudice (e.g., “I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be non-
prejudiced to Black people”). The EMS scale consisted of five statements and targeted 
beliefs about external motivation to respond without prejudice (e.g. “I try to hide any 
negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative reactions from others”). 
The questionnaires were scored such that high scores on either scale indicated a large 
degree of motivation to conceal prejudice. 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). All participants completed the 
IRAP on a personal computer (Dell Pentium 4®). The IRAP software was used to present 
the stimuli and record participants’ responses. Each IRAP trial presented one of two 
statements; “I think BLACK people are” or “I think WHITE people are”. One of twelve 
target stimuli were also presented, and these consisted of six stereotypically positive words 
(“Friendly”, “Honest”, “Hardworking”, “Peaceful”, “Good”, “Clever”) or negative words 
(“Hostile”, “Deceitful”, “Lazy”, “Violent”, “Bad”, “Stupid”). Finally, each trial presented 
two response options, “True” and “False”. The program also presented the IRAP 
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instructions and a consent form.
Procedure
Public and Private contexts. Participants in the Public-context were given a form 
consisting of a “Public” statement, which they had to read and then indicate that they 
understood the information by providing a written summary: 
You are about to take a measure of racial prejudice on a computer. When you finish 
the test the computer will calculate the level of bias you have towards Black people 
on a scale from 0, meaning low bias, and 100, meaning the most bias possible. 
After I record your computer score, your bias will also be evaluated using some 
surveys.
This statement was used as a tool to elicit feelings of social desirability within the Public-
context group, such that these participants may attempt to appear less racially biased on 
both the explicit measures (DS and DV scales, Semantic differential scales, Feeling 
thermometers) and the implicit measure (IRAP). The participants in the Private group 
were not given this form to fill out, and were told that the experimenter would collect but 
not examine their scores, with the implication that individual levels of racial stereotyping 
would remain unknown. 
In both the Public and Private assessment situations, the experimenter sat adjacent 
to the participant and watched as he or she responded to the IRAP practice blocks. The 
experimenter then left the room while the participant completed the IRAP test blocks and 
did not return until the computer task was finished. For the explicit measures, participants 
in the Private-context were given the four scales in booklet form and told to fill them out 
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by circling the numbers that corresponded to their own feelings; they were also told not to 
mark the booklet in any other way (such as writing their name on it) because their answers 
were confidential. Public-context participants were given the booklet to read, and were 
also required to record their names on the coversheet because their answers were not 
confidential.
Implicit measure. The IRAP program began with a set of instructions, which 
described the task by illustrating the layout of the screen and explaining the response 
options (available from the first author upon request). The instructions informed 
participants that on each trial one of two statements, “I think BLACK people are” or “I 
think WHITE people are”, would appear at the top of the screen along with a target word 
in the center of screen. Participants were also told that the response options “True” and 
“False” would appear at the bottom of the screen, and they were required to choose one of 
these options on each trial, by pressing either the ‘d’ or ‘k’ key; they were told that the left-
right positions of these response options would switch randomly from trial-to-trial. The 
instructions also explained that the IRAP consisted of four different trial-types and 
illustrated examples of these were provided. In explaining these trial-types, participants 
were informed that sometimes they would be required to respond in a way that was 
consistent with their beliefs and at other times they would have to respond in a way that 
was inconsistent with their beliefs. Participants were assured that this was part of the 
experiment, and it was important for them to respond as quickly and accurately as possible 
on all trials of the IRAP (at no point was a participant informed which part of the 
experiment would be contradictory to their beliefs). The instructions also informed 
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participants that correct responses would allow them to progress to the next trial, but 
incorrect responses would produce a red ‘X’ in the middle of the screen, which could only 
be removed by pressing the correct key.
The IRAP task consisted of a minimum of two practice blocks and fixed set of six 
test blocks. Each block presented the same 24 trials, comprised of what are defined as four 
different trial-types (see Figure 1). The first block of the IRAP was designed to be 
consistent with pro-white stereotyping (e.g., I think WHITE people are – Positive – True; I 
think BLACK people are – Positive – False; I think WHITE people are – Negative – False; 
I think BLACK people are– Negative – True). The feedback contingencies alternated from 
block to block between pro-white and pro-black. Thus, in the second block of the IRAP 
correct responses were the opposite to the previous block (e.g., I think WHITE people are 
– Positive – False; I think BLACK people are – Positive – True; I think WHITE people are 
– Negative – True; I think BLACK people are – Negative – False). Before each new block 
began, the participants were informed that the previously correct and wrong answers 
would be reversed. The order in which IRAP blocks were presented was not 
counterbalanced across participants because previous research has found that this variable 
does not interact significantly with the critical IRAP effect (e.g., McKenna, et al., 2007; 
Power, et al. 2009; Vahey, et al. 2009).
Each IRAP block consisted of 24 trials, with each target stimulus presented once in 
the presence of each of the two statements. The trials were presented quasi-randomly with 
the constraint that none of the four trial-types could be presented twice in succession. The 
positioning of the two response options was also quasi-random in that they could not 
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appear in the same position three times in succession. For the first two practice blocks, 
participants were informed that it was a practice phase and errors were expected. 
Participants were required to reach a standard of >=80% correct responses, and a median 
response time of <=3000ms. These criteria were used to ensure that participants 
understood, and were complying with the IRAP instructions. If participants failed to 
achieve the two criteria for either of the two practice blocks, the required standard, and the 
standard of responding they had achieved, were presented on the screen. Participants were 
allowed three attempts (a total of six practice blocks) to achieve the practice criteria, and if 
they failed to do so, they were thanked, debriefed and their data were discarded (two 
participants were removed from the study on this basis). Participants who did achieve the 
practice criteria proceeded to the six test blocks.
The procedure for the first test block was similar to the first practice block, except 
that on-screen instructions informed participants that the next phase was a test and to “go 
quickly”, although making “a few errors is okay”. The second test block was similar to the 
second practice block, but with the modified instructions to go quickly. Test blocks 3 and 5 
were the same as block 1, and test blocks 4 and 6 were the same as block 2. No 
performance criteria were applied during the test blocks in order to proceed, but if a 
participant’s performance fell below 80% accuracy for any test block the data for that 
participant were discarded (seven participants were removed from the study on this basis). 
When all six test blocks had been completed participants reported to the researcher.
Explicit measures. Participants were given the four explicit measures to complete. 
The Discrimination (DS) and Diversity (DV) scales (see Appendix A), semantic 
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differential scales (see Appendix B), feeling thermometers (see Appendix C), and Internal 
and External Motivation to Conceal Prejudice scales (IMS and EMS respectively, see 
Appendix D). As noted earlier, the Private group completed the four scales by circling the 
appropriate numbers on the questionnaires whereas Public participants completed the four 
scales and recorded their names on the coversheet. The participants were then thanked, 
debriefed, and any questions were answered. All participants completed the experiment in 
a single session that lasted approximately 20-30 minutes.
Results and Discussion
Implicit Measure
Data preparation. The primary datum was response latency defined as the time in 
milliseconds that elapsed between the onset of a trial and a correct response emitted by a 
participant. To control for individual variations in speed of responding that may act as a 
possible confound when analyzing between group differences, the response latency data 
for each participant were transformed into D-IRAP scores (Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, et 
al., 2010; Barnes-Holmes, Waldron, et al., 2009; Cullen & Barnes-Holmes, 2009; Vahey, 
et al., 2009) using an adaptation of the Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) D-algorithm.
The steps involved in calculating the D-IRAP scores were as follows: (1) only 
response-latency data from the six test-blocks were used; (2) latencies above 10,000ms 
were removed from the dataset; (3) if the data from a participant contained more than 10% 
of test-block trials with latencies less than 300ms that participant was removed from the 
analyses; (4) twelve standard deviations for the four trial-types were calculated: four for 
the response-latencies from test-blocks 1 and 2, four from test-blocks 3 and 4, and a 
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further four from test-blocks 5 and 6; (5) 24 mean latencies were then calculated for the 
four trial types in each test-block; (6) difference scores for each of the four trial types were 
calculated, for each pair of test blocks, by subtracting the mean latency of the pro-white 
test-block from the mean latency of the corresponding pro-black test block; (7) each 
difference score was then divided by its corresponding standard deviation from step 4, 
yielding 12 D-IRAP scores; one score for each trial-type for each pair of test blocks; (8) 
four overall trial-type D-IRAP scores were then calculated by averaging the scores for 
each trial-type across the three pairs of test blocks; (9) an overall D-IRAP score was 
calculated by averaging all 12 trial-type D-IRAP scores from step 7.
The foregoing data transformation yields positive D-scores for positive bias, and 
negative scores for negative bias, towards Whites. In contrast, for the two Black trial-types 
negative D-scores indicate positive bias and positive scores indicate negative bias. In order 
to facilitate direct comparisons across the trial-types, the signs for the Black trial-type D-
scores were reversed (i.e., + scores became – scores, and vice versa). Following this 
additional data transformation, positive D-scores now indicate positive bias towards both 
Whites and Blacks and negative scores indicate negative bias towards both groups (note, 
previously published IRAP studies have not included this final transformation). It should 
also be understood that the overall D-IRAP scores were calculated before reversing the 
signs for the two Black trial-types, and thus a positive overall D score indicates a pro-
white/anti-black bias whereas a negative overall D score indicates a pro-black/anti-white 
bias.
Main analyses. A preliminary analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that there 
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were no main or interaction effects for the order in which pro-white versus pro-black 
blocks were presented (ps > .4), and thus this variable was removed from all subsequent 
analyses. The D-IRAP scores for the four trial-types in the Public and Private contexts are 
presented in Figure 2. All eight effects showed a positive bias. The strongest effects were 
produced on the White-Positive trial-type, and were similar across contexts. The Black-
Positive trial-type also revealed a relatively strong effect for the Public but not for the 
Private context. Weaker effects were observed in both contexts for the two Negative trial-
types, with the Black-Negative trial-type approaching zero in the Public context. 
Figure 2. Mean D-IRAP trial-type scores, with standard error bars, for the Public and Private Assessment 
Situations. 
A mixed repeated measures 2 x 4 analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on 
the D-IRAP scores, with Private- and Public-contexts as the between-participant variable 
and trial-type as the within-participant variable. There was a significant main effect for 
trial-type, F(3, 40) = 5.507, p < .001, !p2 = .12, but no effect for context or interaction (ps 
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> .3). Fisher’s PLSD post-hoc analyses revealed significant differences between White-
Positive and White-Negative trial-types (p < .01) and between Black-Positive and Black-
Negative trial-types (p < .05); no significant differences were obtained between the Black-
Positive and White-Positive trial-types, or between the Black-Negative and White-Negative 
trial-types (ps > .1). That is, positive trial-types appeared to produce stronger IRAP effects 
than negative trial-types, but race had no significant effect on the IRAP performance.
Given that context had no significant main or interaction effects on the IRAP the 
data for Public and Private conditions were combined. The combined data for each trial-
type were then subjected to one-sample t-tests to determine if the D-IRAP scores differed 
significantly from zero. The White-Positive effect was significant (t = 6.93, df = 41, p <.
0001), as was the Black-Positive effect (t = 4.05, df = 41, p <.0002). The effects for the 
two negative trial-types were non-significant (ps > .3).
Split-half reliability. To assess the internal consistency of the IRAP, five split-half 
reliability scores were calculated, one for each trial-type and one for the overall D-IRAP 
measure. In each case, two scores were calculated, one for odd trials and the second for 
even trials. These two scores were calculated in the same way as for the original D-IRAP 
scores, except that the algorithm was applied separately to all odd trials and to all even 
trials. The five split-half correlations between odd and even scores, applying Spearman-
Brown corrections, proved to be weak and non-significant for the four individual trial-type 
scores: White-Positive, r = .21, n = 42, p = .46; White-Negative, r = -.19, n = 42, p = .59; 
Black-Positive, r = .43, n = 42, p = .08; Black-Negative,  r = .29, n = 42, p = .29. The 
overall D-IRAP measure produced a weak to moderate and significant split-half 
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correlation, r = .49, n = 42, p =. 04).
Explicit measures 
Discrimination and diversity scales. The overall means for the DS scales revealed 
only a small difference between the Private (M = 4.02, SD = .49), and Public (M = 3.92, 
SD = .56) contexts, with both results revealing positive racial bias (i.e., mean scores above 
3); a one-way ANOVA indicated that the difference was non-significant (p > .5). The 
overall means for the DV scales revealed a small difference between the Private (M = 
3.66, SD = .56), and Public (M = 3.24, SD = .58) contexts, with both groups again showing 
positive racial bias. An ANOVA indicated that the effect was significantly more positive in 
Private than in Public, F(1, 40) = 5.612, p = .02, !p2 = .12.
Semantic differential scales. Four overall means were calculated for the semantic 
differential scales (Private/Black, M = 5.00, SD = 5.5; Public/Black, M = 6.2, SD = 5.7; 
Private/White, M = 4.6, SD = 5.1; Public/White, M = 6.5, SD = 5.5). Although more 
positive means were obtained in the Public context when rating both races, a 2x2 mixed 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant effects (ps > .3).
Feeling thermometers. Four overall means were calculated, showing more positive 
means for the White relative to the Black scales in both contexts (Private/Black, M = 70.9, 
SD = 14.4; Public/Black, M = 70.9, SD = 13.7; Private/White, M = 73.7, SD = 15.2; 
Public/White, M = 73.3, SD = 15.6). A 2x2 mixed repeated measures ANOVA indicated 
that only the main effect for race was significant, F(1, 40) = 4.762, p = .03, !p2 = .11 
(remaining ps > .8).
Motivation to conceal prejudice scales. Two overall means were calculated for 
48
each motivation scale in each setting (Private/IMS, M = 7.75, SD = .96; Public/IMS, M = 
6.5, SD = 1.37; Private/EMS, M = 3.82, SD = 2.0; Public/EMS, M = 4.2, SD = 1.82). The 
higher internal motivation in the Private context proved to be significant, F(1, 40) = 
11.716, p = .001, !p2 = .23, but the higher external motivation in the Public context did not 
(p > .4) 
Implicit-Explicit Correlations
Two correlation matrices of the implicit and explicit measures were calculated –
one for the Public and one for the Private context. Each matrix thus involved correlating 
the four trial-type and overall D-IRAP scores with each of the eight explicit measures. Out 
of the 80 correlations only four were significant. The Public context yielded a significant 
negative correlation between the White-Positive trial-type and the black semantic 
differential scales (r -.43, p < .05), indicating that increased white bias on the IRAP 
predicted less positive explicit ratings for black. In addition, the Public context yielded 
two significant correlations that indicated a divergence between the implicit and explicit 
measures. Specifically, for the Black-Negative trial-type a greater pro-black bias predicted 
increased pro-white ratings on the semantic differential scales (r = .484, p < .05) and 
reduced pro-black ratings on the feeling thermometers (r = -.454, p < .05). Thus, the 
relationship between the White-Positive trial-type and the explicit measure appeared 
broadly consistent (i.e., pro-white predicted anti-black), but the relationship between the 
Black-Negative trial-type and the explicit measures did not (i.e., pro-black predicted pro-
white and anti-black). Finally, the correlation matrix for the Private context yielded only 
one significant correlation, between the White-Positive trial-type and Internal Motivation
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(r = -.579, p < .01), indicating that increased pro-white bias on the IRAP predicted reduced
internal motivation to conceal racial prejudice.
Summary
The results from the IRAP failed to provide evidence for implicit anti-black 
stereotyping, in that all of the D-IRAP effects were positive and did not differ significantly 
across white versus black trial-types. Furthermore, the Public/Private manipulation failed 
to impact significantly on the IRAP measure. The results did indicate stronger effects for 
the two trial-types involving positive rather than negative target stimuli. Given the 
direction of the effects, it appears therefore that participants found it easier to confirm 
positive statements than to deny negative statements about white and black people.
In contrast to the IRAP, the explicit measures showed some sensitivity to both race 
and the Public/Private manipulation. Specifically, in the Private context racial diversity 
was endorsed more strongly, and internal motivation to conceal prejudice was higher, than 
in the Public context. Furthermore, the feeling thermometers yielded a small but 
significant pro-white bias, but no effect for context. Only three (out of 40) significant 
implicit-explicit correlations were obtained for the Public context, and these are difficult to 
interpret because one correlation showed convergence between the measures but the other 
two did not. For the Private context, only one (out of 40) implicit-explicit correlations 
were significant and this indicated that reduced internal motivation to conceal prejudice 
predicted stronger pro-white bias on the IRAP.
In conclusion, therefore, contrary to initial expectations the IRAP failed to produce  
evidence of racial bias and appeared largely insensitive to the Public/Private context
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manipulation. Although the explicit measures showed some sensitivity to race and context, 
the effects were not clear cut. For example, participants endorsed greater racial diversity in 
the private rather than the Public context, but this effect may be explained by the fact that 
Private-context participants also reported higher levels of internal motivation to conceal 
prejudice. Furthermore, only a small number of significant implicit-explicit correlations 
were obtained and some of the effects appeared contradictory. Overall, therefore, the 
results of the current experiment, particularly with respect to the IRAP, were inconsistent 
with previous research. Consequently, in the next experiment two possibly important 
features of the IRAP were modified and participants were again exposed to a race IRAP in 
a Public or Private context. 
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EXPERIMENT 2
Numerous published studies have shown a white in-group implicit bias using a 
range of measures (see Nosek, Smyth, Hansen,  Devos, Lindner, Ranganath, Tucker 
Smith, Olson, Chugh, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007, for a review), and yet no such effect 
was observed in the previous experiment using the IRAP. Shortly after Experiment 1 was 
conducted, however, a related IRAP study within the Maynooth laboratory did show an 
implicit pro-white/anti-black bias (Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes & Stewart, 
2010). Unlike the previous experiment, the study presented the sample words “Safe” and 
“Dangerous” with pictures of black and white men holding guns. Furthermore, a clear 
anti-black bias was observed only when participants were required to respond within 
2000ms on each trial of the IRAP (rather than 3000). Indeed, Barnes-Holmes, et al. argued 
that reducing the response latency criterion served to increase the “automaticity” of the 
measure (see Moors & DeHouwer, 2006). Participants in Experiment 2 of the current 
study were thus required to respond within 2 seconds on each trial of the IRAP. Based on 
the assumption that personalizing an implicit measure may have unintended performance 
effects (Nosek & Hansen, 2008), a further modification was also made to the procedure by 
removing the phrase “I think” from the sample stimuli (i.e., only “Black People” and 
“White People” were presented as labels).
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Method
Participants
Thirty-two participants, 15 males and 17 females aged 18 to 38 years (M = 24), 
completed the experiment individually in the Department of Psychology at the National 
University of Ireland, Maynooth. All participants were white, Irish citizens and were 
randomly assigned to one of two assessment contexts — Public (16 participants) and 
Private (16 participants). No inducements were offered for participation in the study. All 
participants were experimentally naïve. Forty-one individuals commenced the experiment, 
but the data from nine participants were excluded because they failed to achieve pre-
determined performance criteria on the IRAP.
Materials and Apparatus
The apparatus and materials used in Experiment 2 were similar to those used in 
Experiment 1 (DS and DV scales, Semantic differential scales, Feeling thermometers, IMS 
and EMS scales). Note, however, the sample statements were shortened to “BLACK 
people” and “WHITE people” and the IRAP instructions were modified slightly to 
indicate that participants had to reach an average response latency of <= 2000ms across 
each practice block of the IRAP before they could proceed to the test blocks.
Procedure
The procedure in Experiment 2 was similar to that used for Experiment 1, except 
that the response latency practice criterion was reduced from 3000 to 2000ms, and all 
instructions and feedback were adjusted to reflect this change. Five participants failed to 
reach the practice criteria (i.e., >= 80% correct and a median response latency <= 
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2000ms), and thus did not proceed to the test blocks. The data for four additional 
participants were removed because their accuracy levels on one or more test blocks fell 
below 75% correct.
Results and Discussion
Implicit Measure
Data preparation. The response latencies were subjected to the same data 
preparation procedures as were employed for Experiment 1.
Main analyses. A preliminary analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that there 
was a significant main effect for order F(3, 28) = 5.660, p < .02, !p2 = .17, but no 
interaction effect with trial-type or context (ps > .58), and thus order was removed from 
subsequent analyses. The D-IRAP scores for the four trial-types in the Public and Private 
contexts are presented in Figure 3.
           
Figure 3. Mean White and Black D-IRAP trial-type scores, with standard error bars, for the Public and 
Private Assessment Situation. 
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The effects showed positive bias for the two white trial-types but negative bias for 
the two black trial-types. The White-Positive trial-type showed the strongest effect, 
although the Black-Negative trial-type produced a relatively strong negative bias in the 
Private context. Overall, context appeared to have limited impact on the D-IRAP effects. 
A mixed repeated measures 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on the D-IRAP scores, with 
Private- and Public-contexts as the between-participant variable and trial-type as the 
within-participant variable. There was a significant main effect for trial-type, F(3, 30) = 
5.822, p < .001, !p2 = .16, but no effect for context or interaction (ps > .45). Fisher’s 
PLSD post-hoc analyses indicated that the White-Positive trial-type produced significantly 
stronger positive bias than the other three trial-types (ps < .02), with no other significant 
differences (ps > .1).
Given that context had no significant main or interaction effects on the IRAP the 
data for Public and Private conditions were combined. The combined data for each trial-
type were then subjected to one-sample t-tests to determine if the D-IRAP scores differed 
significantly from zero. The White-Positive effect was significant (t = 4.586, df = 31, p <.
0001), but the White-Negative, Black-Positive and Black Negative effects were not (ps > .
2).
Split-half reliability. To assess the internal consistency of the IRAP, five split-half 
reliability scores were calculated (in the same way as for Experiment 1), and these were 
weak and non-significant for three of individual trial-type scores: White-Positive, r = .198, 
n = 32, p = .55; White-Negative, r = .223, n = 32, p = .49; and Black-Positive, r = .05, n = 
32, p = .89. For Black-Negative, however, the effect was moderate to strong and
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significant, r = .627, n = 32, p = .007. Finally, the overall D-IRAP measure produced a 
weak to moderate and significant split-half correlation, r = .51, n = 32, p =. 05.
Explicit Measures  
Discrimination and diversity scales. The overall means for the DS scales revealed 
only a small difference between the Private (M = 3.96, SD = .53), and Public (M = 4.16, 
SD = .43) contexts, with both results revealing positive racial bias (i.e., mean scores above 
3); a one-way ANOVA indicated that the difference was non-significant (p > .2). The 
overall means for the DV scales revealed a small difference between the Private (M = 
3.54, SD = .68), and Public (M = 3.20, SD = .54) contexts, with both groups again showing 
positive racial bias. A one-way ANOVA indicated that the difference was also non-
significant (p > .1).
Semantic differential scales. Four overall means were calculated for the semantic 
differential scales (Private/Black, M = .7, SD = 1.02; Public/Black, M = 1.51, SD = 8.91; 
Private/White, M = .427, SD = .896; Public/White, M = 1.38, SD = .823). More positive 
means were obtained in the Public context when rating both races and a 2x2 ANOVA 
revealed that this difference was significant F(1, 30) = 8.560, p >.006, !p2 = .22.
Feeling thermometers. Four overall means were calculated, showing more positive 
means for the White relative to the Black scales in both contexts (Private/Black, M = 63.1, 
SD = 14.0; Public/Black, M = 71.2, SD = 15.8; Private/White, M = 64.3, SD = 12.0; 
Public/White, M = 74.3, SD = 16.6). A 2x2 ANOVA indicated that the effect for context 
approached significance, F(1, 30) = 3.495, p < .071, !p2 = .1, but the effect for race and 
interaction did not (ps > .28).
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Motivation to conceal prejudice scales. Two overall means were calculated for 
each motivation scale in each setting (Private/IMS, M = 6.3, SD = 1.39; Public/IMS, M = 
7.1, SD = 1.42; Private/EMS, M = 4.08, SD = 1.3; Public/EMS, M = 4.2, SD = 1.71). 
Separate one-way ANOVA’s for each scale revealed no significant differences (all ps > .1). 
Thus, unlike the previous Experiment, the Public-Private manipulation did not impact on 
motivation to conceal prejudice.
Implicit-Explicit Correlations
Two correlation matrices of the implicit and explicit measures were calculated –
one for the Public and one for the Private context. Each matrix thus involved correlating 
the four trial-type and overall D-IRAP scores with each of the eight explicit measures. Out 
of the 80 correlations none were significant (all ps > .15).
Post-Hoc Analyses
In the current Experiment participants were required to respond within 2000ms on 
each trial of the IRAP, and were not permitted to continue to the test blocks if their median 
response latency on a practice block exceeded this criterion. Once participants started on 
the test blocks, however, they were not prevented from continuing if latency increased 
above the 2000ms criterion. It is possible, therefore, that latency may have floated above 
criterion for some participants during the test, leading perhaps to a reduction in the 
automaticity that the shorter latency criterion was designed to elicit. Consequently, the raw 
latency data for each of the participants were divided according the four trial-types and 
averaged across the consistent and across the inconsistent blocks, yielding eight mean 
latencies. If any of the eight latencies was greater than 2000ms, the data for that 
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participant were discarded. On this basis, the data for six participants were removed (one 
from the Private and 5 from the Public condition), and all of the previous analyses that 
were conducted on the IRAP data were repeated.
The 2x4 ANOVA again yielded a significant effect for trial-type, F(3, 24) = 7.580, 
p < .0002, !p2 = .61, with no effects for context or interaction (ps > .64). Interestingly, 
however, the Fisher’s PLSD post-hoc tests indicated that the pro-white bias on the White-
Negative trial-type was significantly different to the anti-black bias on the Black-Negative 
trial-type (p = .01); this difference was non-significant in the previous analyses. 
Furthermore, the previously significant difference between the White-Positive and White-
Negative trial-types was no longer significant, and the non-significant difference between 
the White-Negative and Black-Positive trial-types now approached significance (p = .06). 
Overall, therefore, removing the data for participants who did not maintain the 2000ms 
practice latency criterion produced post-hoc effects suggestive of relatively stronger pro-
white in-group and anti-black out-group implicit biases.
Given that context once again had no significant main or interaction effects the 
combined data for each trial-type were subjected to one-sample t-tests. Once again, the 
White-Positive effect was significant (t = 4.495, df = 25, p <.0001), and the two Black 
trial-type effects were not (ps > .14). In contrast to the previous analyses, however, the 
White-Negative effect was now significant (t = 2.425, df = 25, p <.02), suggesting again 
that removing “slow” test-block responders served to increase the implicit pro-white bias. 
Finally, analyses of the split-half reliabilities for the IRAP yielded similar results to the 
previous analyses.
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Summary and Conclusion
As was the case in the previous experiment, the Private/Public context 
manipulation had no significant impact the IRAP effects. Unlike the previous experiment, 
however, IRAP effects indicative of pro-white in-group and anti-black out-group bias were 
observed. Furthermore, the in-group/out-group biases appeared to be strengthened when 
slow responding participants were removed from the data set. The split-half reliability of 
the IRAP was moderate and significant for the Black-Negative trial-type; in the previous 
experiment all of the reliabilities were weak and non-significant.
With regard to the explicit measures, the Public context increased the ratings for 
both races on the semantic differential scales and feeling thermometers (the latter 
approached significance). Contrary to the previous experiment none of the explicit 
measures produced significant effects indicative of racial bias, and furthermore context 
had no significant impact on motivation to conceal prejudice (in the previous experiment 
the Private context increased internal motivation). Finally, unlike Experiment 1, none of 
the implicit-explicit correlations were significant. At the current time, it is difficult to 
determine why these differences in the explicit measures emerged across the two 
experiments. However, given that the IRAP also produced unexpected results in the first 
experiment (i.e., no racial bias effects), it seems best simply to note the differences in the 
explicit measures at this point and to remain alert to this issue in subsequent experiments.
Overall, the current experiment produced IRAP effects indicative of in-group racial 
bias that appeared broadly consistent with the results of a related study (Barnes-Holmes, 
Murphy, et al., 2010). However, it remains unclear to what extent the different outcomes 
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for the two experiments were due to the reduced latency criterion or to the removal of “I 
think” from the sample statements. Experiment 3 was conducted to address this issue.
61
CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 3
CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 3
In Experiment 3 the phrase “I think” was reintroduced into the sample stimuli (i.e., 
as in Experiment 1, the current Experiment presented the phrases “I think Black People 
are” and “I think White People are”). Similar to Experiment 2, participants had to reach an 
average response latency of <= 2000ms across each practice block of the IRAP before they 
could proceed to the test blocks. Given that the public-private manipulation had no 
significant effects on the IRAP performances across the previous two experiments the 
“standard” private context was employed in the current experiment (i.e., participants were 
not told that the experimenter would know their level of racial bias). Although previous 
studies have found that the order in which IRAP blocks are presented does not moderate 
the IRAP effect, it was decided to check this variable once more in the context of the 
current research programme. Thus half of the participants were exposed to pro-white 
relations-first and the remaining participants were exposed to pro-black relations-first. 
Method
Participants
Twenty-two participants, 12 males and 10 females aged 19 to 36 years (M = 26), 
completed the experiment individually in the Department of Psychology at the National 
University of Ireland, Maynooth. All participants were white, Irish citizens and all 
completed the experiment in a Private context. No inducements were offered for 
participation in the study. All participants were experimentally naïve. Thirty-two 
individuals commenced the experiment, but the data from ten participants were excluded 
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because they failed to achieve pre-determined performance criteria on the IRAP.
Materials and Apparatus
The apparatus and materials used in Experiment 3 were similar to those used in 
Experiment 2 (DS and DV scales, Semantic differential scales, Feeling thermometers, IMS 
and EMS scales), except that the sample statements were “I think BLACK people are” and 
“I think WHITE people are”.
Procedure
The procedure in Experiment 3 was similar to that used for Experiment 2 except 
that all participants completed Experiment 3 in a private setting and the order in which 
IRAP blocks were presented was counterbalanced across participants -- half of the 
participants were exposed to pro-white relations-first and the remaining participants were 
exposed to pro-black relations-first. Two participants failed to reach the practice criteria 
(i.e., >= 80% correct and a median response latency <= 2000ms), and thus did not proceed 
to the test blocks. The data for three additional participants were removed because their 
accuracy levels on one or more test blocks fell below 75% correct, and the data for five 
participants were removed because their mean response latencies were greater than 
2000ms for one or more trial-types on one or more test-blocks.
Results and Discussion
Implicit Measure
Data preparation. The response latencies were subjected to the same data 
preparation procedures as were employed in the previous experiments.
Main analyses. The overall mean D-IRAP scores for the four trial-types, divided 
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by order, are presented in Figure 4. The effects showed positive bias for the two white 
trial-types and the Black-Positive trial-type, but negative bias for the Black-Negative trial-
type; the White-Positive trial-type showed the strongest effect. The order in which IRAP 
blocks were presented appeared to have little effect on each of the four trial-types. 
Figure 4. The mean D-IRAP scores, with standard error bars, for the four trial-types in the pro-white first 
and pro-black first conditions. 
A mixed repeated measures ANOVA indicated that there was a significant main 
effect for trial-type, F (3, 20) = 7.128, p = .0004, !p2 = .26, but no main or interaction 
effects for order (ps > .6). Fisher’s PLSD post-hoc analyses indicated that the White-
Positive trial-type produced significantly stronger positive bias than the two black trial-
types (ps < .04), and that the Black-Negative trial-type produced significantly stronger 
negative bias than the White-Negative and Black-Positive trial-types (ps < .01).
The combined data (across order) for each trial-type were then subjected to one-
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sample t-tests to determine if the D-IRAP scores differed significantly from zero. The 
White-Positive effect was significant (t = 4.257, df = 21, p =.0004), as was the White-
Negative effect (t = 3.070, df = 21, p <.005), but the Black-Positive and Black-Negative 
effects were not (ps > .1).
Split-half reliability. To assess the internal consistency of the IRAP, five split-half 
reliability scores were calculated (in the same way as for Experiments 1 and 2), and these 
were weak and non-significant for two individual trial-type scores: White-Positive, r = .
362, n = 22, p = .33, and Black-Positive, r = .455, n = 22, p = .19. For Black-Negative, the 
effect was moderate and approached significance, r = .558, n = 22, p = .07. The correlation 
for White-Negative was negative, thus violating reliability model assumptions. Finally, the 
overall D-IRAP measure produced a weak to moderate but non-significant split-half 
correlation, r = .438, n = 22, p = .21.
Explicit Measures  
Discrimination and diversity scales. The overall means for both the DS and DV 
scales revealed a positive racial bias (M = 4.09, SD = .47, and M = 3.55, SD = .6, 
respectively). 
Semantic differential scales. Two overall means were calculated for the semantic 
differential scales, one for Black and one for White (Black, M = 5.09, SD = 5.50; White, M 
= 4.40, SD = 5.19). A more positive mean was obtained for Black relative to White, but 
this difference was non-significant (p > .36).
Feeling thermometers. Two overall means were calculated, showing more positive 
means for White relative to Black (Black, M = 70.4, SD = 14.5; White, M = 71.7, SD = 
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15.7), but this difference was non-significant (p > .26).
Motivation to conceal prejudice scales. Two overall means were calculated, one for 
the IMS and one for the EMS (IMS, M = 7.81, SD = .89; EMS, M = 3.85, SD = 1.95), and 
these showed broadly similar levels of motivation to the previous two experiments.
Implicit-Explicit Correlations
A correlation matrix of the implicit and explicit measures was calculated. This 
involved correlating the four trial-type and overall D-IRAP scores with each of the eight 
explicit measures. Out of the 40 correlations only three were significant (all other ps > .1). 
The Black-Negative trial-type was correlated negatively with both the black feeling 
thermometer (r = -.45, p < .03) and the white feeling thermometer (r = -.45, p < .03), 
indicating that greater negativity towards black people on the IRAP predicted increased 
positivity towards both black and white people on the two thermometers. Finally, the 
Black-Negative trial-type was correlated positively with the diversity scales (r = .48, p < .
01), indicating that reduced negativity towards black people on the IRAP predicted greater 
endorsement of racial diversity in Ireland.
Post-Hoc Analyses
The current experiment produced IRAP effects indicative of in-group racial bias 
similar to those observed in Experiment 2. Unlike the previous experiment, however, the 
phrase “I Think” was included in the sample statements. In order to determine if the 
absence-versus-presence of the phrase impacted upon the IRAP performances, the data 
from Experiments 2 and 3 were subjected to a 2x4 mixed repeated ANOVA, with sample 
phrase as the between-participant variable and trial-type as the repeated measure (to be 
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consistent with Experiment 3, only the data from the Private condition in Experiment 2 
were included, and the data for one participant were removed because the mean response 
latencies were greater than 2000ms for one or more trial-types on one or more test-blocks). 
The ANOVA failed to yield significant main or interaction effects for sample-phrase (ps 
> .28), thus indicating that personalizing the sample with “I think” did not have a 
significant effect on IRAP performance.
Summary and Conclusion
Similar to the previous experiment, the IRAP effects were indicative of pro-white 
in-group and anti-black out-group bias. Once again, split-half reliability was moderate 
only for the Black-Negative trial-type, but on this occasion it failed to reach significance. 
The order in which the IRAP blocks were presented did not appear to moderate the IRAP 
effects. 
Consistent with Experiment 2, none of the explicit measures produced significant 
effects indicative of racial bias, and motivation to conceal prejudice was similar to 
previous experiments. Unlike Experiment 2, three of the forty implicit-explicit correlations 
were significant, and each of them involved the Black-Negative trial-type. Two of the 
correlations indicated that greater negativity towards black people on the IRAP predicted 
increased positivity towards both black and white people on the two feeling thermometers. 
Although apparently contradictory, this result may have emerged because at least some 
white participants attempted to match their out-group thermometer ratings of black people 
with their in-group ratings of white people. Certainly, the Motivation to conceal prejudice 
scales indicated that participants were internally motivated in this direction (i.e., to appear 
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non-prejudiced). On balance, however, the third significant correlation indicated that 
reduced negativity towards black people on the Black-Negative trial-type predicted greater 
endorsement of racial diversity in Ireland. It is difficult to explain this correlation in terms 
of participants simply matching a black rating to a white rating because all the statements 
on the DV scales pertain to black people. These data thus suggest an IRAP performance 
may correlate with one or more explicit measures of racial prejudice, although motivation 
to conceal prejudice may play an important moderating role in that implicit-explicit 
relationship. This issue is addressed directly in the next Experiment.
Overall, the current experiment again produced IRAP effects indicative of in-group  
racial bias that appeared broadly consistent with the results of a related study (Barnes-
Holmes, Murphy et al., 2010). Furthermore, a comparison of Experiments 2 and 3 
suggested that the presence-versus-absence of the phrase “I think” had no significant 
impact on the IRAP effects, although this latter conclusion is based on a post-hoc analysis. 
In the next experiment, therefore, the “I think” variable was targeted directly. In addition, 
it was noted that 5 participants in Experiment 3 were removed from the data set because 
their response latencies during the test blocks “drifted” over 2000ms on one or more trial-
types. A modification to the IRAP software was thus introduced at this point in the 
research program. Specifically, the warning message “Too Slow!” was presented on any 
trial (practice or test) whenever a participant did not respond within 2000ms.
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As noted above, the “I think” variable was manipulated directly in Experiment 4, 
and the warning message “Too Slow!” was presented if a participant failed to respond 
within the specified latency criterion (2000ms). The current experiment also aimed to 
investigate an issue that has been the focus of previous studies on implicit attitudes. 
Specifically, a number of studies have found that the relationship between implicit and 
explicit measures is moderated by participants’ motivation to conceal the attitude under 
investigation (e.g., Payne, Govorun, & Arbuckle, 2006). That is, implicit measures may 
predict explicit measures when participants lack motivation to conceal the relevant 
attitude, but the predictive relationship is absent when motivation is high. A series of 
regression analyses will thus be used to determine if the relationship between the IRAP 
and explicit measures is also moderated by such motivation. Insofar as the IRAP overlaps, 
to some extent, with other implicit measures the IRAP may correlate with explicit 
measures for those participants who are low in motivation to conceal racial prejudice, but 
will not correlate for those participants who are highly motivated to conceal prejudice.
Method
Participants
Thirty-six participants, 17 males and 19 females aged 18 to 38 years (M = 24), 
completed the experiment individually in the Department of Psychology at the National 
University of Ireland, Maynooth. All participants were white, Irish citizens and were 
randomly assigned to one of two assessment contexts — “I think” (18 participants) and No 
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“I think” (18 participants). Within each assessment context, half of the participants were 
exposed to pro-white relations-first and half were exposed to pro-black relations-first. No 
inducements were offered for participation in the study. All participants were 
experimentally naïve. Forty-one individuals commenced the experiment, but the data from 
five participants were excluded because they failed to achieve or maintain performance 
criteria on the IRAP (described below).
Materials and Apparatus
The apparatus and materials used in Experiment 4 were similar to those used in 
Experiment 3 (IRAP, DS and DV scales, Semantic differential scales, Feeling 
thermometers, IMS and EMS scales). Note, however, the two IRAP sample statements for 
half of the participants were shortened to “BLACK people” and “WHITE people”. In 
addition response latency feedback was introduced. That is, if a participant took longer 
than 2000ms on any IRAP trial, the phrase “Too Slow!” was presented on the screen. The 
IRAP instructions were modified slightly to indicate these changes. 
Procedure
The procedure in Experiment 4 was similar to that used for Experiment 3, except 
that the response latency feedback was introduced. Specifically, if a participant failed to 
emit a response (correct or incorrect) within 2000ms on any trial, the message “Too 
Slow!” appeared in the lower bottom centre of the screen, and remained there until a 
response was emitted. If the response was correct the screen cleared and the program 
progressed to the 400ms inter-trial interval; if the response was incorrect only the “Too 
Slow!” message was removed and the red X appeared (to continue to the inter-trial interval
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a correct response was required). The pre-experimental instructions were adjusted to 
reflect the presentation of the “Too Slow!” feedback. 
Four participants failed to reach the practice criteria (i.e., >= 80% correct and a 
median response latency <= 2000ms), and thus did not proceed to the test blocks. The data 
for one additional participant were removed because accuracy levels on one or more test 
blocks fell below 80% correct.
Results and Discussion
Implicit Measure
Data preparation. The response latencies were subjected to the same data 
preparation procedures as were employed for Experiment 3.
Main analyses. A preliminary mixed repeated measures 2x2x4 ANOVA indicated 
that there were no main or interaction effects for order or for “I think” (ps > .53). Four 
planned comparisons between-participant ANOVAs were conducted to insure that the “I 
think” variable had no impact on any of the individual trial-types and each of these was 
non-significant (ps > .22). At this point, therefore, the order and “I think” variables were 
removed from subsequent analyses. 
The overall mean D-IRAP scores for the four trial-types are presented in Figure 5. 
The results showed positive bias for the two white trial-types, an almost neutral effect for 
Black-Positive, and negative bias for Black-Negative. A one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for trial-type, F(3, 35) = 21.244, p < .0001, !p2 
= .37. Fisher’s PLSD post-hoc analyses indicated that the White-Positive trial-type 
produced significantly stronger positive bias than the other three trial-types (ps < .006) and 
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revealed significant differences between the White-Negative and Black-Negative trial-
types (p < .0001), and between the Black-Positive and Black-Negative trial-types; the 
difference between the White-Negative and Black-Positive trial-types approached 
significance (p> .07). One-sample t-tests indicated that the White-Positive effect was 
significantly different from zero (t = 9.135, df = 35, p <.0001), as were the White-Negative 
(t = 2.270, df = 35, p <.02) and the Black-Negative effects (t = -4.511, df = 35, p <.0001), 
but the Black-Positive effect was not (p > .7).
Figure 5. The mean D-IRAP scores, with standard error bars, for the four trial-types.
Split-half reliability. To assess the internal consistency of the IRAP, five split-half 
reliability scores were calculated (in the same way as for the previous Experiments) and 
these were moderate to strong and significant for three of individual trial-type scores: 
White-Positive, r = .591, n = 36, p < .01; Black-Positive, r = .505, n = 36, p < .04; and 
Black-Negative, r = .739, n = 36, p < .0001. For White-Negative, however, the effect was 
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weak and non-significant, r = .128, n = 36, p > .7. Finally, the overall D-IRAP measure 
produced a moderate to strong and significant split-half correlation, r = .774, n = 36, p <. 
0001.
Explicit Measures  
Discrimination and diversity scales. The overall means for the DS scales revealed 
only a small difference between the “I think” (M = 3.75, SD = .67), and No “I think” (M = 
3.84, SD = .54) sample stimuli, with both results revealing positive racial bias (i.e., mean 
scores above 3); a one-way ANOVA indicated that the difference was non-significant (p 
> .6).The overall means for the DV scales revealed another small difference between the “I 
think” (M = 3.46, SD = .73), and No “I think” (M = 3.42, SD = .54) samples, with both 
groups again showing positive racial bias. A one-way ANOVA indicated that the difference 
was also non-significant (p > .8).
Semantic differential scales. Four overall means were calculated for the semantic 
differential scales (“I think”/Black, M = .79, SD = 1.14; No “I think”/Black, M = .9, SD = 
8.6; “I think”/White, M = .87, SD = 1.14; No “I think”/White, M = .63, SD = .81); all four 
means revealed a positive bias (> 0). A 2x2 mixed repeated measures ANOVA yielded no 
significant main or interaction effects (ps > .14).
Feeling thermometers. Four overall means were calculated, showing more positive 
means for the White relative to the Black scales given the “I think” samples (Black, M = 
66.5, SD = 19.8; White, M = 74.3, SD = 21.3), but the opposite pattern given the No “I 
think” context (Black, M = 70, SD = 11.9; White, M = 68.9, SD = 12.3). A 2x2 mixed 
repeated measures ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for feeling thermometer, F(1, 
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34) = 4.403, p < .05, !p2 = .1, and a significant interaction, F(1, 34) = 7.827, p < .01, !p2 
= .2. Four simple effects tests yielded one significant difference; participants who were 
presented with the “I think” samples in the IRAP produced thermometer ratings that were 
significantly greater for White than for Black (p < .01; remaining ps > .35).
Motivation to conceal prejudice scales. Two overall means were calculated for 
each motivation scale in each setting (“I think”/IMS, M = 6.6, SD = 1.5; No “I think” /
IMS, M = 6.5, SD = 1.3; “I think”/EMS, M = 4.8, SD = 1.5; No “I think”/EMS, M = 4.07, 
SD = 1.6). Separate one-way ANOVA’s for each scale revealed no significant differences 
(ps > .15).
Implicit-Explicit Correlations
A correlation matrix of the implicit and explicit measures was calculated. This 
involved correlating the four trial-type and overall D-IRAP scores with each of the eight 
explicit measures. Out of the 40 correlations none were significant (all ps > .1). 
The Moderating Impact of Motivation to Conceal Prejudice
As noted previously, it was predicted that there should be some indication that 
implicit attitudes coincide with explicit attitudes for individuals who are not motivated to 
conceal racial prejudice. In contrast, individuals who are highly motivated in this regard 
should show equivalent implicit attitudes on the IRAP but under-report their racial 
prejudice. 
IRAP trial-type regression analyses. A single motivation score for each participant 
was first obtained by averaging the combined IMS and EMS scores. Single feeling 
thermometer and semantic differential scores were obtained by subtracting the white from 
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black ratings. All variables were then standardized and a series of two-step multiple 
regressions were conducted. On the first step, one of the explicit attitude measures (feeling 
thermometer, semantic differential, DV or DS) was entered as the dependent variable with 
one of the four IRAP trial-types (White-Positive, White-Negative, Black-Positive, Black-
Negative) and the single motivation score as predictors. In the second step, the IRAP trial-
type x motivation interaction was entered. A total of 16 separate regression analyses were 
thus conducted, and one of these yielded a significant two-way interaction effect. 
Specifically, the Black-Negative trial-type interacted with motivation in predicting 
participants’ ratings on the semantic differentials, b = .393, t = 1.989, p < .05. The second 
step added a significant increment in variance explained !R2 = .11, F(3, 35) = 11.44, p = .
05. Regression lines relating the Black-Negative IRAP performance and semantic 
differential ratings are displayed at one standard deviation above and below the mean on 
motivation to conceal prejudice (Figure 6).
 The figure illustrates that the Black-Negative IRAP performance was strongly 
related to the semantic differential rating for those individuals who were unmotivated to 
conceal their prejudice (b = .41). In contrast, the relationship was much weaker and in the 
opposite direction for those who were motivated to conceal prejudice (b = -.19). The 
interaction is driven by the fact that highly motivated participants tended to under-report 
their racial prejudice on the semantic differentials, but did not perform differently on the 
Black-Negative IRAP trial-type, as indicated by the lack of correlation between the IRAP 
and motivation to conceal prejudice scores reported above.
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Figure 6. Regression interaction plot with lines relating Black-Negative IRAP performance and semantic 
differential ratings, displayed at one standard deviation above and below the mean on motivation to conceal 
prejudice.
Overall D-IRAP regression analyses. The analytic strategy employed with the 
individual IRAP trial-type scores was also used with the overall D-IRAP score. That is, 
four separate regression analyses were conducted. As noted in the Results section of 
Experiment 1 overall D-IRAP scores are calculated before reversing the signs for the two 
Black trial-types, and thus a positive overall D score indicates a pro-white/anti-black bias 
whereas a negative overall D score indicates a pro-black/anti-white bias. To facilitate 
graphical comparison with the feeling thermometer and semantic differential measures, 
black ratings were subtracted from white ratings, thus yielding positive scores for pro-
white/anti-black and negative scores for pro-black/anti-white. 
For each analysis one of the explicit measures was entered as the dependent 
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variable, and on the first step the overall D-IRAP score and motivation were entered as 
predictors. On the second step, the IRAP x motivation interaction was entered, and one of 
the four regression analyses yielded a significant two-way interaction effect. The IRAP 
again interacted with motivation in predicting participants’ ratings on the semantic 
differentials, b = -.404, t = 1.9, p < .05. The second step added a significant increment in 
variance explained !R2 = .13, F(3, 35) = .522, p = .05. The interaction plot presented in 
Figure 7 again indicates that the IRAP performance was strongly related to the semantic 
differential rating for unmotivated individuals (b = .3), but the relationship was weaker 
and in the opposite direction for motivated participants (b = -.12).
Figure 7. Regression interaction plot with lines relating overall D-IRAP performance and semantic 
differential ratings, displayed at one standard deviation above and below the mean on motivation to conceal 
prejudice.
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Summary and Conclusion
Similar to the previous experiment, the IRAP effects were indicative of pro-white 
in-group and anti-black out-group bias. Consistent with the post-hoc comparison made 
between Experiments 2 and 3, the presence-versus-absence of the phrase “I think” had no 
significant impact on the IRAP effects. Unlike any of the previous experiments, the anti-
black bias observed on the Black-Negative trial-type proved to be significantly different 
from zero. Furthermore, in contrast to earlier experiments split-half reliabilities were 
generally moderate to strong and significant. Overall, these findings suggest that reducing 
the latency criterion to 2000ms and introducing the “Too Slow!” latency feedback 
message served to increase the IRAP effects and their internal reliabilities. 
Experiments 2 and 3 did not produce significant effects indicative of racial bias for 
any of the explicit measures, and this result was observed again in the current experiment 
for the DS and DV scales, and for the semantic differentials, for both types of IRAP (“I 
think” versus No “I think”). For the feeling thermometers, however, a significant pro-
white/anti-black bias was observed but only for those participants who had previously 
completed the “I think” IRAP. The opposite pattern was observed for the No “I think” 
IRAP participants, but the effects were non-significant. This result is difficult to interpret 
at the current time, but it does suggest that although the two different samples did not 
impact on the IRAP performance itself they may have influenced subsequent ratings on 
the feeling thermometers. Future research may explore this issue further.
Consistent with Experiment 2, none of the forty implicit-explicit correlations were 
significant. As noted previously, however, Experiment 3 yielded three significant 
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correlations involving the Black-Negative trial-type, and it was suggested that motivation 
to conceal prejudice may play an important moderating role in this respect. Evidence to 
support this conclusion was obtained in the current experiment in which overall IRAP and 
Black-Negative trial-type performances were found to be strongly related to an explicit 
measure for unmotivated but not motivated individuals.
At this point in the research programme an IRAP had been developed that showed 
relatively strong in-group and out-group racial bias, reasonable levels of internal 
reliability, and did not appear to be influenced greatly by increased personalization (i.e., 
using the phrase “I think”). Furthermore, participants who were motivated to conceal 
prejudice tended to under-report their racial prejudice on the semantic differentials, but did 
not perform differently on the IRAP. This pattern of findings is generally consistent with 
the conclusion that the IRAP possesses at least some of the properties of an implicit 
measure. Nevertheless, an important test of the validity of the current IRAP would involve 
conducting a known-groups analysis (De Houwer, & De Bruycker, 2007, Barnes-Holmes, 
Murtagh, et al., 2010, Barnes-Holmes, Waldron, et al., 2009). Specifically, would 
performance on the current IRAP differ significantly between groups of black and white 
participants resident in Ireland? Insofar as the IRAP is a valid measure of racial bias one 
might indeed expect clear differences. Testing this prediction was the primary purpose of 
the next experiment.
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The primary purpose of the current experiment was to test the prediction that 
performance on the IRAP will differ significantly between groups of black and white 
participants resident in Ireland. Although previous research using implicit measures has 
shown that white participants tend to show a relatively strong in-group pro-white bias 
(e.g., Nosek, et al., 2002; Pena, Sidanius, & Sawyer, 2004), the opposite pattern has not 
been observed for black participants. Rather, black participants tend to show a relatively 
weak out-group, pro-white bias (Nosek, et al., 2002; Pena, et al. 2004). Nevertheless, the 
difference in positive bias towards whites does differ significantly between the groups, 
with whites showing a stronger bias than blacks. Thus, insofar as the IRAP is functionally 
similar to other implicit measures, one might predict that both white and black participants 
will produce evidence of pro-white bias on the IRAP, although the white bias will be 
significantly stronger than the black bias. 
On balance, Experiment 5 will be the first study of implicit attitudes to be 
conducted with black participants in Ireland, and thus a precise prediction is difficult. 
Ireland has a very short history of significant black immigration with past censuses 
showing, for example, that the number of black African nationals living in Ireland 
increased almost ten-fold from 4,867 in 1996 to 42,764 in 2006 (http://www.cso.ie/census/
default.htm). As such, Ireland presents an unusual social and cultural context, relative to 
countries in which black minorities have resided for decades if not centuries. Furthermore, 
many black residents in Ireland came seeking asylum from various forms of persecution in 
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their indigenous countries, and thus may not be directly comparable to previous samples 
of black participants employed in non-Irish studies of implicit racial bias. Given this rather 
unusual historical context there are insufficient grounds on which to predict that black 
Irish residents will respond with the pro-white bias observed in previous studies. It does 
seem reasonable, however, to predict that black participants will respond differently from 
white participants on at least some of the four IRAP trial-types. Experiment 5 tested this 
prediction.
Method
Participants
Considerable difficulty was encountered in recruiting black Irish residents as 
participants for the study, largely due to language difficulties. Eventually, a sample of 
twenty-two black individuals attending adult education classes in an inner-city school 
agreed to participate. Sixteen of these participants aged 17 to 26 years (M = 22), 
completed the experiment individually. All participants were born in Nigeria but had been 
resident in Ireland for at least 5 years. All participants were experimentally naïve. Twenty-
two individuals commenced the experiment, but the data from six participants were 
excluded because they failed to achieve or maintain performance criteria on the IRAP 
(described below). The data from the eighteen white Irish participants who completed the 
“I think” condition of Experiment 4 were used to compare with the data from the black 
participants.
Materials and Apparatus
The apparatus and materials used in Experiment 5 were similar to those used in 
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Experiment 4 (IRAP, DS and DV scales, Semantic differential scales, Feeling 
thermometers). However, the IMS and EMS scales were not employed because questions 
pertaining to motivation to conceal prejudice among a black minority living in Ireland 
were not deemed relevant, or even meaningful, in the context of the current study. The two 
“I think” IRAP sample statements were employed for all participants in Experiment 5. 
Procedure
The procedure in Experiment 5 was similar to that used for Experiment 4. Six 
participants failed to reach the practice criteria (i.e., >= 80% correct and a median 
response latency <= 2000ms), and thus did not proceed to the test blocks.
Results and Discussion
Implicit Measure
Data preparation. The response latencies were subjected to the same data 
preparation procedures as were employed for Experiments 1 through 4.
Trial-type analyses. The D-IRAP scores for the four trial-types for black 
participants are presented in Figure 8, along with the data from the eighteen white 
participants who completed the identical “I think” condition of Experiment 4. The black 
participants showed positive bias across all four trial-types. The white participants also 
showed positive bias across the two white trial-types and the Black-Positive trial-type but 
relatively strong negative bias for the Black-Negative trial-type; the positive bias for the 
Black-Positive trial-type was relatively weak compared to the bias observed for the black 
participants.
A mixed repeated measures 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on the D-IRAP scores, 
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with race of participant as the between-participant variable and trial-type as the within-
participant variable. There was a significant main effect for trial-type, F(3, 32) = 6.31, p 
< .0006, !p2 = .16, and for race of participant F(1, 32) = 11.9, p < .001, !p2 = .27, and a 
significant interaction, F(3, 32) = 7.65 p < .0001, !p2 = .19. Between-group post-hoc 
analyses (Fisher’s PLSD) revealed significant differences between black and white 
participants’ performances on the two black trial-types (ps < .02), but not on the white 
trial-types (ps > .2).
Figure 8. The mean D-IRAP scores, with standard error bars, for the four trial-types for Black and White 
participants.
A within-group post-hoc ANOVA for the black participants revealed no significant 
trial-type effect (p > .1), but an ANOVA for the white participants was significant, F(3, 17) 
= 9.92, p < .0001, !p2 = .36. Fisher’s PLSD post-hoc analyses for the latter ANOVA 
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indicated that the White-Positive trial-type produced significantly stronger positive bias 
than the other three trial-types (ps < .009); furthermore, the Black-Negative trial-type was 
significantly different, and in a negative direction, compared to the White-Negative and 
Black-Positive trial-types (p < .01). 
Eight one-sample t-tests indicated that three of the four trial-type effects for the 
black participants were significantly different from zero (ps < .001); the White-Negative 
effect approached significance (p = .06). For the white participants, the White-Positive 
effect was significant (p <.0001), as was the Black-Negative effect (p <.03), but the 
remaining two effects were not (ps > .2).
In summary, the black participants showed positive racial bias for both the in- and 
out-groups that did not differ significantly across trial-types. The white participants also 
showed positive bias towards white people, but in stark contrast to the black participants 
they showed relatively weak positive or strongly negative bias towards black people.
Split-half reliability. To assess the internal consistency of the IRAP, five split-half 
reliability scores were calculated for white participants (in the same way as for the 
previous Experiments) and these were weak and non-significant for White-Positive, r = .
362, n = 18, p = .3; weak, negative and non-significant for White-Negative, r = -.2, n = 18, 
p = .72; weak to moderate and non-significant for Black-Positive, r = .525, n = 18, p = .1; 
and moderate to strong and significant for Black-Negative, r = -.786, n = 18, p = .002. 
Finally, the overall D-IRAP measure for white participants produced a strong and 
significant split-half correlation, r = .803, n = 18, p < .001. Five split-half reliability scores 
were also calculated (in the same way) for black participants and these were weak and 
87
non-significant for White-Positive, r = .007, n = 16, p = .99; moderate to strong and 
significant for White-Negative, r =.795, n = 16, p = .004; weak, negative and non-
significant for Black-Positive, r = -.577, n = 16, p = .4; and Black-Negative, r = -.593, n = 
16, p = .4. The overall D-IRAP measure for black participants produced a weak and non- 
significant split-half correlation, r = -.331, n = 16, p = .6. In summary, the D-IRAP 
measures showed good internal reliability for white participants for Black-Negative and 
Overall D-scores, and for black participants for the White-Negative trial-type.
Explicit Measures  
Discrimination and diversity scales. The overall means for the DS scales revealed 
a difference between white participants (M = 3.76, SD = .67), and black participants (M = 
3.31, SD = .27), with both revealing positive racial bias (i.e., mean scores above 3); a one-
way ANOVA indicated that white participants responses were significantly more positive 
than those of black participants, F(1, 32) = 6.129, p < .01, !p2 = .16. The overall means for 
the DV scales again revealed positive bias for both white (M = 3.46, SD = .73), and black 
participants (M = 3.73, SD = .8). A one-way ANOVA was non-significant (p > .3).
Semantic differential scales. Four overall means were calculated for the semantic 
differential scales (white participants/Black, M = .8, SD = 1.14; black participants/Black, 
M = 1.6, SD = .6; white participants/White, M = .87, SD = 1.14; black participants/White, 
M = 1.23, SD = .55), with all four means revealing a positive bias (> 0). A 2x2 mixed 
repeated measures ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for race of participant F(1, 
32) = 4.32, p < .04, !p2 = .12, but no other main or interaction effects (ps > .09). Follow up 
tests revealed that black participants rated black people more positively than white 
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participants rated black people, F(1, 32) = 6.768, p < .01, !p2 = .17; although black 
participants rated white people more positively than white participants rated white people, 
this difference was not significant (p > .26).
Feeling thermometers. Four overall means were calculated, showing more positive 
means for White relative to Black ratings for white participants (Black, M = 66.5, SD = 
19.8; White, M = 74.3, SD = 21.3), but the opposite pattern for black participants (Black, 
M = 77.5, SD = 12.4; White, M = 74.4, SD = 14.1). A 2x2 mixed repeated measures 
ANOVA yielded no significant main effects (ps > .1), but a significant interaction, F(1, 32) 
= 13.125, p < .001, !p2 = .29. Two between-participant follow-up ANOVAs yielded one 
effect that approached significance; black participants rated black people more positively 
than white participants rated black people, F(1, 32) = 3.620, p < .07, !p2 = .1; the rating of 
white people by black and white participants did not differ significantly (p > .9). Two 
within-participant follow-up ANOVAs indicated that white participants rated white people 
significantly more positively than they rated black people F(1, 17) = 9.686, p < .006, !p2 
= .36, and black participants rated black people more positively than they rated white 
people, but only at a level that approached significance, F(1, 15) = 4.310, p < .06, !p2 = .2. 
Implicit-Explicit Correlations
A correlation matrix of the implicit and explicit measures was calculated across 
black and white participants. This involved correlating the four trial-type and overall D-
IRAP scores with each of the six explicit measures. Out of the 30 correlations, six were 
significant and two approached significance (all other ps > .1): White-Positive trial-type 
with black feeling thermometer (r = -.35, p < .04); Black-Positive trial-type with both 
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black semantic differential (r = .39, p < .02) and black feeling thermometer (r = .411, p < .
01); Black-Negative trial-type with both black semantic differential (r = .336, p < .05) and 
black feeling thermometer (r = .343, p < .04); overall D-IRAP score with black feeling 
thermometer (r = -.38, p < .02); White-Negative trial-type with diversity scale (r = -.33, p 
= .06); and overall D-IRAP with black semantic differential (r = -.32, p = .07). For each of 
the eight correlations the IRAP effect was consistent with the explicit measure. For 
example, increased pro-white bias on the White-Positive trial type predicted lower ratings 
on the black feeling thermometer, whereas increased pro-black bias on the Black-Positive 
trial-type predicted higher ratings on this thermometer. Note also that a negative overall D-
IRAP score indicates a pro-black/anti-white bias, and thus the negative correlation with 
the black semantic differential is consistent with the other correlations.
Predictive Validity
A series of hierarchical logistic regression analyses were conducted to determine if 
one or more of the IRAP measures increased the predictive validity each of the six explicit 
measures. For illustrative purposes, consider the first regression analysis reported in Table 
1. The DS was entered as a predictor or race (i.e., white or black participant) in the first 
step of the model, and this proved to be weak but significant, B = 1.82, p = .03, accounting 
for 13% of the variance. The White-Positive D-IRAP scores were entered in the second 
step of the model, and this produced virtually no increment in predictive validity, B = 1.35, 
p = .32, accounting for 15% of the variance (R2 change = .02). A further four separate 
models were then created in which the Discrimination Scale was entered as the first step 
and the remaining IRAP measures were entered as second steps. The Black-Positive, 
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Black-Negative, and overall D-IRAP measures significantly increased the predictive 
validity of the DS, with the Black-Negative measure yielding the largest increment (R2 
change = .41). The same general strategy was then applied to the remaining five explicit 
measures (see Table 1), and a similar pattern of results was obtained for these except that 
the Black-Positive measure did not significantly increase predictive validity for the black 
semantic differential and black feeling thermometer. 
 In short, the Black-Negative and Overall D-IRAP measures each significantly 
increased the predictive validity of each of the six explicit measures. The Black-Negative 
measure in particular produced large increases in the percentage of variance accounted for, 
adding between 36 to 44 percent to the explicit measures. 
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Table 1
Summary of Hierarchical Logistical Regression analysis for the variables predicting race of participants (N = 
34).
Step 1
Explicit Measure
Step 2
Explicit + Implicit Measures
Predictor Variables B R! p Predictor Variables B R! p R2 Change
Discrimination Scale 1.82 .13 .03* Discrimination Scale +
White-Pos D-IRAP           
White-Neg D-IRAP
Black-Pos D-IRAP
Black-Neg D-IRAP
Overall D-IRAP
1.35
0.07
3.09
7.53
6.25
.15
.13
.27
.54
.34
.32
.94
.03*
.02*
.03*
.02
0
.14
.41
.21
Diversity Scale 0.49 .02 .30 Diversity Scale +
White-Pos D-IRAP           
White-Neg D-IRAP
Black-Pos D-IRAP
Black-Neg D-IRAP
Overall D-IRAP
1.48
0.78
2.67
6.50
4.57
.06
.04
.15
.45
.19
.25
.39
.04*
.02*
.02*
.04
.02
.13
.43
.17
Semantic Differential (SD) 
Black
0.97 .14 .02* SD Black +
White-Pos D-IRAP           
White-Neg D-IRAP
Black-Pos D-IRAP
Black-Neg D-IRAP
Overall D-IRAP
1.18
0.64
2.04
7.42
4.35
.15
.14
.20
.50
.26
.38
.52
.13
.02*
.04*
.01
0
.06
.36
.12
Semantic Differential (SD) 
White
0.47 .03 .26 SD White +
White-Pos D-IRAP           
White-Neg D-IRAP
Black-Pos D-IRAP
Black-Neg D-IRAP
Overall D-IRAP
1.37
0.59
2.65
6.56
4.97
.05
.04
.15
.45
.21
.30
.53
.05*
.02*
.02*
.02
.01
.12
.42
.18
Feeling Thermometer 
(FT) Black
0.04 .08 .08 FT Black +
White-Pos D-IRAP           
White-Neg D-IRAP
Black-Pos D-IRAP
Black-Neg D-IRAP
Overall D-IRAP
1.91
0.69
2.22
6.69
4.16
.09
.09
.15
.45
.21
.50
.49
.10
.02*
.04*
.01
.01
.07
.37
.13
Feeling Thermometer 
(FT) White
0.00 .00 .99 FT White +
White-Pos D-IRAP           
White-Neg D-IRAP
Black-Pos D-IRAP
Black-Neg D-IRAP
Overall D-IRAP
1.65
0.68
2.72
6.63
4.39
.04
.01
.13
.44
.17
.22
.44
.04*
.01*
.02*
.04
.01
.13
.44
.17
*p < .05
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Discriminant Analysis
A series of discriminant analyses were performed in order to determine the extent 
to which each of the IRAP and explicit measures predicted whether a participant was black 
or white. For illustrative purposes, consider the first discriminant analysis reported in 
Table 2. The value of the discriminant function for the White-Positive IRAP measure was 
not significantly different for black and white participants, "2 (1, 32) = 1.41, p = .23, with 
the overall function successfully predicting outcome for 67.6% of cases, with accurate 
predictions being made for 62.5% of the black group, and 72.2% of the white group. This 
indicated a 37.5% false negative misclassification of the black group, and a 27.8% false 
positive classification of the white group. The remaining discriminant analyses indicated 
that three of the IRAP measures (Black-Positive, Black-Negative, and Overall D-IRAP) 
and two of the explicit measures (DS and black semantic differential) were significant 
predictors (the black feeling thermometer approached significance). The best predictor of 
group status was the Black-Negative IRAP measure, predicting outcome for 82.4 percent 
of cases.
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Table 2
Summary of Discriminant Analyses for the Variables Predicting Race of Participants (N = 34).
Measure "2 df p Race Predicted 
Percentage of 
Group 
Membership
Overall 
Percentage 
Correct 
Classification
Black White
White-Pos D-IRAP 1.41 1, 32 .23 Black
White 
62.5
27.8
37.5
72.2
67.6
White-Neg D-IRAP .56 1, 32 .46 Black
White
37.5
22.2
62.5
77.8
58.8
Black-Pos D-IRAP 5.31 1, 32 .02* Black
White
68.8
33.3
31.3
66.7
67.6
Black-Neg D-IRAP 16.38 1, 32 .00* Black
White
93.8
27.8
6.3
72.2
82.4
Overall D-IRAP 7.23 1, 32 .01* Black
White
68.8
38.9
31.3
61.1
64.7
Discrimination Scale 5.52 1, 32 .02* Black
White
87.5
38.9
12.5
61.1
73.5
Diversity Scale 1.06 1, 32 .30 Black
White
43.8
50.0
56.3
50.0
47.1
Semantic Differential 
Black
6.04 1, 32 .01* Black
White
68.8
33.3
31.3
66.7
67.6
Semantic Differential 
White
1.26 1, 32 .26 Black
White
75.0
44.4
25.0
55.6
64.7
Feeling Thermometer 
Black
3.38 1, 32 .07 Black
White
56.3
33.3
43.8
66.7
61.8
Feeling Thermometer 
White
.00 1, 32 .99 Black
White
50.0
66.7
50.0
33.3
41.2
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Summary and Conclusion
The primary purpose of the current Experiment was to conduct a “known-groups” 
analysis of the race-IRAP developed across the previous four experiments. Specifically, 
would performance on the IRAP differ significantly between groups of black and white 
participants resident in Ireland? The results showed that black participants showed positive 
racial bias for both the in- and out-groups that did not differ significantly across trial-
types. The white participants also showed positive bias towards white people, but in stark 
contrast to the black participants they showed relatively weak positive or strongly negative 
bias towards black people. The internal reliability of the D-IRAP measures were 
reasonably robust for white participants for Black-Negative and Overall D-scores, and for 
black participants for the White-Negative trial-type.
The explicit measures yielded mixed results. The DS indicated that white 
participants were significantly more pro-black than black participants, but no such 
difference was obtained on the DV measure. For the semantic differentials, the black 
participants were more positive about both races than the white participants. The feeling 
thermometers revealed an interaction between race of participant and in and out-group 
ratings. Specifically, black participants rated black people more positively than white 
participants rated black people; ratings of white people were similar across participants. 
Finally, both groups rated the in-group more positively than the out-group. 
The implicit and explicit measures correlated on only 6 of the thirty correlations, 
with two others approaching significance. In each case, the IRAP effect was consistent 
with the explicit measure. A series of hierarchical logistic regression analyses indicated 
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that the Overall D-IRAP, and the Black-Negative trial-type in particular, substantively 
increased the predictive validity of each of the six explicit measures. A series of 
discriminant analyses indicated that three of the IRAP measures and two of the explicit 
measures each predicted group status, with the Black-Negative IRAP trial-type being the 
best predictor.
Overall, these findings show that the current IRAP revealed in-group/out-group 
bias for the white participants but not for the black participants. The explicit measures 
produced mixed results, but correlated in a limited number of cases with the IRAP data. 
Finally, one or more of the IRAP measures provided increased predictive validity over the 
explicit measures, and provided the best prediction of group status.
At this point in the research programme an IRAP had been developed that yielded 
clear evidence of implicit racial bias among white Irish participants. The very first IRAP 
study involved collecting both response latency and electroencephalogram (EEG) data 
(Barnes-Holmes, Hayden, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2008), and the results showed 
different patterns of EEG activity across blocks of consistent versus inconsistent trials on 
the IRAP. At the time of writing, EEG data had not been collected in another IRAP study 
and thus in the next experiment EEGs were recorded while participants were exposed to 
the race-IRAP that had been developed across the previous experiments.
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EXPERIMENT 6
! Psychophysiological assessment tools have been suggested as viable and useful 
techniques for the assessment of prejudiced emotional responses. Such tools have the 
advantages of circumventing limitations of self-report measures (Guglielmi, 1999) and of 
eliminating possible sources of bias in questionnaires more generally such as modification 
of responses for reasons of social desirability. Several relevant techniques have pervaded 
the literature (e.g., functional magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI], event-related potentials 
[ERPs], electromyography [EMG], startle eye-blink responses, and autonomic responses; 
see Guglielmi, 1999; Ito & Cacioppo, 2007 for reviews). As discussed, the very first 
IRAP study also measured ERPs, and the results showed different patterns of activity 
across blocks of consistent and inconsistent IRAP trials.
 Experiment 6 sought to extend these findings, and thus recordings were taken from 
multiple EEG signals, while participants completed the race-IRAP, and these signals were 
then transformed into event-related potentials (ERPs; e.g., Kutas, 1993; Kutas & Hilliard, 
1984). This method of recording neural activity is relatively noninvasive and inexpensive, 
and allows researchers to investigate the neurophysiological processes underlying 
functions such as perception, semantic relations, and reasoning (see Barnes-Holmes, 
Staunton, et al. 2005; Barnes-Holmes, Regan, et al., 2005, for examples of ERP research 
within the behavior-analytic tradition). 
Generating ERP data involves time-locking the EEG signals to a particular series 
of events and then averaging the signals across trials. The process of averaging allows the 
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researcher to distinguish the brain’s normal background activity from the activity produced 
by the stimuli presented in the experiment. In effect, each EEG signal for a particular set 
of stimuli is collated and averaged to produce a single waveform for each site, and then 
these waveforms are averaged across participants to provide “grand average” waveforms 
that provide group-based measures of the effect of the targeted stimulus or stimuli. 
There is a range of waveforms associated with ERP measures. Some ERPs, for 
example, are thought to be correlated with specific cognitive processes, such as 
differentiating different auditory stimuli from one another or understanding words. These 
ERPs commonly occur at around 300 or 400ms after stimulus onset. The use of ERP 
measures with the race-IRAP in the current study was entirely exploratory, and thus no 
specific predictions were made pertaining to the ERP waveforms that might emerge. One 
ERP measure however that seemed particularly pertinent to the IRAP is the N400, a late 
negative waveform (see Holcomb & Anderson, 1993; Kounios & Holcomb, 1992). The 
N400 is usually produced when participants are required to respond to stimuli that are 
unexpected, unrelated, or wrongly paired in some sense (known as low cloze-probability). 
Presenting pairs of words that are semantically unrelated, for example, tends to produce an 
N400, whilst words from the same semantic categories do not. Insofar as pro-black/anti-
white trials on the race-IRAP require “incorrect” or “wrongly paired” responses, a more 
negative waveform may emerge for these trials relative to pro-white/ anti-black trials. 
Indeed, this is the general pattern of results obtained in the only study that has measured 
EEG signals while participants completed an IRAP (Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2008). On 
balance, the previous study was conducted using verbal relations that would not be 
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deemed socially sensitive (e.g., Pleasant – Holiday – Similar) and a practice latency 
criterion of 3000ms was applied. Given that the current study will employ socially 
sensitive verbal relations (e.g., Black – Stupid – True) and a 2000ms response latency 
criterion, it is quite possible that different EEG results will emerge.
In Experiment 6, separate ERP waveforms, recorded across a range of sites, for 
blocks of pro-white/anti-black IRAP trials were collected. Similarly, waveforms were also 
collected for blocks of anti-white/pro-black trials. A comparison could thus be made 
between the ERP waveforms associated with these two types of IRAP trials.
Method
Participants
Sixteen participants, 8 male and 8 female, agreed to participate. Ages ranged from 
18 to 33 years. Data from seven participants were excluded due to excessive noise in the 
EEG data (explained below). Participants were given a local record-store voucher worth 
10 euros upon completing the study. 
Apparatus and materials
The entire experiment was conducted in an electrically shielded room in the human 
neuroscience laboratory in the Department of Psychology at NUI, Maynooth. The stimuli 
and materials used with the race-IRAP were identical to those of Experiment 5. To record 
EEG signals during the IRAP task, a Brain Amp, magnetic resonance (MR) compatible 
(Class IIa, Type BF) with approved control software (Brain Vision Recorder 1.0), and 
electrode cap (BrainCap/ BrainCap MR) were used. Two Dell personal computers 
(Pentium 4) were employed for the experiment. One computer controlled the Brain Amp, 
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and a second the IRAP. The ERPs data were analyzed using approved analysis software 
(Brain Vision Analyser 1.0). Hardware and software were manufactured and supplied by 
Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany.
Procedure
The IRAP was identical to that of Experiment 5. Participants were first attached to 
the Brain Amp and were then exposed to the entire IRAP. Each session, consisting of 
electrode placement and then the IRAP task, lasted on average 1 hr and 15 mins. Only the 
ERPs data from the six test blocks were analyzed. Evoked potentials were recorded and 
analyzed from 32 sintered AG/AG-CI scalp electrodes positioned according to the 
international 10-20 system. The 32 sites chosen for recording were Fp1, Fp2, F7, F3, Fz, 
F4, F8, FT7, FC3, FCz, FC4, FT8, T7, C3, C4, T8, TP9, TP7, CP3, CPz, CP4, TP8, TP10, 
P7 P3, Pz, P4, P8, O1, Oz and O2. The central vertex electrode was used as reference and 
the FPz as ground. Amplifier resolution was 0.1 µV (range, ±3.2768 mV) and the 
bandwidth set between 0.5 and 62.5 Hz, with a sampling rate of 250 Hz. The notch filter 
was set at 50 Hz. All electrode impedances were at or below 5 k#. The EEG was collected 
continuously and edited off-line.
Results and Discussion
Implicit Measure
Data preparation. The response latencies were subjected to the same data 
preparation procedures as were employed for Experiment 5.
Main analyses. The overall mean D-IRAP scores for the four trial-types are 
presented in Figure 9. The results showed positive bias for the two white trial-types, and 
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negative bias for the two black trial-types. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed 
a significant main effect for trial-type, F(3, 8) = 88.906, p < .0001, !p2 = .92. Fisher’s 
PLSD post-hoc analyses indicated that the two white trial-types produced significantly 
stronger positive bias than the two black trial-types (ps < .0001). The two white trial types 
did not differ significantly from each other (ps > .9), and neither did the two black trial-
types (ps > .4). One-sample t-tests indicated that each of the four trial-type effects differed 
significantly from zero (all ps < .0006).
Figure 9. The mean D-IRAP scores, with standard error bars, for the four trial-types. 
Split-half reliability. To assess the internal consistency of the IRAP, five split-half 
reliability scores were calculated (in the same way as for the previous Experiments). Three 
of the reliability estimates (for White-Positive, White-Negative and Black-Positive) were
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negative, thus violating reliability model assumptions. The split-half correlation for the
Black-Negative trial-type, however, was moderate (r = .613) but not significant. The 
overall D-IRAP measure was weak (r = .164) and also non-significant.
Summary and Conclusion. Similar to previous experiments, the IRAP effects were 
indicative of pro-white in-group and anti-black out-group bias. The split-half reliability 
measures were all non-significant, but once again internal reliability was strongest for the 
Black-Negative trial-type. It is also worth noting that this was the first experiment to 
record a significant anti-black effect on the Black-Positive trial-type.
ERPs Data
The continuous EEG signals for each of 16 participants were filtered (0.53 Hz, 
time constant = 0.3 s, 24 dB/octave roll-off) and then segmented. The segments were 
divided into 900ms epochs commencing 100ms before onset of the stimuli on each trial 
(overlapping segments were removed). Vertical and horizontal ocular artifacts were then 
corrected, and any segments on which EEG or electro-ocular activity exceeded ±75 µV 
were rejected (the data from 7 participants were removed from subsequent analyses 
because no segments were artifact free). The remaining segments were then baseline 
corrected (using the 100ms pre-stimulus interval). Finally, to reduce noise for the ERPs 
analyses, the data for the three pro-white/anti-black test blocks were collapsed, as were the 
data for the three pro-black/anti-white test blocks (for ease of communication, these two 
types of test block will be referred to as pro-white and pro-black, respectively). 
 The grand average waveforms for each of the 6 frontal electrode sites (Fp1, Fp2, 
F7, F3, F4, and F8) for pro-white (light lines) versus pro-black (dark lines) blocks are 
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presented in Figure 10. No differences in evoked potentials between pro-white and pro- 
black trials were detectable at any of the other sites and thus, in accordance with common 
practice (e.g., Weisbrod, Keifer, Winkler, Maier, Hill, Roesch-Ely et al., 1999) these data 
are not reported. Visual inspection of the waveforms from the six sites indicated little 
evidence of differential activity between the pro-white and pro-black blocks until 
approximately 200ms after stimulus onset. Thereafter, the two waveforms separated with 
the pro-black blocks producing greater positivity than the pro-white blocks. The 
waveforms for sites F3 and F4 tended to converge again around 500ms, whereas the 
waveforms for the remained sites did not.
Figure 10. The grand average waveforms for each of the 6 frontal electrode sites (Fp1, Fp2, F7, F3, F4, and 
F8) for pro-white (light lines) versus pro-black (dark lines) blocks.
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The area dimensions (µV x ms) for each ERP waveform (in the temporal region 
300–800ms) for each participant were calculated, yielding either positive or negative 
values with respect to the 0 µV level. For the purposes of statistical analysis average area 
dimensions were calculated across the three left sites (Fp1, F7, F3) and across the three 
right sites (Fp2, F8, F4) for pro-white and pro-black waveforms.
The data were entered into a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with laterality (left 
versus right) and IRAP (pro-white versus pro-black) as variables. The main effect for 
laterality proved to be significant, F (1, 8) = 7.37, p = .03, !p2 = .48, as did the effect for 
the IRAP, F (1, 8) = 7.48, p = .02, !p2 = 48; the interaction was non-significant (p > .6). 
Follow-up paired t-tests for each of the six sites revealed significant differences between 
pro-white and pro-black waveforms at Fp1, Fp2, F7, and F8 (all ps < .03).
Summary and Conclusions
 Experiment 6 replicated the IRAP effects obtained in previous experiments 
revealing pro-white in-group and anti-black out-group bias. However, this was the first 
experiment to record a significant anti-black effect on the Black-Positive trial-type. Similar 
to previous experiments internal reliability was strongest for the Black-Negative trial-type. 
At the present time, it is unclear why an anti-black effect was observed for the Black-
Positive trial-type, but given the relatively low n compared to previous experiments, it 
would be unwise to conclude that this effect that would be replicated reliably.
The EEG recordings revealed that the ERP grandaverage waveforms for the pro-
black trials were more positive than for the pro-white trials across six of the frontal sites 
between 300-800ms. Insofar as pro-black responding for white participants is considered 
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history-inconsistent and pro-white responding history-consistent, the current experiment 
produced completely opposite effects to those reported in the only other IRAP study that 
employed EEG as a measure (Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2008). Specifically, waveforms 
associated with relational responding that was deemed inconsistent with the participants’ 
prior history were more negative than those waveforms associated with history-consistent 
responding. In addition, the previous study also reported significant differences between 
the waveforms for sites in the central and parietal areas; these were not observed in the 
current experiment. 
At the present time, it remains unclear why these differences emerged in the EEG 
measures across the two studies. As noted earlier, however, the previous study employed 
stimuli that were not deemed socially sensitive, and used a response-latency criterion of 
3000ms (rather than 2000ms.). Furthermore, participants in the earlier study were not 
required to remain within the latency criterion during the test blocks (this was required in 
the current study). Clearly, therefore, further research will be required to determine the 
variables responsible for the different ERP patterns observed across the two studies. 
Nevertheless, the current findings do indicate that EEG signals may be used to 
differentiate between two different types of IRAP trial, even when socially-sensitive 
stimuli are employed.
Thus far, the research reported in the current thesis has involved developing an 
IRAP that may be used to measure implicit racial bias. Both response latencies and EEG 
patterns have been shown to be sensitive dependent measures. However, a critical issue in 
the area of racial prejudice concerns the development of methods that may be used to 
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modify or undermine such prejudice. The final study reported in the current thesis focused 
on this issue.
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! The development of methods that may be used to modify or undermine prejudice 
remains a critical issue. However, attempts to modify biases uncovered by other so-called 
implicit measures (e.g., the IAT) have yielded disappointing results. For example, in 
studies which employed interventions including an education and empathy manipulation 
and counter-conditioning procedures neither Gapinksi, Schwartz and Brownell (2006) nor 
Teachman, Gapinski, Brownell, Rawlins and Jeyaram, (2003) achieved a successful 
reduction in bias. A recent promising pilot study by Lillis and Hayes (2007) compared two 
approaches to reducing racial and ethnic prejudice: a protocol based on acceptance and 
commitment therapy (ACT) and an education-based protocol drawn from a well-known 
textbook on the psychology of racial differences. In Experiment 7 we sought to compare 
the effects of both of these approaches on IRAP and explicit performances. 
! Implicit attitudes were originally believed to be relatively fixed and uncontrollable 
and research on prejudice reduction has traditionally focused on changing explicit attitudes 
(Bargh, 1999; Devine, 1989). Researchers have argued that an awareness of one’s bias and 
motivation to change it are necessary for prejudice reduction to be successful (Allport, 
1954; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Myrdal, 1944). However, there has 
been a growing increase in research investigating the malleability of implicit attitudes 
(Bargh, 1999; Blair, 2002; Cullen, et al., 2009). Cullen et al (2009, p.592) discuss a 
number of recent studies which suggest that implicit attitudes can be influenced by (a) 
expectancies (Blair & Banaji, 1996), (b) practice or training (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll,
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Hermsen, & Russin, 2000), (c) automatic motives (Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor, 2000), 
and (d) motivation to respond without prejudice (Lepore & Brown, 1997).
Some researchers have begun to study the malleability of implicit attitudes through 
exemplar training. This involves presenting participants with a series of exemplars which 
are designed to influence their attitudes toward a specific target (e.g., Dasgupta & 
Greenwald, 2001; Lowery, et al., 2001). In Experiment 1 of their exemplar study, 
Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) presented participants with pictures of either admired 
Black and disliked White individuals, or disliked Black and admired White individuals. 
Participants then completed an IAT directly following exemplar exposure and again 24 
hours later (without re-exposure to the exemplars). Explicit attitude measures were also 
administered across the two sessions. Findings indicated that exposure to admired Black 
and disliked White exemplars significantly weakened implicit pro-White preferences for 
24 h, but did not affect explicit attitudes. This basic effect was replicated in a second 
experiment, but with implicit ageism as the target attitude.
As discussed previously, in a more recent study, Cullen et al. (2009) conducted a 
partial replication of Experiment 2 from Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001), but using the 
IRAP rather than the IAT. The study showed that when participants were presented with 
positive examples of old people and negative examples of young people, implicit negative 
bias towards old people was significantly reduced. Similar to the Dasgupta and Greenwald 
study, the explicit measures were largely unaffected.
At the time of writing no published study had demonstrated the malleability of 
implicit racial bias as measured by the IRAP (cf. Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, et al., 2010). 
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Furthermore, no published IRAP study had attempted to investigate the impact of 
educational or other types of interventions designed to undermine racial prejudice. Thus, 
in the final study of the current research programme two types of intervention were 
employed to determine if they would reduce the levels of negative implicit racial bias 
observed across many of the previous experiments.
For the purposes of the current study, the two interventions selected were taken 
from a recent report that sought to explore the effectiveness of a psychological acceptance-
based protocol versus a traditional prejudice awareness education training programme. 
Given that the current research was exploratory, no specific predictions were made 
concerning the impact of these two different interventions. 
Method
Participants
Twenty four participants, 13 male and 11 female, who had completed Experiment 4 
or 5 agreed to participate, and their responses to both the implicit and explicit measures 
from those experiments were employed as pre-intervention baseline data. Ages ranged 
from 19 to 32 years. No inducements were offered for participation in the study.
Materials and Apparatus
The apparatus and materials used in Experiment 7 were similar to those used in 
Experiment 5 (IRAP, DS and DV scales, Semantic differential scales, Feeling 
thermometers, IMS and EMS scales). Based on work by Brochu and Morrison (2007) 
participants in Experiment 7 were also presented with Behavioral Intention Questionnaires 
(BIQs, see Appendix E), which included twelve photographs; six depicting females (three 
111
black and three white), and six depicting males (three black and three white). For each 
photograph, the participant was required to answer five questions assessing the extent to 
which they would interact with the pictured person. Each question involved a 7 point 
rating scale (1 = very unlikely to 7 = very likely). Therefore, scores could range from 5 to 
35 for each pictured person, with higher scores indicating greater likelihood of interaction 
with the target. In line with Lillis and Hayes (2009), participants were randomly assigned 
to either an acceptance or a psycho-education based brief protocol. See Appendix F for the 
materials employed in each protocol.
Procedure
The IRAP and explicit measures were the same as those employed in Experiment 
5, except the BIQ was also employed. There were three phases in the current Experiment. 
In Phase 1, participants completed the BIQ individually. In Phase 2 participants were 
randomly assigned to either the acceptance or psycho-education based intervention, which 
lasted from 30-45 minutes (see below).
Prejudice awareness training (education). The education based protocol was 
adapted from Lillis and Hayes (2007). The material included is based on a widely used 
textbook of multicultural psychology by Sue and Sue (2003). Chapter 11, which 
specifically addresses characteristics of African Americans, was used. Participants were 
presented with material directly from the textbook outlining characteristics of this minority 
ethnic group. It emphasized group strengths and common stereotypes and included 
information about the importance of recognizing and correcting one’s own biases, 
becoming more aware of and open to different cultures and identifying the uniqueness of 
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each individual. This approach also highlighted the moral aspects of prejudice and the 
negative impact that behavioral expressions of prejudice have on others (Lillis & Hayes, 
2007). As in the Lillis and Hayes (2007) study, participants were required to examine the 
truth of their own prejudicial thoughts and to consider the ways in which these thoughts 
may impact on their behavior toward people from minority ethnic groups.
Participants assigned to the Education protocol were presented with detailed 
information from Chapter 11 in Sue and Sue (2003) pertaining to the discrepancy between 
the treatment of White and Black people in America. Participants read how African 
Americans experience nearly three times as much poverty as White Americans and are 
twice as likely to experience unemployment. The text highlighted the disadvantaged status 
of African Americans as well as the impact of racism and poverty on their lives and the 
opportunities they are presented with. They were informed that one third of African 
American men in their 20s are in jail, on probation, or on parole and that this rate grew by 
over a third between 1990 and 1995.
Other equally bleak statistics were presented, from the finding that the lifespan of 
African Americans is five to seven years shorter than that of White Americans to the fact 
that despite comparative insurance cover, compared to white patients, African American 
patients are less likely to undergo corrective surgeries or major therapeutic procedures. As 
part of this protocol, participants completed a number of exercises. The first exercise 
asked participants to “Please write down your immediate reactions to this information.”
Further exercises asked participants to “Now, please write down what you think it 
would be like to be a black person living in Ireland” and to “Please write down any ideas
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you might have for overcoming current or potential race-related difficulties in the Irish 
context.”
Acceptance and commitment training. The mindfulness and acceptance based 
protocol was based on Lillis and Hayes (2007) and the current study also aimed to 
encourage participants to: (a) become mindfully aware of their own prejudicial thoughts, 
feelings and reactions, (b) accept those thoughts and feelings as the natural result of 
learning and using language in a prejudicial society, (c) notice the automatic processes of 
evaluation and judgment more generally, and (d) orient to positive actions consistent with 
one’s own values regarding how to treat other human beings.
Again, as in the Lillis and Hayes (2007) study participants completed a number of 
exercises. The first exercise asked participants to complete statements in writing, such as 
“Most Black people tend to . . .” and “Some racial slurs I know are . . . .” Participants were 
asked to notice the different thoughts that came up while they completed the task. 
Participants were then directed to complete common phrases such as “Blondes have 
more . . .” and “There’s no place like . . . .” and were then asked to notice how automatic 
these thoughts were. The next exercise requested students to say and to memorize the 
numbers 1, 2, 3. The text then asked “What are the numbers?” and attention was drawn to 
how difficult it was to get “the numbers” out of their heads. Participants were asked to 
recognize how easy it was for a specific thought to be “put in their head” and to consider 
how difficult it is to remove a thought.
Other exercises adapted from Lillis and Hayes (2007) challenged participants to 
question the value in trying to change ones thoughts or feelings. Another exercise asked 
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participants to imagine themselves in various interpersonal scenarios with people whose 
race or ethnic identity changed (at work, alone on the street, etc.) and to notice their 
emotional reactions. Participants were reminded of how easily prejudicial thoughts, 
attitudes, and feelings can emerge but the text highlighted that these thoughts need not 
affect behavior. Participants were encouraged to mindfully acknowledge the presence of 
prejudicial thoughts and feelings without attempting to alter them, and to focus on 
behaving in a manner consistent with their values (Lillis and Hayes, 2007). 
In the third and final phase of the experiment participants completed the IRAP and 
the explicit measures (including the BIQs), and then were thanked and fully debriefed.
Results
Implicit Measure
Data preparation. The response latencies were subjected to the same data 
preparation procedures as were employed for Experiments 1 through 6.
Preliminary analyses. Fourteen one-way ANOVAs indicated that there were no 
significant differences at baseline on either the implicit or the explicit measures between 
participants randomly assigned to either intervention (ps > .17).
Trial-type analyses. The D-IRAP scores were entered in a mixed repeated 
measures 2 x 2 x 4 ANOVA, with intervention (ACT versus Education) as the between-
participant variable and trial-type and pre- and post-intervention as the within-participant 
variables. There was a significant main effect for trial-type, F(3, 22) = 45.96, p < .0001, 
!p2 = .68, but not for pre-post or intervention (ps > .09). There was, however, a significant 
interaction between trial-type and pre-post F(3, 22) = 2.76, p = .049, !p2 = .11. In effect, 
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the interventions appeared to impact significantly upon the IRAP trial-type effects, but this 
was not moderated by the type of intervention (i.e., the effects of ACT and Education did 
not differ significantly). Consequently, the data were collapsed across the interventions 
and the results are presented in Figure 11.
At baseline, participants showed positive bias across the two white trial-types but 
negative bias for the two black trial-types. Post intervention, participants showed positive 
bias across three of the four trial-types; the two white trial-types and the Black-Positive 
trial-type. The negative bias on the Black-Negative trial-type was maintained, but was 
weaker compared to baseline. The Black-Positive trial-type whilst slightly negative at 
baseline became positive post intervention. The positive bias for the White-Positive trial-
Figure 11. Mean D-IRAP trial-type scores, with standard error bars, pre and post intervention.
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type was also reduced post intervention compared to baseline. In effect, for three of the 
trial-types, implicit pro-white and anti-black bias was reduced following the interventions.
To explore the impact of the interventions on each trial-type, four paired t-tests 
were used to determine if the changes from pre to post were significant. The changes for 
the white trial-type were not (ps >.2) whereas the changes for the black trial-types were 
marginally significant (ps < .055). Eight one-sample t-tests indicated that three of the four 
trial-type effects were significantly different from zero at baseline; White-Positive (t = 
7.252, df = 23, p <.0001), White-Negative (t = 2.230, df = 23, p <.036), and Black-
Negative (t = -5.946, df = 23, p <.0001), but the Black-Positive effect was not (p > .4). 
Post intervention, each of the four trial-type effects were significantly different from zero; 
White-Positive (t = 5.565, df = 23, p <.0001), White-Negative (t = 3.144, df = 23, p <.036), 
Black-Positive (t = 2.093, df = 23, p <.047), and Black-Negative (t = -2.369, df = 23, p <.
026).
In summary, at baseline participants showed positive racial bias towards white 
people but showed weak or strongly negative bias towards black people. Post intervention, 
participants again showed positive racial bias towards white people but also slightly more 
positive bias toward black people on the Black-Positive trial-type, and slightly less 
negative anti-black bias on the Black-Negative trial-type.
Explicit Measures 
A total of 10 explicit measures were employed in the current study (DS, DV, SD 
white, SD black, FT white, FT black, IMS, EMS, BIQ white, BIQ black). The mean 
ratings and standard deviations for each measure for both pre and post intervention are 
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presented in Table 3. Each explicit measure was entered into a 2x2 mixed repeated 
measures ANOVA with pre/post as the repeated measure and intervention as the between-
participant variable (note that preliminary analyses had established that there were no 
significant differences on any of these measures at baseline).
Table 3 
Mean ratings and standard deviations for each explicit measure for both pre and post intervention
ACT- based Intervention Education-based Intervention
Pre Post Pre Post
Measure M SD M SD M SD M SD
Discrimination Scale 3.74 .592 4.08 .38 3.92 .65 3.89 .45
Diversity Scale 3.35 .538 3.60 .55 3.63 .79 3.58 .44
Semantic Differential Black .94 1.00 1.25 .76 .83 .98 1.1 -.6
Semantic Differential White .58 1.00 1.1 .74 .79 1.05 1.1 .47
Feeling Thermometer Black 68.33 12.67 80.00 12.06 66.58 18.09 82.50 11.38
Feeling Thermometer White 73.33 14.98 80.83 12.40 69.08 20.52 83.33 9.85
Internal Motivation to Conceal 
Prejudice
6.03 1.35 7.82 .89 6.32 1.21 7.35 1.41
External Motivation to 
Conceal Prejudice
3.83 1.91 4.43 1.67 4.87 1.63 4.13 2.1
Behavioural Intention 
Questionnaire Black
21.74 2.80 22.83 2.97 21.13 2.46 21.75 2.48
Behavioural Intention 
Questionnaire White
21.94 2.72 22.91 2.75 21.63 2.38 22.37 2.28
Discrimination and diversity scales. No significant differences were obtained from 
the ANOVAs for these two measures (ps > .26).
Semantic differential scales. The ANOVA for the rating of White people yielded a 
significant main effect for pre/post, F(1, 22) = 4.72, p < .04, !p2 = .18 with no other 
significant effects (p > .5). A similar pattern was obtained for the rating of Black people, 
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but the effect only approached significance F(1, 22) = 2.98, p =.09, !p2 = .12 (remaining  
ps > .56). In summary, participants in both intervention groups rated both White and Black 
people more positively on the SD scales post intervention.
Feeling thermometers. Both ANOVAs yielded significant main effects for pre/post 
(White F(1, 22) = 9.65, p < .005, !p2 = .3; Black F(1, 22) = 17.29, p < .0004, !p2 = .44), 
with no other main or interaction effects (ps > .34). Once again, participants in both 
groups indicated more positive reactions to both White and Black people following the 
interventions.
Motivation to conceal prejudice scales. The ANOVA for internal motivation 
yielded a significant main effect for pre/post, F(1, 22) = 12.19, p < .002, !p2 = .36 (all 
remaining ps for this ANOVA and the ANOVA for external motivation > .26). These 
results indicate that both intervention groups became more internally motivated to conceal 
prejudice following the interventions.
Behavioral Intention Questionnaires. The ANOVA for the BIQ for white people 
yielded a significant main effect for pre-post, F(1, 22) = 249.84 p < .0001, !p2 = .92 
(remaining ps > .06), indicating that behavioural intentions to interact with white people 
increased following both interventions. The ANOVA for the BIQ for black people also 
yielded a main effect for pre-post, F(1, 22) = 76.07, p < .0001, !p2 = .78 but an interaction 
with intervention was also recorded, F(1, 22) = 5.63, p < .03, !p2 = .2. Two one-way 
repeated measures ANOVAs indicated that both intervention groups showed significant 
increases in behavioural intentions towards black people, ACT, F(1, 11) = 37.48, p < .
0001, !p2 = .76; Education, F(1, 11) = 56.32, p < .0001, !p2 = .83. Thus, both 
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interventions increased behavioural intentions, but the effect was larger for the Education 
group. 
Implicit-Explicit Correlations
Two correlations matrices of the implicit and explicit measures were calculated; 
one matrix for pre- and a second for post-intervention. For each matrix the four trial-type 
and overall D-IRAP scores were correlated with each of the ten explicit measures. Out of 
the 50 correlations for the pre-intervention matrix, two were significant (all other ps > .
06). Increased external motivation predicted greater positive bias towards white people (on 
the White-Positive trial-type; r = .455, p < .03), whereas increased internal motivation 
predicted greater negative bias towards black people (on the Black-Negative trial-type; r = 
-.424, p < .04). Out of the 50 correlations for the second matrix only one was significant 
(all other ps > .1). Specifically, higher ratings on the Diversity scale predicted greater 
positive bias towards white people (on the White-Positive trial-type; r = .424, p < .04).
Summary and Conclusions
Both interventions impacted significantly on the D-IRAP performances. There was 
very limited evidence of a reduction in the pro-white bias, but close to significant 
reductions in the anti-black bias from pre- to post-intervention. Most of the explicit 
measures showed significant changes from pre- to post-intervention, except for the 
Discrimination and Diversity scales. Both the semantic differential scales and feeling 
thermometers showed more positive ratings for both black and white people post-
intervention. With respect to the motivation scales, internal motivation increased 
significantly from pre to post, but external motivation did not. Both interventions also 
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increased behavioural intentions towards white people. A similar increase was also 
observed when rating black people, but the effect was larger for the Education group. The 
implicit-explicit correlations yielded only three significant effects out of a possible 100. 
Pre-intervention, greater external motivation predicted greater positive bias towards white 
people, but increased internal motivation predicted greater negative bias towards black 
people. Post-intervention, higher ratings on the Diversity scale predicted greater positive 
bias towards white people.
Overall, the findings indicated that both implicit and explicit attitudes changed as a 
result of the two interventions, with little evidence that one intervention was more 
effective than the other. Interestingly, the change that occurred for the implicit measures 
indicated a reduction in negative bias towards black people, with little change in the 
positive bias recorded for white people. In contrast, the explicit measures generally 
showed changes in responses to both black and white people. Thus the two types of 
measure appeared to differ in terms of the changes observed following the two 
interventions. This differential impact on the IRAP and the explicit measures is consistent 
with previous research that has documented the independent malleability of implicit and 
explicit attitudes (Cullen, et al., 2010; Barnes-Holmes, Murphy et al., 2010; Boysen et al., 
2006). 
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The aim of the current programme of research was to determine if the IRAP, a 
recently developed methodology for the assessment of implicit cognition, is a useful 
measure of implicit racial bias in the Irish context. Over the course of a series of 
experiments, the research has refined the IRAP and has also examined its relationship with 
various alternative attitudinal indices, including self-report measures and measures of 
behavioural intentions. In addition, the fifth experiment, presented in Chapter 6, explored 
the predictive validity of the IRAP using known-groups, while Experiment 6, presented in 
Chapter 7, investigated the relationship between neural activity and IRAP responses. In the 
final experiment, the malleability of IRAP performances, as a result of acceptance and 
education-based interventions, was investigated.
In this final chapter of the thesis, the major findings of the six empirical 
investigations conducted will be summarised and the wider implications of the research 
will be discussed.
Overview of the Findings 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 2), the first empirical investigation of the current 
programme of research, manipulated the assessment context in which the IRAP was 
completed. The aim of the experiment was to determine if manipulating the private versus 
public context of the assessment situation would impact upon the IRAP effects in a similar 
manner to that observed with the IAT in the Boysen, et al. (2006) study (i.e., a reduction in 
implicit in-group bias in the public relative to the private assessment context). Results 
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showed, contrary to initial expectations, that the IRAP failed to produce evidence of racial 
bias and appeared largely insensitive to the Public/Private context manipulation. Although 
the explicit measures showed some sensitivity to race and context, the effects were not 
clear cut. Furthermore, only a small number of significant implicit-explicit correlations 
were obtained and some of the effects appeared contradictory. Overall, therefore, the 
results of Experiment 1 (particularly with respect to the IRAP), were inconsistent with 
previous research (see Nosek, et al. 2007, for a review).
The irregularity of these results, however, was consistent with another study that 
was conducted shortly after the current research programme began. Specifically, Barnes-
Holmes, Murphy et al. (2010) reported an implicit pro-white/anti-black bias but only when 
participants were required to respond within 2000ms on each trial of the IRAP (rather than 
3000). Consequently, in Experiment 2 (Chapter 3) of the current research programme 
participants were required to respond within 2 seconds on each trial of the IRAP. In 
addition, based on the assumption that personalizing an implicit measure may have 
unintended performance effects (Nosek & Hansen, 2008), a further modification was also 
made to the procedure by removing the phrase “I think” from the sample stimuli (i.e., only  
“Black People” and “White People” were presented as labels). Results showed that 
participants in Experiment 2 did not produce significant effects indicative of racial bias for 
any of the explicit measures and furthermore, none of the forty implicit-explicit 
correlations were significant. Participants did however produce IRAP effects indicative of 
in-group racial bias which were broadly consistent with the results of Barnes-Holmes, 
Murphy, et al., 2010). Nevertheless, it remained unclear to what extent the different 
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outcomes for the two experiments were due to the reduced latency criterion or to the 
removal of “I think” from the sample statements.
In order to address this issue, Experiment 3 (Chapter 4) reintroduced the phrase “I 
think” into the sample stimuli (i.e., as in Experiment 1), and like Experiment 2, 
participants in Experiment 3 were required to respond within 2000ms on each trial of the 
IRAP. Experiment 3 again yielded IRAP effects indicative of in-group racial bias, but 
failed to produce significant effects indicative of racial bias for any of the explicit 
measures. Three of the forty implicit-explicit correlations were significant and each of 
these involved the Black-Negative trial-type. A post-hoc comparison of Experiments 2 and 
3 suggested that the presence-versus-absence of the phrase “I think” had no significant 
impact on the IRAP effects.
To further explore the impact of personalising the IRAP, Experiment 4 (Chapter 5) 
directly targeted the “I think” variable. In addition, in order to reduce attrition rates, a 
modification to the IRAP software was introduced. Specifically, the warning message 
“Too Slow!” was presented on any trial (practice or test) whenever a participant did not 
respond within the pre-set 2000ms latency criterion. Experiment 4 also aimed to 
investigate the moderating effect that motivation to conceal prejudice has on the implicit –
explicit relationship, an issue that has been the focus of previous studies on implicit 
attitudes (e.g., Payne, Govorun, & Arbuckle, 2006). Results showed that similar to 
Experiment 3, the IRAP effects were indicative of pro-white in-group and anti-black out-
group bias. In addition, consistent with the post-hoc comparison made between 
Experiments 2 and 3, the presence-versus-absence of the phrase “I think” did not impact 
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significantly on the IRAP effects.
Critically, in contrast to the previous experiments, the anti-black bias observed on 
the Black-Negative trial-type proved to be significantly different from zero. Furthermore, 
unlike the earlier experiments, split-half reliabilities were generally moderate to strong and 
significant. Overall, these findings suggest that reducing the latency criterion to 2000ms 
and introducing the “Too Slow!” latency feedback message served to increase the IRAP 
effects and their internal reliabilities. Interestingly, Experiment 4 did produce significant 
effects indicative of racial bias on one of the explicit measures (the feeling thermometers), 
but only for those participants who completed the personalised IRAP (i.e., with “I think” 
labels). These results were in contrast with the earlier reported experiments and were 
difficult to interpret. They may suggest, however, that although manipulating the “I think” 
variable did not impact on the IRAP performance it may have influenced subsequent 
ratings on the feeling thermometers. Finally, a series of regression analyses indicated that 
participants who were motivated to conceal prejudice tended to under-report their racial 
prejudice on the semantic differentials, but did not perform differently on the IRAP from 
those participants who were not motivated in this regard. Overall, the pattern of findings 
obtained across Experiments 2, 3, and 4 was deemed to be generally consistent with the 
conclusion that the IRAP possesses at least some of the properties of an implicit measure.
At this point in the research programme an IRAP had been developed that showed 
relatively strong in-group and out-group racial bias, reasonable levels of internal 
reliability, and did not appear to be influenced greatly by increased personalization. 
Furthermore, participants who were motivated to conceal prejudice tended to under-report 
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their racial prejudice, but did not perform differently on the IRAP. In order to further 
validate the utility of the race-IRAP developed across the previous four experiments, 
Experiment 5 (Chapter 6) involved a known-groups analysis. The aim of Experiment 5, 
therefore, was to test the prediction that performance on the current IRAP would differ 
significantly between groups of black and white participants resident in Ireland.
The results of Experiment 5 revealed in-group/out-group bias for the white 
participants but not for the black participants. Specifically, the white participants showed 
positive bias towards white people, but relatively weak positive or strongly negative bias 
towards black people whereas the black participants showed positive racial bias for both 
the in- and out-groups that did not differ significantly across trial-types. The internal 
reliabilities of the D-IRAP measures were reasonably robust for white participants for 
Black-Negative and Overall D-scores, and for black participants for the White-Negative 
trial-type.
The explicit measures again produced mixed results and only six of the thirty 
implicit-explicit correlations proved to be significant. A series of hierarchical logistic 
regression analyses indicated that the Overall D-IRAP, and the Black-Negative trial-type in 
particular, significantly increased the predictive validity of each of the six explicit 
measures. In addition, a series of discriminant analyses indicated that three of the IRAP 
measures and two of the explicit measures each predicted group status, with the Black-
Negative IRAP trial-type being the best predictor.
At this point in the research programme an IRAP had been developed that yielded 
clear evidence of implicit racial bias among white Irish participants, but a lack of such bias 
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among black participants resident in Ireland. In further testing the IRAP as a measure of 
implicit racial bias, it was decided to record an additional measure of IRAP performance 
to that of response latency. The first IRAP study (Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2008) involved 
collecting both response latency and electroencephalogram (EEG) data and the results 
showed different patterns of EEG activity across blocks of consistent versus inconsistent 
trials on the IRAP. At the time of writing, EEG data had not been collected in another 
IRAP study and thus in the next experiment EEGs were recorded while participants were 
exposed to the race-IRAP that had been developed thus far. It was also noted that the 
Barnes-Holmes, et al. study was conducted using verbal relations that would not be 
deemed socially sensitive (e.g., Pleasant – Holiday – Similar) and a practice latency 
criterion of 3000ms was applied. Given that the race-IRAP employed socially sensitive 
verbal relations (e.g., Black – Stupid – True) and a 2000ms response latency criterion, it 
was unclear whether different EEG results would emerge.
Experiment 6 (Chapter 7), replicated the IRAP effects obtained in previous 
experiments revealing pro-white in-group and anti-black out-group bias. However, this 
was the first experiment to record a significant anti-black effect on the Black-Positive trial-
type. Similar to previous experiments, internal reliability was strongest for the Black-
Negative trial-type. At the present time, it is unclear why an anti-black effect was observed 
for the Black-Positive trial-type, but given the relatively low n compared to previous 
experiments, it would be unwise to conclude that this effect would be replicated reliably.
The EEG recordings revealed that the ERP grandaverage waveforms for the pro-
black trials were more positive than for the pro-white trials across six of the frontal sites 
128
between 300-800ms. Insofar as pro-black responding for white participants is considered 
history-inconsistent and pro-white responding history-consistent, the current experiment 
produced completely opposite effects to those reported in the only other IRAP study that 
employed EEG as a measure (Barnes-Holmes, et al., 2008). Specifically, waveforms 
associated with relational responding that was deemed inconsistent with the participants’ 
prior history were more negative than those waveforms associated with history-consistent 
responding. In addition, the previous study also reported significant differences between 
the waveforms for sites in the central and parietal areas; these were not observed in the 
current experiment.
At the present time, it remains unclear why these differences emerged in the EEG 
measures across the two studies. As noted above, however, the previous study employed 
stimuli that were not deemed socially sensitive, and used a response-latency criterion of 
3000ms (rather than 2000ms.). Furthermore, participants in the earlier study were not 
required to remain within the latency criterion during the test blocks (this was required in 
the current study). Clearly, therefore, further research will be required to determine the 
variables responsible for the different ERP patterns observed across the two studies. 
Nevertheless, the current findings do indicate that EEG signals may be used to 
differentiate between two different types of IRAP trial, even when socially-sensitive 
stimuli are employed.
Thus far, the research reported in the current thesis involved developing an IRAP 
that may be used to measure implicit racial bias. Furthermore, both response latencies and 
EEG patterns were shown to be sensitive dependent measures. However, a critical issue in 
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the area of racial prejudice concerns the development of methods that may be used to 
modify or undermine such prejudice. The final study reported in the current thesis focused 
on this issue. Experiment 7 (Chapter 8), therefore, sought to compare two approaches to 
reducing racial and ethnic prejudice: a protocol based on acceptance and commitment 
therapy (ACT) and an educational based protocol drawn from a textbook on the 
psychology of racial differences. Both of these approaches were based on the work of 
Lillis and Hayes (2007).
The findings indicated that both implicit and explicit attitudes changed as a result 
of the two interventions, with little evidence that one intervention was more effective than 
the other. Interestingly, the change that occurred for the implicit measures indicated a 
reduction in negative bias towards black people, with little change in the positive bias 
recorded for white people. In contrast, the explicit measures generally showed changes in 
responses to both black and white people. Thus the two types of measure appeared to 
differ in terms of the changes observed following the two interventions. This differential 
impact on the IRAP and the explicit measures is consistent with previous research that has 
documented the independent malleability of implicit and explicit attitudes (Cullen, et al., 
2010; Barnes-Holmes, Murphy et al., 2010; Boysen et al., 2006).
Overall, the seven experiments reported in the current thesis lead to the 
development and refinement of an IRAP that could be used to measure implicit racial bias. 
Support for the reliability of the measure was provided when the same overall pattern of 
pro-white and anti-black bias among white participants was observed across all but the 
first experiment, which employed a 3000ms latency criterion. Measures of internal 
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reliability were also found to be relatively robust, especially for a response-time measure. 
Interestingly, internal reliability was highest for the trial-type that typically indicated racial 
bias (the Black-Negative trial-type). The known-groups study provided strong support for 
the validity of the race IRAP because it clearly discriminated between black and white 
participants, and increased predictive validity over the explicit measures. When EEG was 
employed as an additional dependent measure of IRAP performance, significant 
differences between responding on pro-white/anti-black versus pro-black/anti-white 
blocks was observed, thus providing additional support for the reliability and validity of 
the measure. Finally, consistent with previous studies on the malleability of implicit 
measures, performance on the race IRAP shifted in a predicted direction as a result of two 
interventions that were designed to reduce racial prejudice. These data again provide 
support for the validity of the measure. In sum, the research reported in the current thesis 
has yielded an IRAP that could be used in subsequent research in the study of implicit 
racial bias.
Wider Implications of the Research
The REC model.  Reducing the response latency criterion from 3000 to 2000ms, 
and introducing trial-by-trial temporal feedback (across Experiments 1-4), increased 
implicit racial bias on the IRAP. This result is consistent with the findings of Barnes-
Holmes, Murphy, et al. (2010), and also with the REC model (Barnes-Holmes, et al., in 
press). As described in the Introductory chapter, the model assumes that specific IRAP 
trials may produce an immediate and relatively brief relational response before the 
participant actually presses a response key. The probability of this initial response will 
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often be determined by the verbal and nonverbal histories of the participant and by current 
contextual variables. By definition, the most probable immediate response will be emitted 
first most often, therefore any IRAP trial that requires a key press that coordinates with 
that immediate response will be emitted relatively quickly; however, if an IRAP trial 
requires a key press that opposes the immediate relational response, it may be emitted less 
quickly. Accordingly, across multiple trials, the average latency for inconsistent blocks 
will be longer than for consistent trials. In short, the IRAP effect is based on immediate 
relational responding, which is made apparent to the researcher when the behavioural 
system is put under pressure to respond quickly and accurately.
Given that pressure to respond quickly was greatest in Experiment 2 onwards, the 
results indicate that the immediate relational responses White–Positive–True and Black–
Negative–True predominated (for white participants). According to the REC model, such 
response patterns would likely emerge from exposure to some of the verbal and nonverbal 
contingencies that operate for white individuals who have grown up and live in Ireland 
(e.g., the common portrayal of black males in the North American and British media as 
violent gun-carrying gang members). In attempting to explain why such contingencies had 
little if any impact on self-reports, the REC model assumes that responses to these 
measures likely reflected relatively elaborate and coherent relational responding. In other 
words, when asked to express an attitude or belief on a particular issue, it is likely that an 
individual will produce a relational response that coheres with one or more other relational 
responses in his or her behavioural repertoire (see Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, & Dymond, 
2001). Imagine, for example, that a participant produced the same ratings for black and 
132
white men on the semantic differentials. Such relational responses would likely cohere 
with other relevant relational networks, such as “The only difference between these 
pictures is skin colour” and “Racism is wrong.” The important point to note here is that 
explicit measures are typically not completed under high time pressure, and thus 
participants have ample time to engage in the extended relational responding that is 
needed to produce a response that coheres with other relational responses. When exposed 
to a time-pressured IRAP, however, participants are not afforded the opportunity to 
elaborate because there is insufficient time, on a trial-by-trial basis, to engage in the 
additional and sometimes complex relational activity that serves to generate a relationally 
coherent response.
In summary, therefore, the REC model assumes that the IRAP effect, when 
produced under sufficient time pressure, is driven largely by immediate and relatively 
brief relational responses, whereas explicit measures reflect extended and coherent 
relational networks. The core of the REC model explanation for the impact of increased 
time pressure on the divergence between implicit and explicit measures rests on two 
assumptions. Firstly, immediate or automatic evaluative responses may or may not cohere 
with subsequent relational responding. When they cohere, implicit and explicit measures 
will typically converge, but when they do not, the measures will typically diverge. In other 
words, it is assumed that participants usually “reject” their immediate and brief relational 
responses (or automatic evaluations) if they do not cohere with their more elaborate and 
extended relational responding. Secondly, the REC model predicts that the divergence 
between implicit and explicit “socially sensitive” attitudes should increase with greater 
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time pressure on the IRAP, because participants have less time to engage in elaborated 
relational responding. In effect, as time pressure increases on the IRAP, the 
“contaminating” effects of elaborated relational responding on response latencies decrease.
Note, however, that the REC model does not predict that decreasing time pressure 
on the IRAP will necessarily produce increasing convergence with explicit measures. As 
time pressure decreases, it is difficult to predict exactly what variables will impact upon 
response latency, and thus the potential utility of the measure is lost. Indeed, the current 
findings support this conclusion because the internal reliability of the IRAP was absent at 
the level of the individual trial-type when the response latency criterion was set at the 
upper value of 3000ms. When the criterion was set at 2000ms, internal reliability tended to 
be moderate to strong and significant for the overall IRAP effect and for the Black-
Negative trial-type; for the black participants, significant internal reliability was recorded 
for the White-Negative trial-type. At the present time it remains unclear why internal 
reliability differed across different IRAP trial-types, but the relative relational response 
strengths targeted by each of the trial-types may be involved here. That is, perhaps 
stronger or more probable relational responses tend to yield greater internal reliability 
simply because those responses vary less than weaker ones. Indeed, the idea that different 
trial-types target relational responses of different strength is relevant to another feature of 
the current findings discussed below.
As noted previously, the pattern of results for white participants across 
Experiments 2-7 produced strong IRAP effects for the White-Positive and Black–Negative 
trial types. According to the REC model, therefore, the data from these experiments 
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indicate that frames of coordination (i.e., the verbal relation of equivalence or similarity) 
between “White” and “Positive” and between “Black” and “Negative” were relatively 
strong, but frames of distinction (i.e., the verbal relation of difference) between ““White” 
and “Negative” and between “Black” and “Positive” for the most part, were not (the word 
strong is used here simply to denote a high probability in immediate relational 
responding). The REC model assumes that such differences in relational response 
strengths may be attributed, at least in part, to the verbal and nonverbal contingencies 
surrounding racial stereotyping. For example, common verbal practices would typically 
summarize such stereotyping as “white is good” and “black is bad,” rather than “white is 
not bad” and “black is not good.” In other words, two elements of a relational network 
may well cohere, as in “X is good” and “X is not bad,” but the relative strengths or 
weaknesses of the two elements will be influenced to some degree by other variables, such 
as differences in frequency of exposure to the two parts of the network. The current results 
are therefore readily explained by the REC model, although testing the model 
systematically will have to await further empirical inquiry.
It is worth noting that the specific pattern of responding observed in Experiments 
2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 for the Black–Negative but not the Black-Positive trial type has been 
observed previously in IRAP studies on race (Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, et al., 2010) and 
homonegativity (Cullen & Barnes-Holmes, 2008). These effects appear consistent with 
recent evidence that indicates the influence of a “negativity bias” in attitude formation (cf. 
Kunda, 1999). Specifically, when negatively valenced stimuli are presented with “Black” 
or “Gay,” this serves to activate an implicit anti-black or anti-gay bias, respectively, which 
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is not observed when positively valenced stimuli are presented. On balance, procedural 
variables specific to the IRAP may be involved here. For example, the stereotyping effect 
for the Black-Negative trial type required responding “True” more quickly than “False,” 
but the opposite was required for the Black-Positive trial type. It is possible, therefore, that  
a bias toward responding “True” over “False,” per se, interacted with the socially loaded 
stimulus relations presented in the IRAP. If such a response bias does play a role, however, 
the source of that bias needs to be explained. As suggested previously, the impact of 
common verbal practices, which tend to confirm negative rather than deny positive 
stereotypes, is a possibly important variable.
Future research. The current research programme raises at least two areas of study 
that will need further attention. First, the extent to which the IRAP predicts actual 
behaviour in the natural environment needs to be determined. Second, the duration of any 
change in an IRAP performance following an intervention needs to be established. A 
preliminary attempt was made to address the first issue in the final experiment reported in 
the current thesis. Specifically, participants were asked to complete Behavioural Intentions 
Questionnaires (BIQs) for white and black people both before and after an intervention. 
However, none of the IRAP effects, or changes in those effects from pre- to post-
intervention, correlated with the BIQs. Interestingly, this finding contrasts with a previous 
IRAP study on implicit body-size bias in which the measure did correlate with a BIQ 
(Roddy, et al., 2010). At the present time it remains unclear why this correlational effect 
was not replicated in the current research. Perhaps when participants are asked to report 
their behavioural intentions towards pictures of black and white people social desirability 
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is more salient than when the stimuli are white overweight and normal-weight individuals. 
Insofar as this is the case, then the race BIQs may have functioned more as standard 
explicit measures of racial bias rather than valid measures of behavioural intentions. In 
any case, given that previous research has repeatedly shown that implicit measures do 
predict behaviours (see Greenwald, Poehlmann, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009, for a review), 
future studies are needed to determine to what extent the IRAP predicts racially-biased 
behaviour in the natural environment.
The second issue that needs to be addressed in future work was also highlighted in 
the final experiment of the current thesis. Specifically, the findings indicated that both 
implicit and explicit attitudes changed as a result of two interventions. However, no 
attempt was made to determine the relative persistence of these changes. In the only other 
IRAP study that investigated the malleability of implicit attitudes by a direct intervention, 
a follow-up measure was conducted 24 hours later and the changes in implicit attitudes 
were maintained, but with some suggestion that they were reverting back to the original 
pattern (Cullen, et al., 2009). An earlier study using the IAT also reported a similar effect 
(Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). At the present time, however, it remains unclear exactly 
how long changes on implicit attitude measures will last following a relevant intervention. 
Obviously, this is an important area of research in terms of developing effective psycho-
social interventions for racial bias, or prejudice more generally (e.g., Lillis & Hayes, 
2007). In particular, it will be important to determine to what extent changes in measures 
of implicit and explicit attitudes predict, either together or independently, changes in 
specific types of racially-biased behaviours following a relevant intervention.
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Conclusion
The programme of research reported in the current thesis lead to the development 
and refinement of an IRAP that could be used to measure implicit racial bias. The same 
overall pattern of pro-white and anti-black IRAP effects was produced by white 
participants across most of the experiments, and internal reliability was also relatively 
robust. The validity of the race IRAP was supported because it only correlated with the 
explicit measures for those participants who were low in motivation to conceal prejudice. 
Furthermore, it clearly discriminated between black and white participants, and critically it 
increased predictive validity over a range of explicit measures. The recording of 
electroencephalograms provided additional support for the reliability and validity of the 
measure. Finally, performance on the IRAP shifted in a predicted direction following two 
interventions that were designed to reduce racial prejudice, thus providing further support 
for its validity. The research reported in the current thesis has thus produced an IRAP that 
could be used in subsequent research in the study of implicit racial bias. In particular, this 
research will need to focus on the extent to which IRAP performances predict actual 
behaviour in the natural environment, and on the relative persistence in changes in IRAP 
performances following interventions designed to undermine social prejudice. 
138
REFERENCES
REFERENCES
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 23, 
107-117.
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 50, 179-211.
Ajzen, I. (2001). Nature and operation of attitudes. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 
27-58.
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (2005). The influence of attitudes on behaviour. In D. 
Albarracin, B. T. Johnson, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Handbook of attitude and 
attitude change (pp.173-214). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bargh, J. A. (1999). The cognitive monster: The case against controllability of automatic 
stereotype effects. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual process theories in 
social psychology. New York: Guilford.
Barnes, D. (1994). Stimulus equivalence and relational frame theory. The Psychological 
Record, 44, 91-124.
Barnes, D., & Hampson, P. (1993). Stimulus equivalence and connectionism: Implications 
for behaviour analysis and cognitive science. The Psychological Record, 43, 
617-638.
Barnes, D., & Holmes, Y. (1991). Radical behaviorism, stimulus equivalence, and human 
cognition. The Psychological Record, 41, 19-31.
140
Barnes, D., McCullagh, P., & Keenan, M. (1990). Equivalence class formation in non-
hearing impaired children and hearing impaired children. Analysis of Verbal 
Behavior, 8, 1-11.
Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Cullinan, V. (2000). Relational frame theory 
and Skinner's Verbal Behavior: A possible synthesis. The Behavior Analyst, 23, 
69-84.
Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Hayden, E., Milne, R., Power, P. R., & Stewart, I. 
(2006). Do you really know what you believe? Developing the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure (IRAP) as a direct measure of implicit beliefs. The Irish 
Psychologist, 32, 169-177.
Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Smeets, P. M., Cullinan, V., & Leader, G. (2004). 
Relational frame theory and stimulus equivalence: Conceptual and procedural 
issues. International Journal of Psychology & Psychological Therapy, 4, 161-193.
Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Stewart, I., & Boles, S. (in press). A sketch of the 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) and the Relational Elaboration 
and Coherence (REC) Model. The Psychological Record.
Barnes-Holmes, D., Hayden, E., Barnes-Holmes, and Stewart, I. (2008). The Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) as a response-time and event-related-
potentials methodology for testing natural verbal relations: A preliminary study. 
The Psychological Record, 58, 497-516.
141
Barnes-Holmes, D., Hayes, S. C., & Dymond, S. (2001). Self and self-directed rules. In S. 
C. Hayes, D. Barnes-Holmes, & B. Roche (Eds.), Relational Frame Theory: A 
post-Skinnerian account of human language and cognition (pp. 119-140). New 
York: Plenum.
Barnes-Homes, D., Murphy, A., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2010). The Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP): Exploring the impact of private versus 
public contexts and the response latency criterion on pro-white and anti-black 
stereotyping among white Irish individuals. The Psychological Record, 60, 57-66.
Barnes-Holmes, D., Murtagh, L., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2010). Using the 
Implicit Association Test and the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure to 
measure attitudes towards meat and vegetables in vegetarians and meat-eaters. The 
Psychological Record, 60, 287-306.
Barnes-Holmes, D., Regan, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Comins , S., Walsh, D., Stewart, I., et 
al . (2005). Relating derived relations as a model of analogical reasoning: 
Reaction times and event related potentials. Journal of the Experimental Analysis 
of Behavior. 84, 435–452.
Barnes-Holmes, D., Staunton, C., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Whelan, R., Stewart, I., Commins, 
S., et al. (2004). Interfacing relational frame theory with cognitive neuroscience: 
Semantic priming, the implicit association test, and event related potentials. 
International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 4, 215–240.
142
Barnes-Holmes, D., Waldron, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2009). Testing the 
validity of the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) and the Implicit 
Association Test: Measuring attitudes towards Dublin and country-life in Ireland. 
The Psychological Record, 59, 389-40.
Baron, A. S., & Banaji, M. R. (2006). The development of implicit attitudes: Evidence of 
race evaluations from ages 6 and 10 and adulthood. Psychological Science, 17, 
53-58.
Baron, R. A., Byrne, D., & Watson, G. (2004). Exploring Social Psychology (4th ed.). 
Canada: Pearsons.
Baum, W. M. (1994). Understanding behaviorism: Science, behavior, and culture. New 
York: Harper-Collins.
Beale, D. A., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1991). Predicting mothers’ intentions to limit 
frequency of infants’sugar intake: Testing the theory of planned behavior. Journal 
of Applied Social Psychology, 21, 409-431.
Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 6, pp. 1-62). San Diego, CA: Academic 
Press.
Blair, I. V. (2002). The malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 6, 242-261.
Blair, I. V., & Banaji, M. (1996). Automatic and controlled processes in stereotype 
priming. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 1142-1163.
143
Boysen, G. A., Vogel, D. L., & Madon, S. (2006). A public versus private administration of 
the Implicit Association Test. European Journal of Social Psychology 36, 
845-856.
Breckler, S. J. (1984). Empirical validation of affect, behaviour, and cognition as distinct 
components of attitude. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 47, 
1191-1205.
Brochu, P. M., & Morrison, M. A. (2007). Implicit and explicit prejudice toward 
overweight and average weight men and women: Testing their correspondence and 
relation to behavioral intentions. Journal of Social Psychology, 147, 681-706.
Campbell, D. T. (1950). The indirect assessment of social attitudes. Psychological 
Bulletin, 47, 15-38.
Central Statistics Office Ireland (2006). Retrieved December 10, 2009, from http://
www.cso.ie/census/default.htm.
Chaiken, S., & Stangor, C. (1987). Attitudes and attitude change. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 38, 575- 630.
Chambliss, H. O., Finley, C. E., & Blair, S. N. (2004). Attitudes toward obese individuals 
among exercise science students. Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise, 
36, 468–474.
Chan, G., Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2009). Implicit attitudes 
to work and leisure among North American and Irish individuals: A preliminary 
study. International Journal of Psychology & Psychological Therapy, 9, 317-334.
144
Cowley, J., Green, G., & Braunling-McMorrow, D. (1992). Using stimulus equivalence 
procedures to teach name-face matching to adults with brain injuries. Journal of 
Applied Behaviour Analysis, 25, 461-475.
Cullen, C., Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2009). The Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) and the malleability of ageist attitudes. 
The Psychological Record, 59, 591-620.
Cunningham, W. A., Johnson, M. K., Raye, C. L., Gatenby, J. C., Gore, J. C., & Banaji, M. 
R. (2004). Separable neural components in the processing of black and white 
faces. Psychological Science, 15, 806-813.
Dambrun, M., & Guimond, S. (2004). Implicit and explicit measures of prejudice and 
stereotyping: Do they assess the same underlying knowledge structure? European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 663-676.
Dasgupta, N. G., & Greenwald, A. G. (2001). On the malleability of automatic attitudes: 
Combating automatic prejudice with images of admired and disliked individuals. 
Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 81, 800-814.
Dasgupta, N. G, McGhee, D.E., Greenwald, A.G., & Banaji, M.R. (2000). Automatic 
preference for White Americans: Eliminating the familiarity explanation. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 316-328.
Dawes, R. M. (1972). Fundamentals of attitude measurement. New York: Wiley.
145
Dawson, D. L., Barnes-Holmes, D., Greswell, D. M., Hart, A. J. P., & Gore, N. J. (2009). 
Assessing the implicit beliefs of sexual offenders using the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure: A first study. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and 
Treatment, 21, 57-75.
De Houwer, J. (2002). The Implicit Association Test as a tool for studying dysfunctional 
associations in psychopathology: Strengths and limitations. Journal of Behavior 
Therapy & Experimental Psychiatry, 33, 115-133.
De Houwer, J. (2003b). The Extrinsic Affective Simon Task. Experimental Psychology, 50, 
77-85.
De Houwer, J. (2006). What are implicit measures and why are we using them? In R. W. 
Wiers & A. W. Stacy (Eds.), The handbook of implicit cognition and addiction 
(pp. 11-28). CA: Sage Publishers.
De Houwer, J., & De Bruycker, E. (2007). The Implicit Association Test outperforms the 
Extrinsic Affective Simon Task as an implicit measure of interindividual 
differences in attitudes. British Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 401-421.
de Jong, P. (2002). Implicit self-esteem and social anxiety: Differential self-positivity 
effects in high and low anxious individuals. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 
501-508.
Devany, J. M., Hayes, S. C., & Nelson, R. O. (1986). Equivalence class formation in 
language-able and language-disabled children. Journal of the Experimental 
Analysis of Behaviour, 46, 243-257.
146
Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled 
components. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 56, 5-18.
Devine, P. G., Monteith, M., Zuwerink, J. R., & Elliot, A. J.  (1991).  Prejudice with and 
without compunction.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 
817-830.
Dickins, D. W., Singh, K. D., Roberts, N., Burns, P., Downes, J. J.,  Jimmieson, P., & 
Bentall, R. P. (2001). An fMRI study of stimulus equivalence. Neuroreport, 12, 
405-411.
Dugdale, N., & Lowe, F. C. (2000). Testing for symmetry in the conditional 
discriminations of language trained chimpanzees. Journal of the Experimental 
Analysis of Behavior, 73, 5-22.
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The Psychology of Attitudes. Orlando, FL: Harcourt 
College Publishers.
Eagly, A. H., and Chaiken, S. (2007). The advantages of an inclusive definition of attitude. 
Social Cognition, 25, 582-602.
Fazio, R. H. (2001). On the automatic activation of associated evaluations: An overview. 
Cognition & Emotion, 15, 115-141.
Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition research: Their 
meaning and use. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 297-327.
Fazio, R. H., & Petty, R. E. (2008). Attitude, their structure, function and consequences. 
New York: Psychology Press.
147
Fazio, R. H., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Powell, M. C., & Kardes, F. R. (1986). On the 
automatic activation of attitudes. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 50, 
229-238.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behaviour: An 
introduction to theory and research. Reading MA: Addison-Wesley.
Gapinski, K. D., Schwartz, M. B., & Brownell, K. D. (2006). Can television change anti-
fat attitudes and behaviour? Journal of Applied BioBehavioural Research, 11, 
1-28.
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in 
evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. 
Psychological Bulletin, 132, 692-731.
Gawronski, B., LeBel, E. P., & Peters, K. R. (2007). What do implicit measures tell us? 
Scrutinizing the validity of three common assumptions. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 2, 181-193.
Gemar, M. C., Segal, Z. V., Sagrati, S., & Kennedy, S. J. (2001). Mood-induced changes 
on the Implicit Association Test in recovered depressed patients. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 110, 282- 289.
Grant, L., & Evans, A. (1994). Principles of behavior analysis. New York: Harper Collins.
148
Greenwald, A. G. (1989). Why attitudes are important: Defining attitude and attitude 
theory 20 years later. In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), 
Attitude structure and function (pp. 429-440). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-
esteem, and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102, 4-27.
Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., Rudman, L. A., Farnham, S. D., Nosek, B. A., & Mellott, 
D. S. (2002). A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and 
self-concept. Psychological Review, 109(1), 3-25.
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480.
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the 
Implicit Association Test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of 
Personality & Social Psychology, 85, 198-216.
Greenwald, A. G., Poehlmann, T. A., Uhlmann, E., & Banaji, M. R. (2009). Understanding 
and using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity. 
Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 97, 17-41.
Grey, I., & Barnes, D. (1996). Stimulus equivalence and attitudes. The Psychological 
Record, 46, 243- 270.
149
Guglielmi, R. S. (1999). Psychophysiological assessment of prejudice: Past research, 
current status, and future directions. Personality & Social Psychology Review, 3, 
123-157.
Hayes, S. C. (1989). Nonhumans have not yet shown stimulus equivalence. Journal of the 
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 51, 385-392.
Hayes, S. C., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2004). Relational operants: processes and 
implications: A response to Palmer's review of relational frame theory. Journal of 
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 82, 213-224.
Hayes, S. C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Roche, B. (2001). Relational frame theory: A post-
Skinnerian account of human language and cognition. New York: Plenum.
Hayes, S. C., & Hayes, L. J. (1989). The verbal action of the listener as a basis for rule-
governance. In S. C. Hayes (Ed.), Rule-governed behavior: Cognition, 
contingencies, and instructional control (pp. 153-190). New York: Plenum.
Hayes, S. C., & Wilson, K. G. (1993). Some applied implications of a contemporary 
behavior-analytic account of verbal events. The Behavior Analyst, 16, 283-301.
Holcomb, P. J., & Anderson, J. E., (1993). Cross-modal semantic priming: A time-course 
analysis using event-related potentials. Language and Cognitive Processes, 8, 
327–411.
Holland, R. W., Verplanken, B., & Van Kippenberg, A. (2002). On the nature of attitude-
behaviour relations: The strong guide, the weak follow. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 32, 869- 876.
150
Ito, T. A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). Attitudes as mental and neural states of readiness: 
Using physiological measures to study implicit attitudes. In B. Wittenbrink & N. 
Schwarz, Implicit Measures of Attitudes (pp.125-158). New York: Guilford Press.
Katz, D., & Stotland, E. (1959). A preliminary statement to a theory of attitude structure 
and change. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A study of science (Vol. 3, pp. 
423-475). New York: Mc Graw-Hill.
Kawakami, K., Dovidio, J.F., Moll, J., Hermsen, S., & Russin, A. (2000). Just say no (to 
stereotyping): Effects of training in the negation of stereotypic associations on 
stereotype activation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 78, 871-888.
Kendall, S. B. (1983). Tests for mediated transfer in pigeons. The Psychological Record, 
33, 245-256.
Kounios , S. A., & Holcomb , P. J. (1992). Structure and process in semantic memory: 
Evidence from event-related potentials and reaction times. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 121, 460–480.
Krech, D., & Crutchfield, R. S. (1948). Theory and problems of social psychology. New 
York: McGraw- Hill.
Krosnick, J. A. (1998). Attitude importance and attitude change. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 24, 240-255. 
Kunda, Z. (1999). Social cognition: Making sense of people. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
151
Kutas, M. (1993). In the company of other words: Electrophysiological evidence for 
simple-word and sentence-context effects. Language and Cognitive Processes, 8, 
533–578.
Kutas, M., & Hiliard , S. A. (1984). Brain potentials during reading reflect word 
expectancy and semantic association. Nature, 307, 1161–1163.
LaPiere, R. T. (1934). Attitudes vs. actions. Social Forces, 13, 230-237.
Lepore, L., & Brown, R. (1997). Category and stereotype activation: Is prejudice 
inevitable? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 275-287. 
Leslie, J. C., & O’Reilly, M. F. (1999). Behavior Analysis: Foundations and applications 
to psychology. New York: Psychology Press.
Likert, R. (1932). A technique for the measurement of attitudes. Archives of Psychology, 
140, 5-53.
Lillis, J., & Hayes, S. C. (2007). Applying acceptance, mindfulness, and values to the 
reduction of prejudice: A pilot study. Behavior Modification, 31(4), 389-411.
Livingston, R. W. (2002). The role of perceived negativity in the moderation of African 
Americans’ implicit and explicit racial attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 38, 405–413. 
Lowery, B. S., Hardin, C. D., & Sinclair, S. (2001). Social influence effects on automatic 
racial prejudice. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 81, 842-855.
152
Maison, D., Greenwald, A. G., & Bruin, R. H. (2004). Predictive validity of the Implicit 
Association Test in studies of brands, consumer attitudes, and behaviour. Journal 
of Consumer Psychology, 14, 405-415.
McKenna, I., Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2007). Testing the 
fake-ability of the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP): The first 
study. International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 7, 
253-268.
Montieth, M. J., Voils, C. I., & Ashburn-Nardo, L. (2001). Taking a look underground: 
Detecting, interpreting, and reacting to implicit racial biases. Social Cognition, 19, 
395–417.
Moors A., & De Houwer, J. (2006). Automaticity: A theoretical and conceptual analysis. 
Psychological Bulletin, 132, 297–326.
Moskowitz, G. B., Salomon, A. R., & Taylor, C. M. (2000). Preconsciously controlling 
stereotyping: Implicitly activated egalitarian goals prevent the activation of 
stereotypes. Social Cognition, 18(2), 151–177.
Myrdal, Gunnar (1944). An American dilemma: The negro problem and modern 
democracy. New York: Harper & Bros.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports in 
mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231-259.
Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2001). The go/no-go association task. Social Cognition, 
19, 625-666.
153
Nosek, B. A., Banaji, M., & Greenwald, A. G. (2002). Harvesting implicit group attitudes 
and beliefs from a demonstration web site. Group Dynamics, 6, 101-115.
Nosek, B. A., & Hansen, J. J. (2008). The associations in our heads belong to us: 
Searching for attitudes and knowledge in implicit evaluation. Cognition and 
Emotion, 22, 553-594.
Nosek, B. A., Smyth, F. L., Hansen, J. J., Devos, T., Lindner, N. M., Ranganath, K. A., 
Tucker Smith, C., Olson, K. R., Chugh, D., Greenwald, A. G., and Banaji, M. R. 
(2007). Pervasiveness and correlates of implicit attitudes and stereotypes. 
European Review of Social Psychology, 18, 36-88.
Nye, R. D. (1975). Three view of man: Perspectives from Sigmund Freud, B.F. Skinner, 
and Carl Rogers. CA: Brooks-Cole.
O'Brien, K. S., Hunter, J. A., Halberstadt, J., & Anderson, J. (2007). Body image and 
explicit and implicit anti-fat attitudes: The mediating role of physical appearance 
comparisons. Body Image, 4, 249- 256.
Orne, M. T. (1962). On the social psychology of the psychological experiment: With 
particular reference to demand characteristics and their implications. American 
Psychologist, 17, 776-783.
Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). The measurement of meaning. 
Chicago: Urbana.
154
Ottoway, S. C., Hayden, D. C., & Oakes, M. A. (2001). Implicit attitudes and racism: 
Effects of word familiarity and frequency on the Implicit Association Test. Social 
Cognition, 19, 97-144.
Paulhus, D.L. (1984). Two-component model of socially desirable responding. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 598-609.
Payne, K.B., Govorun, O., & Arbuckle, N.L. (2008). Automatic attitudes and alcohol: 
Does implicit liking predict drinking? Cognition & Emotion, 22(2), 238-271.
Peña, Y., Sidanius, J., & Sawyer, M. (2004). Racial democracy in the Americas: A Latin 
and North American comparison. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35, 
749-767.
Petty, R. E., Fazio, R. H., & Brinol, P. (2008). The new implicit measures: An overview. 
New York: Psychology Press.
Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Internal and external motivation to respond without 
prejudice. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 75, 811-832.
Power, P. M., Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2009). The Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) as a measure of implicit relative 
preferences: A first study. The Psychological Record, 59, 621-640.
Pratto, F., & John, O. P. (1991). Automatic vigilance: The attention grabbing power of 
negative social information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 
380-391.
155
Raja, S., & Stokes, J. P. (1998). Assessing attitudes toward lesbians and gay men: The 
Modern Homophobia Scale. Journal of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 3, 
113-134.
Rasinski, K. A. (1989). The effect of question wording on public support for government 
spending. Public Opinion Quarterly, 53, 388-394.
Reese, H. W. (1968). The perception of stimulus relations: Discriminating learning and 
transposition. New York: Academic Press.
Richeson, J. A., & Ambady, N. (2003). Effects of situational power on automatic racial 
prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 177–183.
Roche, B., & Barnes, D. (1996). Arbitrarily applicable relational responding and sexual 
categorization: A critical test of the derived difference relation. The Psychological 
Record, 46, 451-475.
Roddy, S., Stewart, I., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2010). Anti-fat, pro-slim, or both? Using two 
reaction time based measures to assess implicit attitudes to the slim and 
overweight. Journal of Health Psychology, 15, 416-425.
Rosenberg, M. J., & Hovland, C. I. (1960). Cognitive, affective, and behavioual 
components of attitudes. In C. I. Hovland & M. J. Rosenberg (Eds.), Attitude 
organization and change: An analysis of consistency among attitude components 
(pp. 1-14). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
156
Rudman, L. A., Feinberg, J., & Fairchild, K. (2002). Minority members' implicit attitudes: 
Automatic ingroup bias as a function of group status. Social Cognition, 20, 
294-320.
Rudman, L. A., Greenwald, A. G., & McGhee, D. E. (2001). Implicit self-concept and 
evaluative implicit gender stereotypes: Self and in-group share desirable traits. 
Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1164-1178.
Rust, J., & Golombok, S. (1999). Modern psychometrics: The science of psychological 
assessment (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.
Sidman, M. (1971). Reading and auditory-visual equivalences. Journal of Speech & 
Hearing Research, 14, 5-13.
Sidman, M., & Tailby, W. (1982). Conditional discrimination vs. matching to sample: An 
expansion of the testing paradigm. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of 
Behaviour, 37, 5-22.
Sue, D. W., & Sue, D. (2003) Counselling the culturally diverse (4th ed.). New York: John 
Wiley & Sons.
Teachman, B. A., & Brownell, K. D. (2001). Implicit anti-fat bias among health 
professionals: Is anyone immune? International Journal of Obesity, 25, 
1525-1531.
Teachman, B. A, Gapinski, K. D., Brownell, K. D., Rawlins, M., & Jeyaram, S. (2003). 
Demonstrations of implicit anti-fat bias. Health Psychology, 22, 68-78.
157
Teachman, B. A., Gregg, A. P., & Woody, S. R. (2001). Implicit associations for fear 
relevant stimuli among individuals with snake and spider fears. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 110, 226-235.
Thurstone, L. L. (1928). Attitudes can be measured. American Journal of Sociology, 33, 
529-554.
Triandis, H. C. (1971). Attitude and attitude change. New York: Wiley.
Vahey, N. A., Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2009). A first test of 
the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) as a measure of self-esteem: 
Irish prisoner groups and university students. The Psychological Record, 59, 
371-388.
Watt, A., Keenan, M., Barnes, D., & Cairns, E. (1991). Social categorization and stimulus 
equivalence. The Psychological Record, 41, 33-50.
Weisbrod, M., Keifer, M., Winkler, S., Maier, S., Hill, R., Roesch-Ely, D., et al. (1999). 
Electrophysiological correlates of direct versus indirect semantic priming in 
normal volunteers. Cognitive Brain Research, 8, 289–298.
Wicker, A. W. (1969). Attitude versus actions: The relationship of verbal and overt 
behavioural responses to attitude objects. Journal of Social Issues, 25, 41-78.
Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. P. (1997). Evidence for racial prejudice at the 
implicit level and its relationship with questionnaire measures. Journal of 
Personality & Social Psychology, 72, 262-274.
158
Wulfert, E., & Hayes, S. C. (1988). The transfer of conditional sequencing through 
conditional equivalence classes. Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 50, 
125-144.
159
APPENDICES
APPENDICES
Appendix A  The Discrimination (DS) and Diversity Scales (DV)
Appendix B  The Semantic Differential Scales
Appendix C  The Feeling Thermometers
Appendix D  The Internal and External Motivation to Conceal Prejudice Scale
Appendix E  The Behavioural Intentions Questionnaires employed in Experiment 
   7
Appendix F The Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT)-based and 
Education-based protocols employed in Experiment 7
Appendix A
The Discrimination (DS) and Diversity Scales (DV)
Please read each of the following statements and rate them as honestly as you can by 
circling the number that you feel is most appropriate on each scale.
Appendix A continued
The Discrimination (DS) and Diversity Scales (DV)
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The Discrimination (DS) and Diversity Scales (DV)
Appendix A continued
The Discrimination (DS) and Diversity Scales (DV)
Appendix B
The Semantic Differential Scales
The purpose of these scales is to find out your attitudes to people and so you are 
requested to rate how you feel. Please use your first impression and try not to figure 
out the “right answer” or the answer that makes most sense. Please work quickly by 
marking an ‘X’ in th3e place where you feel is most appropriate. All of your 
responses will remain anonymous and confidential
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The Semantic Differential Scales
Appendix B continued 
The Semantic Differential Scales
Black People
Friendly :__:__:__:__:__:__:__: Hostile
   -3  -2  -1  0   +1 +2 +3
Black People
      Honest :__:__:__:__:__:__:__: Deceitful
   -3  -2  -1  0   +1 +2 +3
Black People
            Lazy :__:__:__:__:__:__:__: Hardworking
-3  -2  -1  0   +1 +2 +3
Black People
      Peaceful :__:__:__:__:__:__:__: Violent
         -3  -2  -1  0   +1 +2 +3
Black People
 Bad :__:__:__:__:__:__:__: Good
-3  -2  -1  0   +1 +2 +3
Black People
Stupid :__:__:__:__:__:__:__: Clever
 -3  -2  -1  0   +1 +2 +3
Appendix B continued 
The Semantic Differential Scales
White People
Friendly :__:__:__:__:__:__:__: Hostile
   -3  -2  -1  0   +1 +2 +3
White People
      Honest :__:__:__:__:__:__:__: Deceitful
   -3  -2  -1  0   +1 +2 +3
White People
            Lazy :__:__:__:__:__:__:__: Hardworking
-3  -2  -1  0   +1 +2 +3
White People
      Peaceful :__:__:__:__:__:__:__: Violent
         -3  -2  -1  0   +1 +2 +3
White People
 Bad :__:__:__:__:__:__:__: Good
-3  -2  -1  0   +1 +2 +3
White People
Stupid :__:__:__:__:__:__:__: Clever
 -3  -2  -1  0   +1 +2 +3
Appendix C
The Feeling Thermometers
Appendix C Continued
The Feeling Thermometers
Appendix C continued
The Feeling Thermometers
Appendix D
The Internal and External Motivation to Conceal Prejudice Scale
Instructions: the following questions concern various reasons or motivations people 
might have for trying to respond in non-prejudiced ways toward Black people. Some of 
the reasons reflect internal-personal motivations whereas others reflect more external-
social motivations. Of course, people may be motivated for both internal and external 
reasons; we want to emphasize that neither type of motivation is by definition better than 
the other. In addition, we want to be clear that we are not evaluating you or your individual 
responses. All your responses will be completely confidential. We are simply trying to get 
an idea of the types of motivations that students in general have for responding in non-
prejudiced ways. If we are to learn anything useful, it is important that you respond to 
each of the questions openly and honestly. Please give your response according to the 
scale below.
Please read each of the following statements and rate them as honestly as you can. 
Answer every question according to the rating scale below.
1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9
   Strongly           Strongly
   Disagree           Agree
___1 Because of today’s PC (Politically Correct) standards I try to appear non-
prejudiced toward Black people.
___2 I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways toward Black people because it is 
personally important to me.
___3           Being non-prejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept.
___4 I try to hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid 
negative reactions from others.
___5 If I acted prejudiced toward Black people, I would be concerned that others 
would be angry with me.
___6 Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black 
people is wrong.
___7 I attempt to appear non-prejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid 
disapproval from others.
___8           According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is 
OK.
___9 I try to act non-prejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from 
others.
___10 I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be non-prejudiced toward Black 
people.
Appendix E
The Behavioural Intentions Questionnaires employed in Experiment 7
Based on the photograph of the female presented above, how likely is it that you would:
1.  want to get to know Her better?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
           Very Unlikely               Neutral                          Very Likely
2.  ask Her if you could copy her notes from a class you   missed?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
             Very Unlikely               Neutral                   Very Likely
3.  want to work on a class project with Her?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
            Very Unlikely               Neutral                        Very Likely
4.  invite Her to a study group for an exam?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
          Very Unlikely               Neutral                                   Very Likely
5.  want to become friends with Her?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
         Very Unlikely               Neutral                 Very Likely
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The Behavioural Intentions Questionnaires employed in Experiment 7
Based on the photograph of the male presented above, how likely is it that you would:
1.  want to get to know Him better?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
           Very Unlikely               Neutral                          Very Likely
2.  ask Him if you could copy his notes from a class you   missed?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
             Very Unlikely               Neutral                   Very Likely
3.  want to work on a class project with Him?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
            Very Unlikely               Neutral                        Very Likely
4.  invite Him to a study group for an exam?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
          Very Unlikely               Neutral                                   Very Likely
5.  want to become friends with Him?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
         Very Unlikely               Neutral                 Very Likely
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Appendix F
The Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT)-based and Education-based protocols 
employed in Experiment 7
ACT-based protocol
The following information and exercises are going to deal with prejudicial thoughts and 
feelings.
Many people believe that prejudicial thoughts and feelings are the biggest barrier to a 
society that is accepting, inclusive, and benevolent.
Ask yourself if you would agree with that.
What I want you to do now is to take a look at your own prejudicial thoughts and feelings, 
in a different way than you may have in the past, and see what your experience tells you 
about what role that these thoughts and feelings play in your life.
The first thing I want you to do is turn your attention to your mind and your thoughts. 
During this exercise, I want you to focus on NOTICING and RECORDING the thoughts 
that your mind gives you, without trying to fight or change them. Do NOT censor 
yourself.  Whatever comes up is fine, just notice…
I want you to write down what comes to mind when you read the following…
Most white people are… _____________________
Most black people tend to…_______________________
Some racial slurs I know are…
___________________________________________________________
People who live in this country and don’t speak the language are…
______________________________
If I was the only person of my race in a public place, I would feel the most uncomfortable 
around people who were… 
________________________________________________________________________
Many blacks and don’t do well in school because…
__________________________________________
From time to time, white people can be…
__________________________________________________
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Some racially insensitive thoughts I have are…
__________________________________________________________
I wish black people wouldn’t… 
__________________________________________________________
What did you notice?  Reactions?  What do you think about that stuff?  Were you able to 
notice what your mind was giving you, the fact that thoughts came up?  Were you able to 
let stuff come up without censoring, fighting, changing?
Now I want you to write down what comes to mind when you read the following…
Mary had a little…______________
Blondes have more… ___________
There’s no place like…__________
Wow. How did that happen? Do you think that most people would have come up with the 
same answers?
What’s the deal with thoughts?  It seems like we go through life looking to our own 
thoughts as the authority on everything.  We take our thoughts VERY literally, use them as 
evidence that something is good or bad, or that someone is right or wrong.  
Only, as we just saw, it seems like a lot of our thought content is programmed in from past 
experiences.  Not only that, but once something is programmed in, it is unlikely to 
disappear altogether, so it is subject to the whim of your life.  You may have a whole host 
of experiences that could bring up this thought or that.  But because we don’t pay attention 
to the actual process of having thoughts, we don’t really see how random this is. Next I 
want you to do a little exercise and see if this doesn’t fit for you…
I want you to say and to remember the numbers, 1, 2, 3. What are the numbers?
- what are the chances tomorrow, next week, next year, even on your death bed that you 
will forget?
- all because some crazy psychology student put it in your head
-isn’t that silly, all that valuable brain space wasted?
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- but, what if we can take perspective, just notice our prejudices, become aware of them, 
and recognize that in some way they may be the same as 1, 2, 3?
What if it were the case that we were never going to be able to get rid of own prejudicial 
thoughts?
What if we could simply notice them, be aware that they are historical, and not buy into 
them? Would we need to get rid of them to behave in ways that are open, sensitive, and 
positive, towards others?
I want to make a distinction between having a thought and buying a thought. When you 
BUY into a thought, you look at the world from that thought, like looking through yellow 
colored glasses. When you simply HAVE a thought, you notice that your mind produced a 
thought, the process, and that you are not the thought, the thought need not necessarily be 
true, but rather just something that came up that may or may not be useful to pay 
attention to, like a pop-up add on a computer…
 
Imagine that you are applying for a desirable job. You’ve been out of work. Money is 
tight. You really need to get back to work. Get present with what that would feel like for a 
moment… You’ve met the other candidates and you’re sure that you are the best. Your 
resume is better, you interviewed well. You’re confident that you’re getting this job. Just 
get present with this for a moment, what that would feel like… Then you find out that 
you’re not getting the job, that the job went to another candidate, and that that candidate 
was a different race than you. Notice what happens in your body and try to sit with it, 
without changing it… 
Check in with yourself, what did you feel? ____________________________ 
What race did you picture the other person to be? _______________________
Now, imagine you are on vacation, having a fun time in a city you’ve visited in the past. 
Take a moment to get present with that…After a fun day, it’s time to go home, and you’re 
walking back to your hotel room. It’s late, though, so it’s dark.  You have some familiarity 
with the city, but you’re not entirely sure you’re going the right way. You may be lost. As 
you walk, many people are outside store fronts and buildings talking to each other and 
watching you as you go by, because you stick out, you’re obviously not from the city. Now 
imagine all those people are the same race as you. Take a moment to get present with this 
situation, and notice how your body feels… Now imagine that you’re walking, possibly 
lost, people outside are talking and watching you, and NONE of them are the same race as 
you, you’re the only one.  Now check in with yourself, take a moment, what’s happening 
in your body…what has changed?
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Reactions?  What did you notice?
_______________________________________________
Think about some of your own stereotypes or prejudices and write down what shows up 
for you below: 
It’s hard sometimes to look at the fact that we have emotional and cognitive reactions that 
we don’t want to have. We may think that that means something bad about us. Or we may 
use that to judge how open we are to other people, or how accepting we are. But, what if 
we could just notice and acknowledge these reactions, without attaching anything to them? 
If we could do this, maybe we wouldn’t need to get rid of them or unlearn them to 
BEHAVE the way we want with other people…
Let’s take a look at the issue of trying to control or change how we think or feel…
Don’t think of chocolate cake. . . 
Really, try your very hardest not to think of deep, soft, brown freshly baked chocolate 
cake. . . 
Try your best not to think of the smell and the taste of that cake. . .
Just try to do this for about 30 seconds or so. . .
What did you notice?
Perhaps you deliberately thought about something other than cake (e.g., a tractor). . .
“I Must think about a tractor…because it’s not cake.” 
But you had to think about cake, if only momentarily, to check that you weren’t thinking 
about cake!
 In fact, research says this type of thought suppression is impossible for more than a short 
while, and often causes the suppressed thought to show up more, and be more intense.
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So, what if, instead of fighting with these things, instead of using prejudices, stereotypes, 
and racist thoughts as evidence of problems with our selves and others, we could simply 
notice the process by which they come about, acknowledge that that is part of us, accept 
this, and choose to behave in ways that do no reflect those thoughts or feelings 
whatsoever?
It’s like your mind is a computer.  It constantly feeds you output, it never stops. “I’m 
hungry, what do I need to do today, I hope I see Mary today, I’m really ugly, When will I 
graduate, Should I work out later?” When you’re right up close to the monitor, you can’t 
see anything but the output. But if you stand back from the computer screen, you can 
notice that there is a difference between you and the output. You can watch it, see the 
process, call someone over and say, “Hey, look at that, that’s interesting.” Now imagine 
also that at this computer, various people sit down on it and program stuff in. Sometimes 
your parents are there, typing away, sometimes you friends, teachers, romantic partners, 
people in the media, songs you listen to, and so on and so on…The output comes from so 
many sources, we couldn’t possibly track how or why we think what we do.  Maybe if we 
stand back from the computer screen, we don’t have to.
What are the numbers??? 
Think of your own prejudices, evaluations, and negative thoughts and emotions. Is it 
possible to make a little room for them by stepping back from the computer screen? 
On the following page please summarise in your own words the main points contained in 
the foregoing information and exercises. Please feel free to add anything else that you feel 
is important or you want to say.
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The gap in Black-White views appears to be growing. While 85% of Whites believe that 
Black children have the same educational opportunities as White children, only 52% of 
Blacks agree with that statement (Tilove, 2001).
A human rights commission successfully brought a civil lawsuit against two Klan groups 
for harassing and threatening African Americans who had moved into an all-White 
housing project (Baldauf & Johnson, 1998).
The Supreme Court agreed to decide whether a suit involving “environmental racism” 
could be brought in federal courts. Chester, Pennsylvania, is a town of 42,000 (65% of 
which is African American) and has five major waste facilities. The rest of the country, 
which is 91% white, has 500,000 people but has only two waste facilities (Watson, 1998).
The poverty rate for African Americans remains nearly three times higher than that 
of White Americans (33.1% versus 12.2%), and the unemployment rate twice as high 
(11% versus 5%; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1995). Their disadvantaged status, as well as 
racism and poverty, contribute to the following statistics. About one third of African 
American men in their 20s are in jail, on probation, or on parole. This rate has increased 
by over one third during the past five years (Freeberg, 1995). Over 20% of black males are 
temporarily or permanently banned from voting in Texas, Florida, and Virginia because of 
felony convictions (Cose et al., 2000). The lifespan of African Americans is five to seven 
years shorter than that of White Americans (N.B. Anderson, 1995; Felton, Parson, 
Misener, & Oldaker, 1997).
Other health statistics are equally dismal. Twenty percent of African Americans 
have no health insurance (Giachello & Belgrave, 1997). About 40% of new AIDS cases in 
1995 were African Americans (Talvi, 1997). Rates of hypertension (National Center for 
Health Statistics, 1996) and obesity (Kumanyika, 1993) are higher than those of the White 
population. Although hypertension has been thought to be primarily biological in African 
Americans, psychological factors may also be involved. African Americans exposed to 
videotaped or imaginal depictions of racism showed increases in heart rate and digital 
blood flow (D. R. Jones, Harrell, Morris-Prather, Thomas, Omowale, 1996). Systolic 
blood pressure also appears to be influenced by response to discrimination. African 
Americans who responded by accepting discrimination showed higher blood pressure than 
did those who challenged the situation (Krieger & Sidney, 1996). Medical researchers 
(Ayanian, Udvarhelyi, Gatsonis, Pashos, & Epstein, 1993; Harris, Andrews, & Elixhauser, 
1997) have found that compared to White patients, African American patients were less 
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likely to undergo corrective surgeries or major therapeutic procedures. Since all had 
insurance coverage, the reason for the difference in care is unclear, although race-based 
decisions remain one possibility.
Please write down your immediate reactions to this information. . .
Now, please write down what you think it would be like to be a black person living in 
Ireland. . .
Although these statistics are grim, Ford (1997) pointed out that much of the literature is 
based on individuals of the lower social class who are on welfare or unemployed, and not 
enough is based on other segments of the African American population. This focus on one 
segment of African Americans masks the great diversity that exists among African 
Americans, who may vary greatly from one another on factors such as socioeconomic 
status, educational level, cultural identity, family structure, and reaction to racism. More 
than one third of African Americans are now middle-class or higher. They tend to be well-
educated, married homeowners. In 1989, one out of seven African American families had 
an income of $50,000 or higher (Hildebrand, Phenice, Gray, & Hines, 1997). These are 
important distinctions. Many middle- and upper-class African Americans are receptive to 
the values of the dominant society, believe that advances can be made through hard work, 
feel that race has a relative rather than a pervasive influence in their lives, and embrace 
their heritage. However, they may feel bicultural stress. As Leanita McClain, the first
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African American elected to the Board of Directors of the Chicago Tribune, reported,
I run a gauntlet between two worlds, and I am cursed and blessed by both. I travel, 
observe, and take part in both; I can also be used by both. I am a rope in a tug of war… 
Whites won’t believe that I remain culturally different; Blacks won’t believe that I remain 
culturally the same (Ford, 1997, p. 93).
 However, middle-class African Americans are also exposed to feelings of guilt for 
having “made it,” frustrations by the limitations imposed by the “glass ceiling,” and 
feelings of isolation. Often, upward mobility can produce unintentional effects, as shown 
in the following case study.
A 14-year old African American boy, Joseph, came into counselling because of feelings of 
depression and anger. His parents are professionals and moved to a predominantly White 
suburb. Prior to the move, Joseph attended a mainly Black school, where he received 
many awards for academic achievement. Since his enrolment in a primarily White school, 
Joseph’s performance has fallen. His teachers report him to be disruptive, off-task, and 
argumentative- particularly on issues of justice and minority groups. Joseph complains 
that they are insensitive and resents being the “expert” on Blacks. He has been asked why 
Blacks commit so many crimes and why they are so good in sports. He is also teased when 
he visits friends at his first school for speaking “proper English.” Joseph has stolen 
money from his parents in an attempt to “buy” friendship with his white peers. (Ford, 
1997)
The move from his predominantly Black school to one that is primarily White has 
exposed Joseph to issues of racism and the feelings of being different from both White 
Americans and African Americans. Issues of racial identity are also evident. It is also 
apparent that Joseph’s parents are not aware of the racial issues that have surfaced with the 
change in schools. These factors need to be addressed with both the parents and Joseph.
 
Ford (1997) believes that middle- and upper-class African Americans may suffer a 
negative impact on mental health from issues such as believing a double standard exists 
(having to work twice as hard to succeed); feelings of isolation (being the only African 
American in the organisation); powerlessness (given responsibility only on tasks 
pertaining to minorities); being an “expert” or a “representative” on minority issues (e.g., 
African American professors might be asked to teach multicultural classes even if it is not 
their area of expertise); and “survival guilt” in moving to a higher class and 
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neighbourhood. Because of this, middle- and upper-class African Americans may occupy a 
marginal status in which they are not fully accepted by White Americans and are rejected 
by African Americans. Please write down any ideas you might have for overcoming 
current or potential race-related difficulties in the Irish context. . .
 
Please summarise in your own words the main points contained in the foregoing 
information and exercises. Please feel free to add anything else that you feel is important 
or you want to say. . .
